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Abstract 
It has long been assumed that the distribution of power internationally – and in particular 
whether the world is dominated by one, two or many major powers – is likely to play an 
important role in world politics. The structural effect of what is known in the International 
Relations (IR) literature as the ‘polarity’ of any given moment has been a central theme in 
mainstream theories and across the discipline more widely. The language of uni, bi and 
multipolarity has also been common in public discourse for at least half a century. Yet there 
are at present competing perceptions of polarity across popular and scholarly discourse. Is 
the United States still a unipolar power? Are we currently in or about to enter a multipolar 
era? Or will the US-Sino relationship dominate world politics in the coming decades 
creating a new bipolarity?   
This thesis proposes a redefinition of the concept of polarity in order to be able to 
theoretically account for such competing visions of global order. It argues for the continued 
utility of the concept, particularly given its widespread use by practitioners and analysts 
alike, but that polarity analysis needs to be re-configured along more analytically eclectic 
lines than is the case in the existing literature. Using the English school of IR, the thesis 
builds a theoretical framework for redefining polarity, not as the distribution of material 
capabilities in the international system, but instead as the number of states that hold a 
particular status in international society. This allows for a theoretical discussion of the 
importance of perceptions of polarity and why this so-called ‘fact’ of world politics can be 
perceived differently by separate actors at the same time. This framework is then applied to 
the period of 1815-2012 in order to understand the difference this makes to a macro-
historical analysis of changes in the inter-state order.    
The historical analysis is used to demonstrate both the need for a new definition of polarity 
but also to draw a number of conclusions regarding the sources of perceptions of polarity. 
Ideas about the ability of agents to shape global structures and historical legacies relating to 
international status emerge as particularly important, reinforcing the need for ways of 
understanding structural power that capture its social and historical complexity.  
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
Thus it is possible...for the contemporary student or practitioner of international politics, 
contemplating the vast and amorphous world body politic, to distinguish the relations among the 
great powers as its essential skeleton. 
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (1977: 206) 
 
The problem for anyone who wishes to dismiss the importance of power is that the evidence 
consistently indicates that statesmen attach immense importance to it. The problem for anyone who 
wishes to establish the importance of power is that the concept is ambiguous enough to support 
seemingly contradictory generalizations. Statesmen can perceive equilibrium and hegemony 
simultaneously.  
William Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance (1993: 138).  
 
 
The politics of the major powers has, and continues to be, one of the abiding concerns for 
scholars of world politics. This thesis challenges one of the dominant ways of thinking 
about great power politics – the concept of polarity – in the International Relations (IR) 
literature, and proposes a redefinition in order to retain its theoretical utility. Using the 
English school of IR as a framework to re-think polarity, the thesis analyses almost two 
hundred years of diplomatic history with a view to highlighting the hitherto neglected issue 
of breakdowns in collective perceptions of world order.    
The research starts from the premise, prevalent in much of the existing IR literature, that 
three different forms of polarity (the number of great/superpowers or ‘poles’ of power at 
any given time)1 have existed in history and can exist theoretically: Unipolarity (one pole), 
bipolarity (two poles) and multipolarity (three or more poles). Whilst polarity can be used to 
describe the number of particularly powerful states in both global systems and regional sub-
systems, of interest here is global polarity.2  
                                                     
1
 A full discussion of the issues around defining polarity and what is meant by a ‘pole of power’ is 
provided in Chapter Two. The term ‘great/superpowers’ is used throughout the thesis as it will 
depend on whether a multipolar order (which therefore includes great powers and no superpowers) 
or a bi or unipolar order (which includes superpowers) exists at any one time (see the discussion of 
‘complex polarity theory’ in Chapter Two).  
2
 The terms polarity and global polarity will be used interchangeably throughout. Unless otherwise 
stated, the term polarity should be understood as referring to global or international polarity.  
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The central task here is to outline and then apply a new definition of polarity that can take 
account of both the material and ideational aspects of power and that has a much closer 
resemblance to the way the concept is used in practice. The research uses the concept of 
polarity not so much as a material fact but as a socially transmuted and understood concept 
which effects the interactions of the members of international society.3  
Specifically, this thesis analyses periods in history in which changes in perceptions of the 
number of great powers that exist on the part of decision makers and analysts, in order to 
demonstrate the need for a more nuanced approach to this issue. It uses the English school 
to redefine polarity, not as the distribution of material power in an international system but 
instead as the number of states that enjoy the special social status of great/superpower. In 
this sense, the research brings together the neorealist focus on changes in the number of 
major powers as a systemic variable with English school ideas about the role of the great 
powers as a social institution in international society.  
Part I of the thesis engages with the theoretical tasks of outlining the inadequacies of the 
current approach to polarity and designing a redefinition under the auspices of analytical 
eclecticism. Chapter One outlines the rationale for returning to the issue of polarity at the 
end of the first decade of the Twenty-first Century, and over fifty years since the term was 
first introduced into the IR lexicon. It argues for the continued utility of the concept but also 
for the need to re-think exactly what its main unit of analysis is in order to be able to capture 
the complexity of structural power at the international level. It discusses the fact that 
polarity can be perceived differently by different actors at the same time as a fundamental 
empirical puzzle which the current literature on the subject is unable to account for. Chapter 
One traces a growing consensus amongst many in the Constructivist and English school 
                                                     
3
 Throughout this chapter the concept of polarity will be discussed in relation to international society 
as opposed to an international system. This issues related to this are discussed at in Chapter Three. 
For the sake of consistency, the language of international society is therefore used throughout.  
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traditions about the need to establish ways of understanding polarity without abandoning 
their well-established critiques of neorealism (ie. the theoretical tradition with the greatest 
claim to the concept of polarity). It outlines what is at stake in redefining polarity as well as 
how this can be done using an analytically eclectic approach to theory with a particular 
focuses on historical case studies. By doing so, the case is made for a more nuanced and less 
materially-dependent version of polarity which captures the way the concept is used by 
practitioners than that which is offered by mainstream IR theory.         
Chapter Two explores in detail the existing polarity analysis literature in order to set out the 
starting point of any attempt to redefine this concept. It covers the questions of measuring 
polarity, the forms polarity can take and understanding changes in polarity. The discussion 
also outlines some of the central debates within the literature about stability, conflict and 
cooperation before interrogating the theoretical blind spot in relation to perception of the 
existing work in this area and discussing how the redefinition pursued in this thesis relates 
to this problem.  
A full theoretical framework is outlined in Chapter Three. It outlines the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological openings created by recent developments in English 
school theorising about historical and contemporary international societies. It discusses the 
particular benefits of using an English school framework for this kind of study over other 
analytically eclectic (or at least theoretically pluralist) contenders such as neoclassical 
realism and Constructivism as well as situating the analysis’ focus on diplomatic history and 
studies of perception in relation to the historical sociology and social psychology literatures.     
Part II moves the discussion from the theoretical literature to the historical record. These 
chapters provide the empirical data for testing the new definition of polarity outlined in Part 
I in order to see whether applying this lens produces a different history of great power 
politics than that of the traditional polarity analysis literature. Treating the 
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great/superpowers as a social institution rather than the sum of the distribution of material 
capabilities allows for a focus on the fragility of perceptions of polarity and directs the 
analysis towards a balance between ideational and material factors in examining the 
historical record of changes in polarity.  
Finally in Part III, we return to the theoretical discussion to draw out the major conclusions 
from the historical discussion of Part II for the ways in which we should expect polarity to 
shape world politics in the future. Using a more socially and historically contingent idea of 
what a pole of power actually is within polarity analysis, the thesis is able to provide an 
alternative historical survey of almost two hundred years of diplomatic history. This 
alternative reading of the rise and fall of the great/superpowers since 1815 produces a 
number of important findings about the sources of perceptions of polarity and what factors 
we can expect to shape ideas about the inter-state order in the future. These include ideas 
about human agency in being able to increase a state’s fortunes or reverse misfortunes in the 
international hierarchy. The historical analysis presented in Part II offers a number of 
examples where perceptions of current or imminent polarity have been influenced by the 
prestige of influential statesmen or diplomats, self-perceptions of ideological and other 
forms of leadership and proposals for domestic reforms aimed at reversing trends of 
material decline. In all of these examples, the idea that the distribution of power amongst the 
world’s ‘leading states’ is a structural condition which shapes the possible limits of state 
action is resisted in the face of perceptions about the ability of agents to shape their fate in 
the global order. 
Equally as important to prevailing ideas about agents and structures are the effects of 
historical legacies. The analysis of which states were and which states were not thought of, 
and therefore treated as, poles of power in international society repeatedly demonstrates that 
whether a state has been conferred with great power status in the past matters. In some 
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cases, such a legacy can be used to overcome a lack of credible material capabilities and in 
other cases it cannot. Yet what emerges as centrally important is that the force of historical 
legacies of great power status can be such that states will act as if they are major powers 
rather than as the ‘objective’ polarity of the day would force them to. Added to this are ideas 
about the ‘normal’ state of the structure of international society (such as the centrality of 
multipolarity and the balance of power to much classical international political thought) and 
notions of the cyclical nature of international history.     
Related to these ideas about the past is the importance of assessments of future order on 
how contemporary perceptions of polarity are formed. Collective narratives in global public 
discourse about the trajectory of certain ‘rising’ and ‘declining’ powers emerge from the 
discussion as being particularly influential.  
All of these findings from the historical analysis serve to demonstrate the benefits of 
shifting polarity analysis away from its traditional rationally-determined and materially-
reductionist roots. Using the established tradition within the English school for thinking 
about the great/superpowers as a social institution rather than a material ‘fact’ allows us to 
build a new way of applying the concept of polarity which is compatible with, and derived 
directly from, the historical record.   
Rationale 
The idea that the number of major powers that exist at any one time gives international 
society a particular structure is “one of those rare concepts used frequently in both the 
public policy and academic debates” (Buzan 2004a: 36). The language of multi, bi and 
unipolarity is frequently used to describe the distribution and effects of power, exercised at 
the global level, on state interactions on issues as varied as war and peace to economic 
cooperation to environmental stewardship. It provides a way of capturing one of the main 
currents running through not only the interactions of states but world politics broadly 
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conceived. 4  The polarity of international society is widely accepted by scholars and 
practitioners alike to be central to “simplifying the patterns of international relations” (Bull 
1977: 206) and making “socio-political interactions across state boundaries predictable and 
manageable” (Volgy et al.2009 : 3). Polarity is used in scholarship and policy analysis to 
not only identify which states sit at the top the global hierarchy but also to describe whether 
the order provided by major powers is characterised by complexity (multipolarity), 
symmetry (bipolarity) or singularity (unipolarity).      
While some scholars may take issue with the concept and the most ambitious aims for 
which it has been used (Wendt 1987: 338; Slaughter Burley 1993 217-18) nevertheless, the 
fact is that many of their colleagues continue to refer to polarity as not only a normal and 
unproblematic but also very important element of world politics.5 The importance of the 
continued use of the term is that it helps shape, often in a subtle and almost sub-conscious 
way, the conceptual framing of, at the very least, relations between states at the global level. 
One account goes so far as to say that “The central place of polarity in IR theory is such that 
it is commonly assumed that the appropriate way to study the world is to examine the 
impact of polarity first and then move on to other lesser factors to mop up any unexplained 
variance” (Legro 2011: 342). Some of the scholars using the idea of polarity in their 
analysis advise governments, inter-governmental organisations and multinational 
corporations directly. Others contribute to popular discourse through the media, influential 
blogs and books and journals aimed at a non-specialist audience.6 Even those scholars using 
                                                     
4
 This thesis will use the term ‘world politics’ to refer to the entirety of interactions between states 
and non-state actors on a global scale. While the focus of the analysis is on the hierarchical order 
made up exclusively of sovereign states, this hierarchy interacts with, and influences, more than just 
the actions of states.    
5
 For three recent examples which take the concept of polarity as a normal part of everyday life at 
the global level in their analysis of three different areas published in leading IR or political science 
journals see Conway and Singh 2011, Desai and Vreeland 2011 and Dubash 2012.  
6
 For example, the website of one such journal, The National Interest, has a whole section devoted to 
issues of rising powers, hegemonic decline and great power politics which is titled Polarity in 
International Relations, see: <http://nationalinterest.org/tag/polarity-in-international-relations>. 
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the concept in their teaching (whether explicitly engaging in polarity analysis in IR theory 
courses or simply using, for example the phrase ‘bipolarity’ to describe the Cold War in a 
course covering the history of this period) can be said to perpetuate the strength of the 
concept in terms of global usage.7          
Further to this, and perhaps most importantly, the concept is frequently used by practitioners 
in their public pronouncements. This applies equally to non-great powers as it does to those 
states which have the most to gain from depicting a hierarchical order of which they sit at 
the top. For example, Stephen Harper, who would go on to become Canadian Prime 
Minister wrote in 2003 that “The world is now unipolar and contains only one superpower. 
Canada shares a continent with that superpower” (Canadian Alliance 2003) and the then 
Russian President, Dimitri Medvedev was quoted in 2008 as saying that “the world must be 
multipolar. Single polarity is unacceptable” (Russia Today 2008). In 2012, The Economist 
quoted the British Foreign Secretary on a tour of India as saying that the world has “never 
looked more multipolar” (Economist 2012) which followed the concern expressed by the 
US Secretary of State three years earlier that the United States would need to shift the world 
“away from a multi-polar world and toward a multi-partner world” (Clinton 2009). Taking 
the use of the term by practitioners as their cue, scholars have argued that certain 
understandings of the polarity of international society help frame important policy choices 
(Buzan 2004a; Brooks and Wohlforth 2009). For example Stefano Guzzini has 
demonstrated that, 
Insisting on the unipolarity of the present international system...mobilises a justification for 
leadership and responsibility which, in turn, can justify the ‘inescapable’ and hence 
excusable, nature of unilateralism (and a consensus on multipolarity does the opposite) 
(2007: 36).  
                                                     
7
 It is worth noting that this is probably more true for polarity than many other concepts in IR theory 
given its close association with the single most dominant theory in the teaching of IR over the past 
half century or more – realism – (Smith 2000; Mearsheimer 2002) and in particular with the work of 
Kenneth Waltz who has been so influential as to have led Ken Booth to state that “the discipline 
defines itself in relation to the authority of his work” (2009: 179).  
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If our theories of world politics are to have any relation to practice, then the perceptions of 
policymakers and other practitioners in relation to the shape of the global order must be 
engaged with in some way. If practitioners continue to use the concept of polarity to help 
order the complexity of international life, then the concept will remain important to IR 
theory. Yet as the historical analysis in Part II demonstrates, practitioners have repeatedly 
expressed their views of the polarity of international society in ways which would appear to 
contradict one another. Therefore the central question that this presents, and which this 
thesis attempts to answer is whether polarity theory can be reconfigured in order to deal 
with such ambiguity, contradiction and complexity.     
What is variously referred to as Waltzian (after its original architect and symbolic 
figurehead, Kenneth Waltz), structural or most commonly, neorealism is the body of 
theoretical literature with which we would normally associate the concept of polarity. It is 
the neorealist body of work that has not only done the most to explore the concept and 
hypothesise its effects but also has placed it at the heart of its conception of the international 
system. Yet the overly deterministic and materially-dependent nature of neorealism (Ruggie 
1983; Cox 1981) results in a need to look further afield for a theoretical framework that 
allows for a more complete picture of the role of the great powers (and therefore the real 
impact of a change in their number) in world politics. The challenge for polarity analysis at 
the present time is that the world appears to be amidst a period of profound confusion over 
its current form. As is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six, the statements and actions of 
key actors could be used to depict a multi, bi or unipolar world depending entirely on whose 
perceptions are treated as being most accurate. Unsurprisingly, this puzzle is reflected in 
current IR scholarship as well. To give one illustration, in 2012, two major pieces of 
scholarship were published on the issue of global leadership and the exercise of the special 
10 
 
rights and responsibilities of the great/superpowers. One chose to focus exclusively on the 
United States (Bukovansky et al. 2012) in order to “shed original light on the social nature 
of American power, and how it comes to be variably instantiated in attempts to address key 
global problems” (22). The other, spoke of leading commentators “proclaiming the onset of 
the post-American world” (Kupchan 2012: 47) and argued that “the West should recognize” 
that its geopolitical leverage has “peaked” (168). The former was not in any way alone in 
depicting a world in which the United States is “not just an important actor but is also at the 
core of the system” (Narlikar 2010: 7) or in other words, unipolar (Brooks and Wohlforth 
2008; Hansen 2011; Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth 2011). The latter book too is not 
unique in depicting a world in which the idea that “America’s best days are behind it” has 
become widespread (Friedman and Mandelbaum 2011: 5) and that we are entering, if not 
already within, a multipolar era (Layne 2012a; Hurrell and Sengupta 2012; Held 2013).  
What this tells us is that the proposition that “one finds general agreement about who the 
great powers of a period are, with occasional doubt about marginal cases” (Waltz 1979: 
131), simply does not ring true. The question then becomes: if polarity in the contemporary 
era can simultaneously be perceived differently by different actors, has this happened in the 
past and what are the implications of this for the way we theorise about polarity? 
A great deal of scholarship has dealt with the shortcomings of neorealism as a full 
explanation of the dynamics of systemic politics (various contributors to Keohane 1986; 
Milner 1993; Hobson and Lawson 2008; various contributors to May, Rosecrance and 
Steiner 2010), including Kenneth Waltz’s argument about the need for a separate theory of 
foreign policy to explain why states still act in a sub-optimal way (Elman 1996). Writing 
years after the publication of Theory of International Politics (1979), which still stands as 
the ultimate statement of neo or ‘structural’ realist theory, Waltz wrote that “Just as market 
theory at times requires a theory of the firm, so international-political theory at times needs 
11 
 
a theory of the state” (1985: 331, emphasis added). However this was only ever a limited 
qualification. In the same piece he pointed out that while a state could act as it pleased under 
the constraints of a system’s structure, “It will, however fare badly if some of the other 
parties are making reasonably intelligent decisions” (331). However, unless the critics of 
neorealism are prepared to dismiss the central importance of the great/superpowers in world 
politics as well as the enduring use of the concept of polarity by practitioners, a way of 
theorising about polarity and power transitions that moves beyond the confines of 
neorealism is required.     
This thesis uses historical case studies to illustrate the enduring utility of polarity analysis 
for explaining some elements of state interaction by conceptualising polarity in a way that is 
attuned to both the material and ideational elements of power. In taking a holistic approach 
to using IR theory to build a framework for the study, this research will add to the 
burgeoning literature in the discipline that makes the case for what is being increasingly 
referred to as ‘analytical eclecticism’ (often associated closely with ‘theoretical pluralism’, 
although the distinction between the two is discussed further in Chapter Three). This 
literature (Little 2000; Katzenstein and Okawara 2001/2; Bellamy 2005; Sørensen 2008; 
Katzenstein and Sil 2008; 2010; Jackson 2011; Drezner 2012) – closely associated with 
Wendtian or ‘thin’ constructivism and the resurgence of the English school of IR – 
represents something close to a ‘middle ground’ between what has been labelled the 
rationalist and reflectivist approaches to IR (Smith 2007: 5). By, amongst other things, 
treating both material and ideational factors as equally important and moving between the 
‘levels of analysis’ of system, state and individual, analytical eclecticism explicitly 
preferences complexity and contingency over parsimony (Katzenstein and Sil 2010: 210).         
One of the other hallmarks of the kind of “complex causal stories that are cast at the level of 
middle-range theory” (Ibid: 208) of the analytical eclecticism project is a willingness to take 
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insights from more critical approaches to IR and apply them to the traditional ‘high politics’ 
questions of realism and liberalism (Solingen 2007; Paul 2009; Katzenstein and Sil 2010: 
82; Drezner 2012). Despite the many momentous changes in world politics that have 
occurred during the time period under consideration in this study (1815 – 2015) including 
the continued expansion of ‘European international society’ (Bull and Watson 1984), de-
colonisation, the intensification of processes of globalization and the rise to almost ubiquity 
of the ‘non-state actor’ (Josselin and Wallace 2001), this stratification between great powers 
and non-great powers has continued to be a central feature of the international system.  
Two examples – both of which are often used to demonstrate the inadequacy of state-centric 
approaches – illustrate this point: Firstly while many characterise the current period of 
world politics as being dominated by a so-called ‘war on terror’ (Youngs 2006; Jarvis 2009; 
Wittes 2009) which has elevated non-state actors to a central role in global political 
developments, the ‘terrorist threat’ that this war is meant to address is almost exclusively 
directed towards the US (the unipole), and to a lesser extent, its allies (Cox 2002; Jarvis 
2009; Rogers 2010). It is rare to find a current example of analysis of global terrorism which 
is not dominated by references to US foreign policy and counter-terrorism policy 
throughout. While the very nature of globalised terror networks may instinctively lead 
analysts away from the more conventional realms of great powers and polarity, the 
disproportionately dominant role of the United States in the debates around appropriate 
responses to terrorism (including political, legal and ethical issues), alerts us to the 
importance of the unipolar interpretation of post-Cold War world politics (Coletta 2007; 
Brooks and Wohlforth 2008). In fact, some would argue that almost the entire post-9/11, 
‘war on terror’ era has been dominated by a debate around the merits or otherwise of the 
way the United States has capitalised on its unipolar position (Walt 2005; Layne 2009).          
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The second example takes the other common way of framing contemporary world politics 
as being the “age of climate change” (UN 2009). Again, whilst the phenomenon of climate 
change might point to the increasing relevance of a ‘post-Westphalian’ analysis in that the 
politics of CO2 emission reductions involves important non-state actors such as 
multinational corporations, NGOs and scientific and other epistemic communities. However 
the much scrutinised fifteenth conference of the parties to the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change in December 2009 showed that whilst a multitude of actors now play 
important roles in climate politics, the actions of, and importantly the relations between, the 
great powers still play a disproportionately large role in shaping the outcomes in this area of 
international life (Lynas 2009; Dimitrov 2010).     
What is important to note here is that a state-centric approach does not necessarily imply 
reductionism or determinism. Perhaps the clearest statement of the need for contemporary 
IR to move beyond old debates about state-centrism and instead to understand that both 
mainstream and critical theories can be state-centric without excluding either the sub-state 
or the non-state world has been recently made by David Lake:  
State-centrism is not a statement about the empirical world. No one working in this tradition 
is so naïve as to mistake the billiard balls of state-centric theory as a description of states in 
the real world. Everyone recognises that states have rich and sometimes highly 
consequential internal or domestic political lives. Likewise, everyone accepts that 
transnational forces can affect international politics in important ways. To point out that 
domestic or transnational politics exists and is not captured in state-centric theory is not an 
especially useful criticism; most state-centric theorists would certainly agree (2008: 45-6).   
 
The argument that states remain particularly important for analysing world politics should 
not be taken to mean that other actors are unimportant or even as important. Nor does it 
mean that a study of this kind, which takes as its level of analysis the systemic relations 
between states, must take the view that domestic factors do not significantly shape state 
actions (in fact the focus on perceptions of polarity discussed in the next chapter puts 
particular emphasis on this).  
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The simple point of departure for this thesis is that while the relations between states 
remains an important factor in world politics, then the study of their social relations will 
continue to be a useful endeavour. In particular, until we reach an age where relations 
between states can be said to be genuinely non-hierarchical (see the discussion of the 
concept of ‘nonpolarity’ in Chapter Two), the study of which states are treated as great 
powers and which are treated as non-great powers will remain a vital piece of the puzzle of 
systemic analysis.      
While discussing polarity does mean privileging the major powers and their primary 
concerns in terms of the main focus of historical analysis, this does not mean that all world 
politics can be reduced to great power politics. Clark has described the way in which great 
power politics and hierarchy affects all states not just those in a privileged position in the 
global order: “Hierarchy…collectivises decision making within the rank of Great Powers 
while retaining the anarchical form of politics as between that rank and the others. From the 
viewpoint of the smaller states, power politics is in no way diminished” (1989: 3). 
Attempting to understand the way that the polarity of international society affects the 
interactions of states does not mean that which happens outside of the realm of the great 
powers – both in terms of states and non-state actors – is any less important to a full analysis 
of current world politics.  
Understanding the polarity of international society provides a way of capturing the shape of 
the global power structure in its most simple form. The ontological assumption (discussed 
further in Chapter Three) is that while practitioners use the concept as a frame of reference 
for their worldviews, theorising about polarity will remain an important task. Barry Buzan 
has noted that the concept of polarity has maintained an enduring and fundamental 
importance to capturing the major dynamics of world politics,  
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Despite both the descriptive and ethical challenges that can be put to it, and its failure to 
fulfil the more extreme ambitions for it, polarity has still been extremely useful in academic 
thinking about world politics and international security...Because it rests on a plausible 
claim to capture a fundamental feature of international politics, polarity offers a theoretical 
starting point from which one can build more nuanced analyses by bringing in other 
variables (2004a: 42-43). 
 
This quote points to the limitations of a standard materialist version of polarity. As Buzan 
argues, standard versions of polarity are “essentially a material view of the system, resting 
on relative accumulations of capability. Such an approach discounts the whole social side of 
life “(2004a: 42). Yet the standard version of polarity can “be combined with constructivist 
and/or English school insights into the social structure of international systems” (Ibid: 43) to 
give a larger picture. Such a conception of polarity becomes useful as a:  
Theoretical starting point because of the immediate way it bears on the relational logic 
among the players in the game of international politics. As noted, polarity does not always 
determine outcomes. But it is a very useful guide to understanding the logic of pressures and 
imperatives that are inherent in many situations, not just in military security, but also in 
diplomacy, international institutions and economic management (Ibid).   
 
Two main reasons can be presented for returning to the issue of polarity at present, one 
relating to contemporary world politics, the other, contemporary IR theory. In terms of 
contemporary world politics – or at least very recent world history – polarity seems to have 
found its way back on to the ‘international agenda’ whether we like it or not. This has 
happened in two ways. On the one hand, despite the predictions of IR theorists 
(Krauthammer 1990/91) US unipolarity has endured for twenty years and has had a decisive 
effect on international political life,8 on the other hand both the popular and academic press 
is awash with tales of new ‘rising’ powers bringing with them a return to multipolarity in 
the next few decades. The well documented troubles of the world’s only superpower (ie. the 
unipole) in terms of pursuing its interests and successfully remaking the world in ‘its own 
image’ have become apparent in many areas from security (Rogers 2008) to the global 
                                                     
8
 For a dissenting view, see Schweller 2010. This argument will be addressed in Chapter Two.  
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economy (Guerrieri 2010), prompting  a return to the language of multipolarity in the 
empirical literature (Bisley 2010). According to Alexander Lennon and Amanda Kozlowski, 
How China and India rise, how Russia reemerges, how Europe consolidates its experiment 
in shared sovereignty, how Japan chooses to define its international identity – and how the 
United States reacts to these developments – will shape the international system and the 
nature of international relations in the coming years (Lennon and Kozlowski 2008: viii) . 
 
John Ikenberry has described some of the central questions animating scholars and 
practitioners alike today in the following terms: “What is the shape of the coming system? 
There is a very strong sense that we are at a turning point, that the old order is giving way to 
something new” (2009) while Fareed Zakaria asserts that, “the fact that new powers are 
more strongly asserting their interests is the reality of the post-American world. It also raises 
the political conundrum of how to achieve international objectives in a world of many 
actors...” (Zakaria 2008: 37). Perhaps most forcefully, Stanley Hoffman has written, “Where 
are we going? We face two large question marks. First, is this global anomie temporary – 
and if so, what is it a transition toward: a renewed bipolarity? a global multipolarity? A fully 
asserted American hegemony?” (Hoffmann  1998:5).  
The second reason why polarity remains important is theoretical. After American 
unipolarity has endured for so long in practice (at least from the perspective of some 
scholars), recently IR theorists have returned to the concept of polarity by working 
unipolarity back in to the working assumptions of the theory that has most to say about 
polarity – neorealism (Mowle and Sacko 2007; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Ikenberry, 
Mastanduno and Wohlforth 2009a; 2011; Hansen 2011; Monteiro 2011/12). This theoretical 
development can be added to the larger move described above to apply the developments of 
the ideational turn in IR theory to more ‘traditional’ issues such as polarity.  Chapter Two 
contains a full discussion of the ways in which IR theorists have used (and misused) the 
concept of polarity to add clarity to the systemic level of analysis.  
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Returning to the well-trodden path of the rise and fall of great powers, even in the form of 
historical analysis, albeit using a novel theoretical lens, can provide important lessons for 
the future. Stewart Patrick has summed up the need for such research for current and future 
policy makers,  
As tough as it is to create new institutions, it is even harder to overhaul governance 
structures of existing ones to accommodate rising powers, much less eliminate obsolete 
institutions, given resistance from beneficiaries of the status quo as well as the bureaucratic 
interests of the institutions themselves (Patrick 2009: 80). 
 
What Patrick does not contemplate in this quote is the added complexity of the material 
power held by the status quo powers and their rising challengers only being meaningful in 
as much as it is interpreted in the social world. In this social world, which states are and 
which states are not great powers at any one time can be a matter of contention where 
perception and misperception are all important.  
Therefore, perhaps the rationale for this study can be most succinctly summarised by David 
Calleo when he writes, “When powerful and interdependent nations hold visions of the 
world severely at odds with one another, the world grows dangerous” (Calleo 2008: 63). 
Recent research linking the sociological concepts of social mobility and social competition 
to polarity has pointed to the increased level of competition between rising and status quo 
powers in times of transition (Larson and Shevchenko 2010b). This is well illustrated by 
Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko:  
Japan turned to imperialism in the 1930s after the failure of the Meiji-era social mobility 
strategy of emulating the values and institutions of Western powers. Despite its economic 
and military successes, Japan was not regarded as a true member of the great power club, an 
exclusion made clear to the Japanese by the Paris Peace Conference’s rejection of a 
resolution against racism that was proposed by China and Japan (72).  
 
This line of thinking fits with the overall argument of power transition theorists (Chan 2008) 
yet is not captured in the bulk of this literature given that it solely analyses material change 
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(de Soysa, Oneal and Park 1997) rather than the way “visions of the world” are expressed 
through words and actions.   
The assumptions and aims of this thesis can therefore be summarised as follows: 
• That the number of great/superpowers that exist at any one time continues to be an 
important factor in world politics, not least because both decision makers and 
analysts continue to describe international society in terms of its polarity; 
• That the existing literature on the concept of polarity provides a useful starting point 
for understanding the effects in changes between multi, bi and unipolarity but that it 
does not adequately capture the complexity of the social relations between states; 
• That by widening the theoretical framework within which ‘poles of power’ are 
analysed, a redefinition of polarity may be arrived at which can be applied to 
historical analysis in order to be able to theoretically account for the existence of 
differing perceptions of polarity; 
• That in doing so, it may be possible to bridge the gap between the way the concept 
of polarity is used by practitioners and the way it is treated in the relevant IR 
literature.    
The Importance of Perception 
The classical, materially-dependent view of polarity leaves no theoretical space for 
confusion or disagreement over polarity. In this view, polarity has nothing to do with status, 
recognition or perception but instead exists in a ‘real’ world defined by material power 
which is distributed amongst the states that make up the international system ‘out there’ for 
anyone to observe. Yet the picture appears to be more complex than this would suggest. 
William Thompson describes periods of “macro-structural change” where “distributions of 
power seem to be in flux” such as the early twenty-first century which leads scholars to 
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“disagree about the nature of the current international distribution of power and its 
implications for world politics” (2006: 1). Adam Roberts also describes the post-Cold War 
era as a “confusing and paradoxical” time resulting in “Babel-like confusion about how to 
characterize the contemporary system of international relations” (2008: 343). A number of 
examples demonstrate the extent of the confusion.  
Writing seven years after the demise of the Soviet Union and the labelling of the new era as 
unipolar (Krauthammer 1990/91), one account described two different schools of thought 
amongst Chinese policymakers. The first “still views global politics operating very much in 
the same way as in the Cold War era” whereas the other “considers that a certain type of 
multipolarity is emerging, marked notably by the growing competition among three 
economic blocs – North America, Western Europe, and a potential East Asia economic 
bloc” (Beylerian and Canivet 1997: 194). In other words depending on who you spoke to, 
one could get a description of the international system as either mutli, bi or unipolar all at 
the same time.   
As we shall see in Part II (Chapters Four to Six), such confusion and disagreement over the 
polarity of international society is more common in the historical record than one would 
expect operating under the neorealist assumptions of the traditional polarity literature. 
Whether during a period treated as uniformly multipolar such as the Nineteenth Century up 
to the end of World War II (McGowan and Rood 1975; Duncan and Siverson 1982; 
Saperstein 1991; Ikenberry 2011), the archetypal bipolar period of the Cold War (Wright 
1950; Wagner 1993; Thies 2012) or a unipolar period of “hegemonic dominance” such as 
the post-Cold War period (Ikenberry 2001b; Beeson 2007), the analysis points to 
perceptions of polarity being prone to significant fluctuations.  
An analytically eclectic (or what others might design as a theoretically pluralist) approach to 
polarity opens up space for such disagreement because the things being counted are not the 
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simply the sum of the material capabilities of the most powerful states but in fact the 
number of states that can be said to hold a particular social status. This social status is 
dependent upon a reciprocal construction: a state’s view of itself and the view of it held by 
others (Buzan 2004a: 61). Therefore polarity only exists in as much as it is perceived by the 
members of a social system and those members could, theoretically, perceive polarity 
differently at any one time and those perceptions can change over time.  
Existing Literature  
In essence, this research investigates the type of issue typically found in ‘mainstream’ IR 
scholarship. That is to say it is examining inter-state relations both in terms of the focus on 
great power politics generally and on polarity more specifically. As is outlined further in 
Chapter Two, neorealist theorists in particular have devoted a great deal of attention to 
theorising the effects of different forms of polarity on stability, war, trade and alliances. A 
standard neorealist hypothesis would predict either that: 
a) Following a Waltzian analysis (Waltz 1964; 1979; Levy 1985; Morton and Starr 
2001), a bipolar order will produce greater levels of stability and therefore fewer 
instances of conflict. This sort of system still contains the “least amount of fear 
among the great powers” (Mearsheimer 2001: 45) because of the roughly 
asymmetrical division of power between the two poles. However due to the tightness 
of the power configuration, the chances of overreaction and miscalculation are high 
in bipolar systems are therefore prone to periodic crises.    
 
Or 
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b) Following the work of Deutsch and Singer (1964; Mansfield 1988), a multipolar 
order is more stable and less war-prone. Largely due to the increase in dyadic 
relationships which in turn increases the range of possible interactions, multipolarity 
should discourage arms racing as well as slow down the rate of escalation in a crisis. 
A multipolar order would also be more likely to result in an increase in cooperative 
relations according to Grieco as “larger numbers would enhance the likelihood that 
the relative achievements of gains advantaging (what turn out to be) better-
positioned partners could be offset by more favorable sharings arising from 
interactions with (as matters develop) weaker partners” (1988: 506).  
What was once the under-theorised notion of unipolarity (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999; 
Mowle and Sacko 2007; Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth 2009a; 2011) can now be 
added to this with the recent work of Wohlforth arguing instead for the stability of unipolar 
arrangements (1999; 2009). Stability in a unipolar system is said to derive from the 
difficulties faced by potential challengers which discourages balancing and hegemonic 
challenges while encouraging bandwagoning, flocking and free-riding (Hansen 2011).   
Neorealists who have turned from their general preoccupation with war and conflict to 
cooperation have only added general and vague hypotheses on this question.  According to 
Peter Hass, neorealists predict that regimes will only persist “so long as such a power 
concentration exists; regimes will decline with the diffusion of international power” (Haas 
1993: 181). This is to be expected given that the rational calculations of decision makers 
would depend on their objective assessment of the inter-state order and whether they are 
likely to increase their relative gains under conditions of uni, bi or multipolarity.  
For those neoliberal institutionalists who do examine issues of structural power, the standard 
line of argument, aligning with the neorealist approach, generally referred to as ‘hegemonic 
stability theory’ maintains that cooperative arrangements will largely succeed under the 
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guidance of a hegemonic power which invests time, energy and reputation in building 
institutions if this power can recognise the benefits of the absolute gains made in doing so. 
In this line of thinking, hegemons will tie and enmesh themselves within institutions for the 
sake of providing system-wide order and therefore reducing the possible threats to the status 
quo in which the hegemon enjoys a privileged position (Ikenberry 2001a). Robert 
Keohane’s seminal work on cooperation “after hegemony” argued that even in a world 
without hegemonic leadership in which discord is ever present, a relatively high degree in 
some areas, principally in the economic realm, was still possible. This was not based on 
hegemonic dominance but inter-state cooperation based on regimes which reduce 
transaction costs and “create the conditions for orderly multilateral negotiations, legitimate 
and delegitimate different types of state action, and facilitate linkages among issues...” 
(1984: 244).  Guzzini (2006) has argued forcefully for the inadequacy and indeterminism of 
much of the literature associated with hegemonic stability theory (largely due to the 
rationalist and materialist biases inherent in neoliberal and neorealist approaches) 
particularly as it is used to describe US multilateralism. Even in as much as these theories 
have confined themselves to power (at least in the economic realm in which the lion’s share 
of the neoliberal institutionalist and regime theory literature is concerned) as understood as 
material preponderance (Keohane 1984: 32), contradictory arguments have emerged. 
Hegemony has been said to both facilitate multilateral cooperation (Kindleberger 1973; 
Gilpin 1975) and stifle it (Boniface 2001; Patrick 2002). This thesis joins Guzzini in 
questioning the usefulness of such parsimonious theories of power and cooperation that 
solely rely on a limited understanding of power and a “basic force model, in which 
outcomes reflect the tangible capabilities of actors” (Keohane 1984: 34). This undermines 
the “possibility of an overall concept of power necessary for polarity analysis” (Guzzini 
2006: 120) that could capture the complexity of a multilateral order based, at least in part, in 
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different perceptions of the power structure of international society. Structural power 
therefore, must be thought of as contingent upon the perceptions of actors who produce it by 
conferring on others the status of great/superpower or not and the factors that influence 
those perceptions.    
It is beyond the scope of this study to empirically test all the different theories found in the 
polarity analysis literature (balancing, stability, cooperation etc.) using the redefinition of 
polarity. What the thesis does, taking its cue from the English school, is provide a history of 
international society using one of its primary institutions as a lens in order to provide an 
alternative basis for conceptualising polarity. It applies an alternative understanding of 
polarity to the historical record in order to see whether we can understand history through 
the prism of a less parsimonious and quantifiable definition of structural power.  
Despite challenging much of the standard literature on the subject, this study explicitly 
focuses on the systemic level of analysis (albeit by combining it with the English school 
notion of what could be thought of instead as a societal level of analysis). In this sense, the 
research adds to the growing literature that takes the theoretical advances made by the 
‘ideational turn’ in IR of the 1990s and applies these insights to the traditional ‘high 
politics’ of mainstream IR (Buzan 2004a, Little 2007a; Booth and Wheeler 2008; Clark 
2009a; 2009b). At the same time, the focus of the research also clearly resonates with the 
renewed interest in systems theorising in IR which according to Mathias Albert and Lars-
Erik Cederman, has “fallen on hard times” as “the fashion today in IR is decidedly toward 
micro- or unit-level theorizing” (2010: 1). This despite the claim by Albert and Cederman 
that the need for systems theorising has “if anything grown...the world system is more a 
single ‘system’ than ever before, the structure and dynamics of which only a truly systemic 
perspective can fully grasp” (2010:1-2). The following chapters are an attempt to develop 
this perspective further by returning to the time-honoured arena for structural realist theories 
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– the poles of power in the international system – but in a way which does not search for 
regularities and invariant laws based on a limited understanding of power.  
Therefore this study searches for a way of engaging much more closely with the way that 
polarity is used by practitioners rather than being confined by the logics of abstract and 
parsimonious theories. When the publisher George Brockway wrote in the New Leader in 
1981 that “Our bipolar world is different from everything that has gone before” (Brockway 
1981) or when Chinese President, Hu Jintao spoke of the global trend “toward 
multipolarity” at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 (Hu 2012), neither made reference to the 
relative distribution of material capabilities. While some implicit measurement of material 
capabilities is undoubtedly inferred, this does not follow that their perceptions of a current 
bipolarity (in 1979) or an imminent multipolarity (in 2012) can be reduced to this. What 
they are fundamentally depicting is a world order where the dominance of the major powers 
is either split symmetrically in the case of the former or spread relatively evenly between 
multiple poles of power in the case of the latter. Because practitioners (including policy 
makers such as politicians and civil servants and policy influencers such as analysts, 
journalists, scholars and others) are basing their actions of an idea of the number of states 
who hold a particular status in terms of ‘high politics’ diplomacy, rather than a description 
of the distribution of capabilities (which theoretically may or may not align with this 
number) polarity analysis must find some way of reflecting this.           
While a full study that reconceptualises polarity along these lines and applies it to analysing 
the historical record has not thus far been attempted, a number of scholars in various sub-
fields of IR have pointed to the need for this kind of analysis. While some recent advances 
have been made in examining the ideational elements of status recognition, prestige and 
honour and their relationship with conflict (Ringmar 2002; Wohlforth 2009; Linderman 
2010), this has not been extended to the relationship to perceptions of power. Buzan’s book 
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on The United States and the Great Powers (2004) provides an important point of entry for 
this study by explicitly locating “polarity within a social context” (2004a: 3). Using 
Alexander Wendt’s typology of the potential relationships of states existing along a 
spectrum of friend-rival-enemy, Buzan combines a traditional materialist approach to 
polarity with a constructivist approach to identity. This is particularly important as he argues 
forcefully for the need to engage with the concept of polarity but in ways that capture the 
complexity of the social world inhabited by states. Yet this approach is still limited to 
arguing that “while polarity and social structure can and do interact in powerful ways, they 
are essentially independent variables” (183). Doing so allows Buzan to claim that within the 
structural constraints of the distribution of material capabilities, the identities of the major 
powers, and how they relate to each other (and the non-great powers) “is a key element in 
how one interprets the configurations of polarity” (28). However, this approach is ultimately 
inconsistent with a more powerful English school analysis (discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Three) in which the original distinction put forward by Hedley Bull between the 
international system and international society is discarded. 9  Only when this ontological 
move is made can we begin to get a handle on how to theorise about breakdowns in 
perceptions of polarity. Without doing so, Buzan’s approach, while opening up a 
considerable amount of theoretical space to discuss the social expression of polarity, still 
leaves the definition of what constitutes a great/superpower to realism.  
Realism does offer a powerful way of grasping the implications of “the role power 
relationships play in reconciling clashing interests” (Wohlforth 2008: 134) under conditions 
of international anarchy. However, by being solely situated within a realist framework, 
decades of scholarship on the issue of polarity has consistently suffered from the fact that 
realism on its own is unable to account for the social world in which those power 
                                                     
9
 Interestingly another work by Buzan (2004b) is one of the key texts used in Chapter Three to 
justify blurring this distinction.  
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relationships take place. In this sense, realist theories of power, including structural power, 
are fundamentally incomplete. Andrew Hurrell has noted that “It is one of the great 
paradoxes of academic International Relations that, because it so resolutely neglects the 
social dimensions of power, realism is unable to give a full or convincing account of its own 
proclaimed central category” (Hurrell 2007: 39; see also Schmidt 2007: 53 and Walt 2002: 
222). Clark has made a similar point arguing that despite the fact that when the distribution 
of power is analysed in theory it is almost always conceptualised in material terms, “The 
much harder challenge for IR theory is to make sense of a concept of the distribution of 
power that includes the complexities of that social purpose” (2009b: 477). In its framing of 
polarity in the context of its expression in international society, this thesis, to some extent, 
answers Clark’s challenge. By adopting an analytically eclectic framework which takes the 
focus on polarity from neorealism and combines it with the English school understanding of 
great power status as a key element of international society, it is able to move beyond the 
limits of realism’s materialist explanation of power.              
While for many years, the English school tradition was thought to accept the central 
assumptions of realism when it came to the dominance of the great powers (Dunne 2008: 
279), in fact the idea that polarity is first and foremost perceived by social actors has long 
been implicit in much of this work. Bull claimed that “The idea of a great 
power...presupposes and implies the idea of an international society” (1977: 202) and 
international society is derived from “the development among states of a sense of common 
interests in the elementary goals of social life” (Ibid: 67). Therefore international society is 
produced by its members (Ibid: 71) who in order to confer the status of great/superpower 
must first recognise any claim to such status (Ibid: 202). Adam Watson’s work (1992; 
Suganami 2005: 32-3) on comparative international systems hints at the need for analysing 
the social dimensions of polarity including perceptions or understandings of different forms 
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of international order (albeit characterised in a different form to the discussion here of 
polarity). In discussing Watson’s spectrum of order between multiple independencies at one 
end and empire at the other (with hegemony and dominion in between), Hidemi Suganami 
observes that Watson’s analysis of the factors that determine where on the spectrum any 
given system will be placed includes “the understanding, on the part of all concerned, about 
the legitimate structure of the system along the spectrum” (Suganami 2005:33).   
In a piece where he analyses the effect of what he calls the “social fact of unipolarity” 
Guzzini (2006: 133) has made a similar point arguing that, 
...because we have no objective measure of power, it is crucial to analyse the relationship 
between knowledge about power and politics itself. Like the national interest, balance of 
power arguments are part of the common language of the international society. It is 
important not just because theories are built upon it, but practitioners understand and base 
actions on it. This shifts the analysis of polarity arguments further, from what they could 
mean and explain to what their use, if shared, does not just to the common understanding, 
but also to politics and the social fact of power itself (Guzzini 2006: 133).    
 
Implicit in Guzzini’s argument is that despite the problems associated with neorealist 
polarity analysis, the concept cannot simply be abandoned. If practitioners “understand and 
base actions” upon an understanding of the world that includes some notion of the inter-
state order taking a particular form of polarity, then polarity analysis must be reconfigured 
rather than discarded. Jack Donnelly (2006) has provided perhaps the most succinct 
expression of how the great powers can be conceptualised in a more contingent and less 
materially-reliant sense: 
Not only the particular rights but the very existence of the Great Powers is constituted 
through the norms and institutions of the society of states. Unsurpassed power resources are 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for Great Power status – which is precisely that, a 
status, a rule-governed social relation involving functional differentiation, not just 
differences in capabilities. Great Powers are a socially constituted type of actor playing a 
particular (unequal) role in international society (2006: 153).  
 
Such an analysis of polarity and its effect on the actions of states builds upon recent work 
that argues that “polarity can only be useful if interpreted through the social structure in 
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which it is embedded” (Buzan 2004a: 15; Guzzini 2006, 2007) as well as the established 
work within foreign policy analysis (FPA) that focuses on how agents interact with 
structures (Jervis 1976; Wohlforth 1993; Levy and Ripsman 2009; Kim 2009). The FPA 
literature on perception and misperception in strategic relations between states provides an 
important precedent for focusing specifically on perceptions of polarity. Jervis’ work on this 
issue (whilst building on earlier work such as Farrell and Smith 1967) was pioneering with 
his 1976 book Perception and Misperception in International Politics still after more than 
thirty years being used as the major theoretical starting point for this area of scholarship 
(Fernández Sola and Smith 2009). In it he argued that “perceptions of the world and of other 
actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can 
understand” (3). The vast majority of the book focuses on unit-level variables and individual 
cognitive patterns but some of the ideas contained, for example on the ways in which 
“actors exaggerate the degree to which they play a central role in others’ policies” (343) 
have relevance for analysing differing perceptions of global polarity. This work made 
effective use of Kal Holsti’s earlier conception of “national role conception” (1970) which 
focused on elite perceptions of a nation’s role in the international arena (Hudson 2007: 24).  
The most important work within this literature for this study is that of William Wohlforth 
(1987; 1993; 2009). In particular his book length study of perceptions of the balance of 
power between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, The Elusive 
Balance (1993) and an earlier article on the perceptions of Russian power pre-1914 on the 
parts of Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia itself are relevant to the 
study of perceptions of polarity. Wohlforth argued that “perceived power is clearly an 
important medium – and short-term explanatory variable. In some ways, it links long-term 
changes in the distribution of power with short-term perceptual explanations of the onset of 
war” (1987: 381). His analysis of the lead up to World War I confirms Stephen Van Evera’s 
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earlier claim that misperceptions were the “taproot of the war” (1985: 116) and leads to the 
conclusion that it is “misleading to discuss the timing of the war solely by reference to 
systemic shifts in power as measured by numerical indicators” (Wohlforth 1987: 379).   
In The Elusive Balance Wohlforth examines the way American and Soviet perceptions of 
both each other and themselves diverged at critical points during the roughly forty five year 
period of the Cold War. By using historical research of the way decision makers and 
advisors spoke and wrote about the balance of power between the two superpowers he 
shows how changes in perception helped create four crisis periods; the immediate post-war 
period of 1945-47, the intensification of 1949-51, the series of intense crises between 1959-
62 and the final phase of “high tension” of 1979-85. From this analysis he concludes that  
Rapid changes in perceptions, the ambiguity of feedback, and the rarity and inadequacy of 
tests all translate into the prevalence of differences in perceptions of power among the major 
actors in world politics. The fact that even world war may fail to clarify fully the distribution 
of power must be regarded as the rule rather than the exception (1993: 301).  
 
If this is correct and war may not even clarify the polarity of a system then it follows that 
the peacemaking that follows war which could equally be looked to in terms of providing 
clarity to the question of who sits at the ‘top table’ or acting as a kind of polarity litmus test, 
will be similarly insufficient (Clark 2001).  
While Wholforth’s work on perception and power is about as close to an approach to power 
generally as is adopted in this study, it nevertheless is mainly focused on specific 
understandings of particular power relative dynamics in specific relationships – that is, he 
analyses shifts in the balance of power within a particular form of polarity. The focus here is 
to go wider and to analyse understandings of the polarity of the whole system (ie. the sum of 
all the power relationships in Wholforth’s analysis) across a relatively large period of time 
and to focus on changes (perceived or otherwise) of polarity.  
Redefining Polarity 
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This thesis advances a redefinition of the concept of polarity. The standard definition of 
polarity in the existing literature is “the distribution of capabilities among the major 
structure-producing states” (Grieco 2007: 65). Structural change therefore can be thought of 
in terms of “changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system’s units” (Waltz 
1979: 99).  
In contrast this thesis defines polarity as:  
The number of states perceived as holding the social status of great/superpower at any one 
time.   
This definition does not preclude material capabilities being important in determining 
polarity, in fact the analysis in Part II of this thesis demonstrates that they are centrally 
important. What the definition does is to abandon the notion that material capabilities 
singularly determine polarity. This is an important theoretical move as it opens up the 
theoretical space for ideational as well material factors to be important in constituting the 
polarity of an international system or society. It also creates the theoretical possibility for an 
empirical problem that is demonstrated to be historically important in the analysis in Part II 
– the breakdown of collective perceptions of polarity. If polarity is defined, as it is 
traditionally, as being the sum of the distribution of quantifiable attributes (military, 
economy, resources, population etc.), then there is little or no theoretical space for 
contradictory ideas of the shape of the international order being held by different actors at 
the same time (unless one assumes an informational problem in which different actors are 
unable to attain accurate data on those capabilities). The only way to be able to account of 
this phenomenon theoretically is by moving towards a position in which instead of using a 
“national accounting basis for polarity” one focuses on “the ability of a state to achieve and 
retain the status of being a consequential and independent actor in world politics even if 
others try to reduce that state’s importance or independence” (Grieco 2007: 70).   
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The working hypothesis of this research is that it is not changes in polarity per se that affect 
the form and function of international society but instead the degree of shared perception of 
the system’s polarity in the first place. That is to say, the consensus amongst members of 
international society as to which states should be considered a pole of power at a given 
moment in time and therefore how many exist at that juncture (making the system unipolar, 
bipolar or multipolar). Such an approach focuses both on perceptions of polarity itself as 
well as changes of polarity. This hypothesis would predict that when the this new definition 
of polarity is applied to the historical record, it will be possible to identify times of 
‘cognitive dissonance’ (discussed further in Chapter Three) in relation to the polarity of 
international society – when some members of international society view the world as 
being, for example multipolar while others view it as unipolar.  
Birthe Hansen has argued for the importance of studying times of transition between forms 
of polarity as “States may take risks out of fear or because they perceive a window of 
opportunity to obtain long wished for gains while everything is in a mess or because they 
want to prevent others from doing the same” (2001: 14). Hansen argues that changes in 
polarity can take the form of a process which plays out over several years and during this 
period “some units may react to or anticipate the development according to their particular 
perception of the time and the consequences of the change” (2001: 17 emphasis added). 
Again, Calleo illustrates well the contemporary relevance of a sensitivity to the dynamic of 
changes in perception of polarity: 
Periods of fundamental geopolitical change are particularly challenging, charged, as they 
usually are, with fanatical projects and frightening possibilities. Comprehending and 
mastering big shifts in historical forces requires creative leaps of national imagination. 
Today, with the world rapidly growing more plural in its distribution of power and wealth, a 
lingering unipolar world view isolates the United States from the reality to which it should 
be adapting (Calleo 2008: 63). 
 
This hypothesis adds an additional layer of complexity to this empirical study as it requires 
a theoretical framework that allows for an analysis of the ways in which material and 
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ideational change (in this case changes in the perception of polarity on the part of different 
actors) affects the interaction of states. This requires an understanding of the social dynamic 
of inter-state relations or what the English school of IR refer to as ‘international society.’ 
This framework is set out in Chapter Three.  
Case Studies 
In general, the standard history of changes in the global polarity tends to posit change 
occurring over fairly long time periods (decades rather than years) making a reasonably long 
historical timeframe necessary for this study. While it is possible, under the theoretical 
framework outlined here, to study perceptions of power (broadly defined) further back into 
world history with a focus on status in a social hierarchy, 1815 marks an important 
‘benchmark date’ (Buzan and Lawson 2012) for this study. As we are primarily concerned 
with the question of whether the concept of polarity can be re-defined by focusing more 
carefully on the social construction of the great/superpowers as the main unit of analysis, 
1815 stands out as the point from which polarity analysis is at its most useful. This is 
because the whole concept of a social hierarchy based upon great and non-great powers as 
distinct categories of social actors becomes institutionalised from this point onwards. Before 
this time older dynastic, religious and other forms of social hierarchies still persisted in 
various forms. As Hurrell has noted, “The replacement of older formal hierarchies by a 
hierarchy of power only occurred with Napolean’s abolition of the Holy Roman Empire in 
1800 and with the new forms of diplomatic precedence introduced at Vienna in 1815” 
(1999: 251-2). It is from the diplomatic watershed of the Congress of Vienna that the case 
study chapters begin. From this point onwards, right up to the current time, the concept of 
polarity as defined as the number of great/superpowers in existence at any one time, 
becomes one of the defining images used by practitioners and scholars alike to make sense 
of world politics. The Congress marks the high point of the institutionalisation of the 
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concept of great power management, a concept that has remained central to diplomatic life 
ever since (Ibid: 254). While the concept is closely linked to the concept of the balance of 
power which has a much longer history (see Chapter Four and Little 2007a; Little et al. 
2008), if the definition of polarity is linked to the notion of great power status, then 1815 
onwards becomes a manageable time period in which to study its effect.  
There are two reasons why this theoretical framework lends itself to more of an emphasis on 
historiography rather than deep empirical research. The first is one of practicality. To study 
perceptions of polarity requires long historical timeframes. While diplomatic history might 
be thought of as being dominated by the rise and fall of great powers, the fact is that ideas 
about order tend to fluctuate over years and even decades rather than weeks and months. 
Therefore the study of changes in polarity requires covering (sometimes many) decades of 
history and therefore makes narrative history which focuses on generalisations and large-
scale trends rather than very specific actions and interactions a more appropriate 
methodology.  
The second reason, related to the first, is that a theoretical argument if it is to be robust 
needs to be able to make sense in general and macro contexts rather than only 
geographically or chronologically specific ones. While this thesis argues for a more 
historically and socially contingent understanding of polarity, this does not mean that 
theorising about polarity must be reduced to the kind of specificity associated with FPA and 
area studies. To put it simply, while Part II will feature a good deal of analysis of the words 
and actions of politicians, officials and influential commentators, this data is still used to 
illustrate particular examples of perceptions of polarity within a wider historiography of the 
period in question. Rather than focusing on uncovering new sources and data somehow 
overlooked by historians, the empirical chapters of this study instead aim to tell an 
alternative history of the polarity of international society by applying a redefinition of the 
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concept of polarity itself. This new definition will be proved not only necessary but 
theoretically useful by the extent to which the standard account of the shifts between multi, 
bi and unipolar formations will be demonstrated to be at odds with international discourse 
and actions at the time.   
Organisation 
The following chapters will examine how analytical eclecticism offers a way forward for 
advancing polarity analysis in a less materially-dependent way before applying this 
framework to the case studies discussed above. Chapter Two discusses the concept of 
polarity in more detail in both theory and history. Chapter Three discusses in more detail the 
theoretical framework used for this discussion including the choice of English school 
language over neoclassical realism or Wendtian Constructivism as well as the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological implications of opting for an English school 
understanding of polarity. Part II (chapters Four-Six) provide the historical platform for this 
theoretical analysis to play out. Each chapter analyses the evolution of perceptions of which 
states could be thought of as holding the social status of great/superpower by using the 
public pronouncements of practitioners and analysts as well as state conduct (ie. which 
states are and are not treated as poles of power) as an index for this. It traces changes and 
fluctuations in perceptions of polarity through three periods of history. Each period, in the 
standard reading of the last almost two hundred years of history are normally associated 
with one of the types of polarity. Chapter Four analyses the (so-called) multipolar period of 
1815-1945, Chapter Five, the bipolar period of 1946-1989 and Chapter Six, the unipolar 
period of 1990-2012. Chapter Seven returns back to the macro-historical/theoretical level to 
draw out the conclusions of this research and looks towards the future in terms of 
perceptions of power transitions and their effect on international society.        
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If the US National Intelligence Council (2012) is correct in its assertion that the world is “at 
a critical juncture in human history”, due in part to a “tectonic shift” in global power, then it 
would appear that the time is ripe for returning to the issue of polarity. As the world 
continues to exist in a period of perceptual flux in relation to global polarity, having at least 
some sense of how we can understand this phenomenon theoretically and how it relates to 
our existing theories of IR will be of central importance. The following chapters are an 
attempt to add some greater clarity to this area of international life.    
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Chapter Two: Polarity in Theory and History 
 
Indeed, it took policy makers and analysts quite some time to grasp the fact of bipolarity. Serious 
postwar planning by the United States began in 1942. William Fox’s book, The Super-Powers, 
which introduced that term into the political lexicon, still assumed that there would be three of them.  
John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (1998: 125).  
 
 
This study starts from the position that changes in the number of the most powerful states in 
international society has been and will continue to be a centrally important feature of world 
politics for the foreseeable future.  This is an almost intuitive proposition given the way 
history has largely been told, rightly or wrongly, through the lens of the politics of the great 
powers. Even in a contemporary context when political life has become more crowded with 
a much wider range of actors the ‘big issues’ of our times from climate change to terrorism 
to the spread of HIV Aids to the development of new weapons technologies, reportage, 
analysis and debate is nonetheless dominated by the way the most powerful states react to 
and shape policy agendas around these issues. Yet before we can really understand the ways 
that the great/superpowers influence a particular issue we must deal with the issue of exactly 
how we know which states are and which states are not the ‘poles of power’ of the day.  
But to bring polarity ‘back in’ does not necessarily mean a return to old, and ultimately 
fruitless, debates of days gone by. Nor does it mean that a purely mechanistic or asocial 
view of the world must be adopted. This chapter deals with the ways in which the concept 
of polarity has been used in the past as well as particularly important issues around 
measuring power and defining ‘poles’ of power. This allows us to interrogate the traditional 
polarity literature in greater depth in terms of outlining the starting point in the IR literature 
from which we must depart. The chapter first discusses the place of polarity analysis in the 
literature, including the key debate over the issue of stability, as well as examining the 
ontological issue of the forms of polarity that have, or could, exist. This raises the issue of 
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measurement and the problems with analysing changes in and of polarity empirically. Using 
Buzan’s formulation of ‘complex polarity theory’ to disaggregate regional from global 
polarity and focusing on the importance of perception the chapter outlines the need for a 
version of polarity that is able to transcend the pitfalls of neorealism.    
Polarity in Theory 
Thinking about the structures or system-level features of world politics inevitably means 
engaging, at least in some degree, with the notion of polarity. Political and social analysts 
throughout history have agreed on the fact that the number of actors in a social system 
makes a difference to the dynamics of that system (Russet and Starr 1996: 93). To go a step 
further is to claim that the distribution of power (in whatever forms it takes) amongst those 
actors will make a significant difference to their relations with each other. A different way 
to frame this is to make the case that the degree of social hierarchy that exists between these 
actors (regardless of what that hierarchy is based upon) will also affect the way they relate 
to and interact with each other.   
Clark has described the inherently hierarchical nature of world politics as:  
a social arrangement characterised by stratification in which, like the angels , there are 
orders of power and glory and the society is classified in successively subordinate grades. 
This hierarchy is commonly assigned in terms of politico-military power, yielding the 
traditional groupings of Great Powers, medium powers, and small powers (1989: 2). 
 
For scholars of IR, of particular interest is the number of great powers or ‘poles of power’ 
that exist at any one time. The concept of a differentiation between great and non-great 
powers in the international system has therefore played a central role in the development of 
nearly all theoretical approaches to IR (Buzan and Albert 2010), with Carr describing the 
“dictatorship of the Great Powers” as being “a fact which constitutes something like a ‘law 
of nature’ in international politics” (1939a: 105). As Kenneth Waltz has so elegantly put it, 
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“for more than three hundred years, the drama of modern history has turned on the rise and 
fall of great powers” (Waltz 1993: 44).  
It has been observed that while the notion of polarity may have many critics it has no 
serious rival (Buzan 1995: 207). Exact definitions of the term vary slightly but it is 
generally taken to refer to the number of ‘particularly powerful’ states relative to the 
remaining states in the international system (Mansfield 1993: 106). While this definition 
could potentially be reconciled with the definition put forward in this thesis, the reality is 
that the vast majority of the work on polarity by IR scholars uses a highly restrictive 
definition of power (discussed further below). For example, for Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 
the “degree of inequality in the distribution of power” that creates polarity is reducible to 
“the potential ability to wage war” (1975: 189). In the existing literature, polarity therefore 
is, in its simplest form, a characterisation of the distribution of power (however it is defined) 
amongst the ‘great powers.’ It is said to structure “the horizon of states’ probable actions 
and reactions, narrowing the range of choice and providing subtle incentives and 
disincentives for certain types of behaviour” (Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth 2009b: 
5). Such a description of the importance of polarity instantly alerts us to the fact that the 
concept is unable to provide an all-encompassing grand explanation for the complexities of 
world politics. This means that its utility must be judged against more modest goals. While 
it may not be able to be used to answer every question relating to the great powers in world 
politics, it is a very useful basis on which to add other factors to build an answer (Ikenberry,  
Mastanduno and Wohlforth 2009).      
Identifying the polarity of an international system provides an avenue for clarifying the 
systemic ‘level of analysis’ in IR and what its structural effect might be on world politics, 
not least the foreign policies of states. The appeal of polarity as an organising concept when 
39 
 
analysing great power politics is captured by its adoption in discourse outside of the 
academic discipline of IR.10 As one account puts it, 
Whatever problems academics might have with it, polarity has been hugely influential in 
public debates about international relations. This success is not just confined to the Cold 
War, when bipolarity framed the bulk of the discourse, but extends right down to the present 
day. The unipolar interpretation of world politics has steadily gained strength in the public 
discourse, and has been much reinforced by the surge in US unilateralism following 
September 11 (Buzan 2004a: 45). 
 
Patrick James and Michael Brecher (1998) point out that academic debates around different 
polarity systems have been going on since the 1960’s citing Kenneth Waltz’s case for the 
stability of bipolarity (Waltz 1964), Karl Deutsch and David Singer’s criticism of this and 
their preference, following Kaplan (1957), for multipolarity instead (Deutsch and Singer 
1964) and Richard Rosecrance’s synthesising assertion about the stability of what he called 
‘bi-multipolarity’ (Rosecrance 1966). One of the reasons for the ongoing success of polarity 
theory in the academic literature from this time onwards was that it “tapped into older 
traditions of diplomatic analysis, international history and realism that also centred 
themselves on great powers, power politics and the balance of power” (Buzan 2004a: 36). 
Debates continued throughout the 1970s and 80s – particularly nurtured by the Journal of 
Conflict Resolution and the Correlates of War project which had been started in 1963 at the 
University of Michigan under the leadership of J. David Singer and Melvin Small. The goal 
of the project (which still continues today) was to contribute to “systematic accumulation of 
scientific knowledge about war” (Correlates of War 2012). This led a number of scholars 
associated with it to develop data sets relating to what they called “state-system 
membership” and the distribution of material capabilities amongst them. Particularly 
                                                     
10
 For example see Chirac (2000); John (2003); United States Department of State (2003); Keating 
(2008); Benner (2008); Hongmei (2009). The term has even been used in the popular press to 
describe Australian and Indian dominance in international cricket! See, Sinha (2008).  
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influential was the creation of the Composite Index of National Capability data set11 which 
measured states against six indicators: military expenditure, military personnel, energy 
consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population. Uncovering 
and analysing such historical data was prioritised over qualitative historical research in the 
project’s outputs as power was understood as a state’s capacity to “exercise influence and to 
resist influence attempts” (Singer 1987: 115) and therefore was treated as something a state 
possesses rather than something that is afforded them by others.12 It is interesting to note 
that whilst the importance of the relative distribution of power amongst states had been well 
understood by diplomatic historians before the onset of the Cold War, it is only since then 
that polarity has come to be explicitly studied in academic writing and used in public 
discourse. Two factors may be identified as being particularly significant in this. Firstly, the 
early Cold War period saw an upsurge in positivist theories of IR which attempted to 
emulate the precision and rigour of the natural sciences, a process that naturally encouraged 
quantitative analysis (such as measuring power and counting the number of great powers). 
Secondly, this period was characterised by a particular form of polarity, bipolarity, which by 
virtue of its more concentrated nature brought the issue to the forefront of public discourse 
via features such as arms racing, alliance politics and nuclear deterrence.    
Polarity and Stability 
One of the major arguments of those who have chosen to examine the issue of polarity is 
that there is a clear causal relationship between the polarity of the international system and 
the level of stability that can be observed at that time. As already mentioned, Waltz 
famously gave polarity a normative assessment as early as the 1960s when he argued for the 
stability of bipolarity (Waltz 1964). The essence of his argument rested on the particular 
                                                     
11
 This data is now included in the larger National Material Capabilities (v3.02) data set covering the 
period 1816-2001 and now including more than just the major powers.  
12
 It is worth noting however that the project has produced data sets on issues which can be used for 
such research including membership of intergovernmental organisations diplomatic representations.  
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way in which he thought states would balance each other in a bipolar world. Under 
conditions of multipolarity he argued, states will attempt to balance against each other using 
external means, primarily using alliances. This of course drew on the logic of the ‘balance 
of power’ often associated with the international politics of 19th Century Europe. 13  In 
contrast, Waltz claimed that bipolarity forced the two poles to try and balance each other 
through internal mechanisms such as domestic economic growth and technical innovation 
(particularly military technology). The difference in the two types of balancing for Waltz is 
that external balancing is much more complex and therefore uncertain and for Waltz (or any 
realist for that matter), uncertainty breeds instability and war (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 21-
41). Waltz also claimed that bipolar systems are also characterised by lower levels of 
economic interdependence (which he thought of primarily in terms of vulnerability) than 
multipolar systems which has a further stabilising effect on world politics as states will be 
less conflict-prone (Waltz 1979: Grieco 1997: 172).  
The vision of bipolarity being more stable than multipolarity in theory survived the collapse 
of bipolarity in practice at the end of the Cold War. According to John Mearsheimer, the 
events leading up to the two world wars of the Twentieth Century “amply illustrate the risks 
that arise in a multipolar world. Deterrence was undermined in both cases by phenomena 
that are more common under a multipolar rather than a bipolar distribution of power” 
(Mearsheimer 1990: 24).  
Mearsheimer’s thesis (building on the theoretical work of Waltz) was that given the 
likelihood of returning to a multipolar system, the world was in for a more violent and 
unstable future. Yet Vasquez argues that Mearsheimer’s work is fatally flawed in its failure 
to even acknowledge the existence of, let alone engage with, the large body of empirical 
work found in the peace studies literature which deals with the stability (or lack thereof) in 
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 For a comprehensive analysis of Waltz’s treatment of the concept of the balance of power in his 
classic book Theory of International Politics, see Little (2007: 167-212).  
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both bipolar and multipolar systems. According to Vasquez, even a cursory review of the 
historical evidence would at the very least raise serious questions about the validity of 
Mearsheimer’s predictions. He argues that while viewing the occurrence of conflict 
throughout the 1990s – the first Gulf War, the civil wars in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Somalia 
and Rwanda – as indicators of the instability of multipolarity might be psychologically 
persuasive, “it ignores the violent disturbances of the Cold War – the Czech coup, China, 
Korea, Hungary, Suez, the Congo, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Middle East, Afghanistan” 
(Vasquez 1998: 294).  
The vast majority of the literature on polarity and stability is unashamedly deterministic and 
reductionist. Relatively simple correlations are made between one form of polarity or 
another and stability on the one hand and instability on the other (Bueno de Mesquita 1978; 
Scarborough 1988; Copeland 2000; Mearsheimer 2001). Almost all decisions about war and 
peace can be reduced to shifts in polarity and this is the major determining factor in the 
outbreak of major conflict between states. However more recent approaches have tried to 
move away from this determinism and instead attempt to characterise their causal elements 
as “probabilistic” (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002; 2008) rather than universally deterministic. 
Under the theoretical framework outlined here, whether a strict determinism or a 
probabilistic approach is taken, the key element in terms of causality is not an ‘objective’ 
analysis of polarity but an historically informed understanding of perceptions of polarity.     
Forms of Polarity 
In contrast to many other conceptual tools used by IR theorists, there are relatively few 
ontological debates within polarity analysis.14 It is generally accepted that the polarity of an 
international system can take one of three possible forms. A Unipolar system has only one 
                                                     
14
 As is discussed below, a small number of works in the post-Cold War period have attempted to 
problematise the strict formulation of three categories of polarity described here. See Huntington 
(1999); Buzan, (2004a).  
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pole of power, a bipolar system is somewhat symmetrically divided between two poles and 
a multipolar system contains three or more (with there being, in theory, no maximum 
number of poles of power in a multipolar system).   
The fourth form that some scholars claim polarity can take is tripolarity. This is a more 
specific form of multipolarity made up of three poles. Whilst this configuration has been 
used in some empirical analysis it appears to have little theoretical utility as a form of 
polarity distinct from multipolarity.15 Not only does tripolarity simply refer to a particular 
form of multipolarity (ie. the smallest and therefore most concentrated form), it has rarely 
been used to describe the polarity of an entire system. Instead some have used the term to 
describe the distribution of power in a particular region – most commonly the Asia-Pacific 
region from the late 1960s until the end of the Cold War. 16 One of the key features of 
polarity, perhaps that which makes it a useful for analysing world politics generally, is that 
it measures the systemic distribution of power and not simply the distribution in a given 
region.17          
Finally, a small literature has recently begun to discuss the idea of what is referred to as 
nonpolarity (Haass 2008; Schweller 2010). According to Richard Haass, a nonpolar world is 
one which is characterized by “numerous centers with meaningful power” (2008: 44). Of 
particular interest is the spread of material power to non-state actors such as multinational 
corporations and international organisations. Both Haass and Randall Schweller have 
highlighted the way in which such a system tends to be less associated with order and more 
                                                     
15
 Randall Schweller uses the concept of tripolarity to provide a structural analysis of the origins of 
the Second World War (1993). 
16
 Michael Yahuda describes the period of 1971-89 in the international relations of the Asia-Pacific 
region as being tripolar with the three poles being the United States, the Soviet Union and China 
(1996). Yet Yahuda himself writes, “There is some merit in this view, but it should not be 
exaggerated. China did not carry the same strategic weight as the other two and its impact on global 
configurations of power was still quite limited” (77; also Segal 1982). Perceptions of China’s status 
in the 1970s and 80s are discussed further in Chapter Five.        
17
 This has not prevented some in applying the concept to regional settings (Ross 1999).    
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with randomness and entropy (Schweller 2010; Haass 2008: 52). While neither Haass or 
Schweller’s arguments for describing the current international system as nonpolar are 
convincing (both are in fact describing what would normally be categorised as unipolarity 
and a gradual shift towards multipolarity combined with the rise of importance of non-state 
actors which is conflated with the hierarchical ordering between states), there could, in 
theory, be something to this formulation. However a nonpolar world – where power is so 
diffuse that no set of states can claim a privileged status – could only be theoretically 
possible in a simple neorealist formulation where power is thought of solely in material 
terms and as something a state simply possesses rather than holds in relation to others. In the 
analytically eclectic version of polarity outlined in the next chapter, it is much harder to 
imagine a nonpolar world ever being possible because this way of thinking about polarity 
takes seriously the role of prestige, identity and status as well as the relational nature of 
power. To put it simply, until it can be said that in terms of social hierarchy the United 
States occupies an identical position to Vanuatu and China likewise to Estonia, nonpolarity 
is a highly unlikely empirical phenomenon which adds little theoretical clarity to analysing 
world politics. Even with the rise in importance of non-state actors from Microsoft to the 
World Trade Organisation to Al-Qaeda, the likelihood that states will continue to 
hierarchically organise themselves into great and non-great powers in their social relations 
with each other demonstrates the unlikelihood of a nonpolar world. Just because other actors 
rise in importance relative to states does not mean that the relations between states will not 
continue to be characterised by hierarchy and therefore (until the social institution of the 
great powers declines in practice) polarity.  
However there are further grounds for scepticism about the extent of the relative decline of 
states in relation to non-state actors for as Brooks and Wohlforth point out, “Most nonstate 
actors’ behaviours, moreover still revolves around influencing the decisions of states” 
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(2009: 56). The degree of novelty of the phenomenon of influential non-state actors, what 
Haas describes as a “tectonic shift from the past” (2008: 44) is also less than convincing, 
given that: 
…Nonstate actors are nothing new – compare the scale and scope of today’s pirates off the 
Somali coast with those of their eighteenth-century predecessors or the political power of 
today’s multinational corporations with that of such behemoths as the British East India 
Company – and projections of their rise may well be as much hype as reflections of reality 
(2008: 56).    
 
While arguments about the independent effects of, for example, inter-governmental 
organisations have been convincingly established (Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom 2004; 
Barnett and Finnemore 2005), rarely is this used to demonstrate the end of the hierarchical 
inter-state order. The diffusion of power to actors other than states does not necessarily 
make the relations between states themselves any less dominated by a small number of 
major players. Nor are the power relations between states, including their relative status, 
insignificant in shaping the influence of such organisations (Hurrell 2005).   
Interestingly, Schweller’s argument about unipolarity leading to entropy and therefore to 
polarity becoming “less meaningful” was anticipated five years before in William 
Thompson’s 2005 International Studies Association Presidential Address when he remarked 
that,  
Although a unipolar outcome, should one emerge, must be the product of structural change, 
it seems to encourage many onlookers to think that structural change has slowed to a halt or 
at least become suspended for a period of time (2006: 2).  
 
In other words unipolarity being taken to be a lack of polarity is simply misplaced analysis 
due to a flawed logic. For exactly the same reasons that Brooks and Wohlforth (2008) argue 
that the unipole has a unique opportunity to shape the structure and character of the 
international system – due to a fundamental lack of effective constraints – Schweller argues 
that a system process of entropy rather than the structure of unipolarity has come to define 
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the post-Cold War period. This is based on the idea that “boundless freedom breeds 
randomness” and that under unipolarity, “regional subsystems follow their own logic and 
that is where the action is” (2010: 150). Yet neither trait is reason enough to discard global 
polarity analysis. The degree of randomness exhibited by the United States in the post-Cold 
War period and other unipoles in other periods of history (Kaufman, Little and Wohlforth 
2007) can be disputed, particularly by the large literature analysing the greater degree of 
consistent unilateralism in US foreign policy in what Schweller is describing as a unipolar 
period (Dumbrell 2002; Walt 2005; Monten 2007). And whether regional subsystems can 
simply be said to follow their own logics with no significant interaction with either the 
incumbent unipole or its potential challengers as the system shifts towards either bi or 
multipolarity (the existence of which are still a bi-product of the unipolar structure) at the 
global level is clearly disputed by a number of analysts (Cederman 1994; Buzan and Wæver 
2003). Even the proposition that regional sub-systems are “where the action is” (as opposed 
to where some particularly important but far from where all the action is) is highly dubious 
(Buzan 2004a; Walt 2005; Hurrell 2006; Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth 2009a).              
Measuring Polarity  
Assessing and measuring power has proved a formidable task for the social sciences, 
perhaps none more so than for IR given that as one account puts it, “the majority of the field 
would support the assertion that power is the most central concept in world politics” (Stoll 
and Ward 1989: 1; see also Berenskoetter and Williams 2007). It is perhaps not surprising 
then that discussions about the distribution of power amongst the major players in the 
international system have been plagued by the issue of reaching agreement on the set of 
criteria used to decide whether a state is counted as constituting a pole of power or not.   
Much of the literature on polarity, unsurprisingly given its positivist assumptions, attempts 
to provide a rigorous set of criteria for making judgements on membership of a given 
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polarity structure. Yet in seeking to answer the question of exactly who is being counted as 
a pole and who is not, many theorists overlook the simple notion that a great power is 
precisely that because it is treated as such by its peers. That is to say, the criteria for great 
power or ‘pole’ status are not set by theorists but instead by states (discussed further in 
Chapter Three). Waltz expressed a similar sentiment when he wrote that the question of 
which states constitute polar powers is “an empirical one, and common sense can answer it” 
(1979: 131; for an example of the adoption of this approach following Waltz see Young 
2010: 5).  
This appeal to common sense has not however prevented significant debates in academic 
circles on how to characterise the polarity of a number of periods including both the Cold 
War and post-Cold War periods. Therefore a sizeable literature exists with aim of settling 
this question of measurement. Scholars (including Waltz) have provided lists of different 
sets of material indicators that a state can be judged against to determine its systemic status. 
Such lists usually include factors such as a state’s economic strength and the size of its 
economy, its military strength, the size of its population and geography, its natural resources 
and the level of internal political coherence and stability demonstrated by the state in 
question (Mowle and Sacko 2007: 19). Waltz quite clearly placed a higher emphasis on 
military and economic capabilities (with the former to some extent being reliant on the 
latter), but included in his own list population size, resources, political stability and 
competence (1977: 131). Others who have recognised the limits of this list have simply 
attempted to modify it by adding extra material capabilities (for example, Hopf 1991: 478). 
Jeffrey Hart identifies three main power indicators which can be measured to asses a state’s 
claim as a ‘pole’ of any given system: “resources or capabilities; control over other actors; 
or structural power (the ability to establish the rules of the system” (Hart 1985: 25). In 
discussing the three categories, Hart raises the issue that capabilities may not always 
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correlate with what he calls actualised power (27). He cites the three conflicts of 1948, 1956 
and 1967 between Israel and the Arab states as calling into question “the idea of an 
automatic or direct conversion process for generalized capabilities, since the victors scored 
lower on indicators of generalized capabilities than the defeated” (27). Interestingly for this 
study, Hart notes that capabilities don’t always translate into diplomatic leverage – even 
over close allies.18  
Michael Ward and Lewis House developed a somewhat more amorphous notion of 
“behavioural power” (1988). This is an attempt to indicate the ability of states to influence 
(either directly or indirectly) the behaviours of other states or as Ward put it more simply, 
“the ability to start trouble” (1988: 122). In this sense, states whose actions “preceded a 
great burst of activity on the part of other nations were by inference said to be behaviorally 
powerful” (Ibid: 122). The measurement of this behavioural power involves examining the 
flow of ‘influence attempts’ from one state to another through both multilateral and bilateral 
avenues. According to Ward, such attempts could include the use of legal instruments, 
diplomatic manoeuvring and personal “walks in the woods” (123). Interestingly, Ward and 
House also assume that behavioural power is essentially a zero-sum game. A gain in 
behavioural power for one state is always made at the expense of another. Such an approach 
resonates with the idea put forward in this study that the poles of power are the states which 
are conferred a particular status by others. Yet Ward and Lewis still conceive of power in an 
acquisitive sense – it is still something a state has to use when and how it chooses.              
The question of how power is measured is also raised by scholars who have defined polarity 
in terms of coalitions of states as opposed to strictly defining a ‘pole’ as an individual state 
(Singer and Small 1968; Stoll and Champion 1985). Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr 
                                                     
18
 Amongst others, Hart cites the example of Germany being unable to restrain its weaker alliance 
partner, Austria-Hungary immediately prior to World War I, assuming that it was in fact Germany’s 
intention to do so.   
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advocate such an approach, arguing that “to ignore alliance patterns or the formation of 
cohesive blocs, however, would be to characterize the international system as multipolar 
throughout the period from 1700 to 1945 and to ignore, for instance, the way the two 
opposing alliance systems became solidified and hostile before World War I” (1996: 94). 
Such a statement illustrates the degree to which polarity is often mistakenly conflated with 
the (somewhat confusingly titled) notion of polarisation (Buzan, Jones and Little 1993 49; 
Hart 1985: 31; Buzan 2004a: 4). In this distinction, the former refers to the number of poles 
in the system at any one time whereas the latter is concerned with the number of opposed 
coalitions in the system. Describing and analysing the degree of polarisation of world 
politics could of course involve both great and non-great powers and therefore take us 
further away from even the starting point of measuring the relative distribution of material 
capabilities amongst the major powers, let alone the definition of polarity outlined here. 
While it may add an interesting dimension to our understanding of the polarity of the 
international system (Morton and Starr 2001: 52), it is important that it not be confused with 
and therefore substituted for polarity. Waltz addressed the issue directly when he wrote, “an 
international political system in which three or more great powers have split into two 
alliances remains a multipolar system – structurally distinct from a bipolar system, a system 
in which no third power is able to challenge the top two” (1979: 98).             
Similarly to those interested in the degree of polarisation in the international system, 
analysts such as Edward Mansfield have pointed to the importance of understanding the role 
of concentration in discussions of polarity (1993). For Mansfield, simply measuring the 
number of poles in a system at any given time is inconsistent with the microeconomic roots 
of polarity theory (where unipolarity is akin to a monopoly, bipolarity a duopoly and 
multipolarity an oligopoly). Examining how concentrated power is in an international 
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system can therefore shed light on the issue of power inequalities amongst major powers (or 
poles).  
Mansfield cites other neorealist works such as Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Robert 
Gilpin, and John Mearshimer which stress the need to not only count the number of poles in 
the system but to also measure the distribution of power among them in order to arrive at a 
more complete picture of the dynamics of the international system (Mansfield 1993: 112). 
Others opt for a less complex formulation, such as Wayman (1984) who argues simply that 
the two largest states control at least 50% of the capabilities possessed by all the major 
powers then the system is bipolar, when that possessed by the two poles of power slips 
below the 50% mark, the system has become multipolar (Mansfield 1993:109). Whether 
polarisation or concentration are added to polarity analysis or not, the entirety of the 
literature on the subject remains focused on the capabilities (both hard and soft) possessed 
by states. 
The important point is that for the standard literature, “Political observers assess polarity 
objectively, just as they would count the major firms that constitute an oligopoly” (Mowle 
and Sacko 2007: 16). Material capabilities are viewed as an easily quantifiable standard of 
membership in the great power club. In addition to this, “there is a general tendency among 
realists to associate power with military might” (Schmidt 2007: 61). John Mearsheimer, for 
example claims that “To qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets 
to put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the 
world” (2001: 5). Leaving aside the fact that this runs in direct opposition to all the literature 
that discusses the links between the possession of nuclear weapons and great power status 
(Sagan 1996-7: 78-79; Ganguly 1999; Gartzke and Jo 2009)19 , this should provide the 
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 To some extent even Mearsheimer himself (2001: 224-32) links the possession of nuclear 
weapons to the behaviour of great powers (as expected by offensive realism) which makes this 
criteria for great power status somewhat problematic after 1945. If an existing great power possess a 
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analyst with a clear set of data to work with from which one can understand the polarity of 
the day – ie. the number of states that can be said to be able to meet this standard will tell us 
whether the world is uni, bi or multipolar.  
Yet the problem is, history repeatedly gets in the way. As Douglas Lemke points out,  
Surely China “put up a serious fight in an all-out conventional war” against the United 
States in Korea in the early 1950s. Yet China was not a great power, according to 
Mearsheimer, until 1991. Similarly, France’s fight against Nazi Germany in 1940 was no 
more serious than was Poland’s in 1939. If France was a great power in 1940, why not list 
Poland as a great power in 1939? (2004: 58-9).     
 
There must be something else at play that can account for this disconnect between theory 
and history when applying Mearsheimer’s criteria. Lemke even goes so far as to ask 
whether, in following the work of Jervis and particularly Wohlforth, it could be perceptions 
of military power that could be the appropriate unit of analysis. But again, this fails to 
provide a sufficient guide. Lemke notes that “in 1990 many estimated that the Iraqi army 
would be able to put up a significant resistance against a U.S.-led coalition. Based on exante 
perceptions of combat capability, Iraq qualifies as a great power in the early 1990s” (59). 
Beyond military might, there would appear to be some other criteria that state leaders and 
influential analysts and commentators use as their criteria for judging which states are and 
which are not great/superpowers.  
In his seminal War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin argued that as well as the 
distribution of power (by which he meant military, economic, and technological 
capabilities) (1981: 13), there exists a “hierarchy of prestige” amongst states (30-34). Gilpin 
claimed that prestige is distinct from power in that it, “like authority, has a moral and 
functional basis” (30), which is conferred by others and is therefore hostage to their 
perceptions (31-3). He even went so far as to describe prestige as the “the everyday 
                                                                                                                                                                  
medium-large nuclear arsenal, the ability to mount a serious fight in an all-out conventional war 
becomes an almost unobtainable and therefore meaningless objective for a would-be great power.    
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currency of international relations” (31). Yet ultimately, for Gilpin, prestige can be boiled 
down to material capabilities as, it’s its heart, it is “the reputation for power, and military 
power in particular” and is therefore “achieved primarily through successful use of power, 
and especially through victory in war” (31-2). Even when states such as Germany and Japan  
in the post-War era have managed to obtain a large degree of prestige based on economic 
power, Gilpin claims that this is at least in part due to an ability to be able to translate their 
economic capabilities into military power (33-4).  
Such a limited understanding of prestige leads us back to Mearsheimer’s problem of having 
a theoretical criteria for great power status that does not match-up to the historical record. If 
the prestige that a state is afforded as a great power (which can be traced to, for example, 
the states which are given special rights and responsibilities in international institutions) is 
based on military might and is known only when it is “tested, especially on the field of 
battle” (Gilpin 1981: 33), we would certainly not expect France or China to gain permanent 
seats on the UN Security Council in the aftermath of World War II during which they were 
militarily defeated and occupied. In fact we might hardly expect Britain to necessarily be 
afforded the same ‘prestige’ given its victory over Germany was by a slim margin only 
made possible by its combined efforts with the Soviet Union and the United States. Yet, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Five, both states were in fact treated as great powers in the 
immediate aftermath of the war by some actors and certainly viewed themselves as great 
powers for some time after. As we shall see in Chapter Four, a number of states were 
conferred with great power status of without holding much of a reputation for military 
strength (let alone meet Mearsheimer’s ask of a serious fight in an all-out conventional war 
against the most powerful state in the world) during the latter half of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.         
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The way that polarity is defined in this study relates most closely to the ‘counting of poles’ 
method as opposed to attempting to measure the relative distribution of capabilities. As has 
already been discussed, this study defines polarity as the number of states that are perceived 
at any one time as holding the historically defined social status of great/superpower.    
This leads us towards a preference for analysing polarity on the basis of which states were 
afforded great/superpower status in history over which states should be expected to be a 
pole of power based on the objective criteria discussed above. It also leads us naturally 
towards a focus on perceptions at the time as expressed in the words and actions of 
practitioners and commentators.  
Polarity in History 
While this thesis has purposely restricted its focus to the modern era, the concept of polarity 
has been used to describe power structures over a much wider period. One of the problems 
with analysing structures in world history is that the units of analysis have undergone 
massive changes. Are we to treat nation states, city states, empires and monarchies as like 
units across space and time?  
An initial step in answering this question is to examine the way that the theory as outlined 
above has dealt with this issue. As polarity is a concept almost entirely monopolised by 
neorealist theorists (in terms of both development and application), neorealism would seem 
the obvious starting point here. However this instantly presents a fundamental problem. As 
critics have consistently argued, neorealism is poorly equipped to deal with change (Ruggie 
1983; Ashley 1984; Kratochwil 1993) due to its emphasis on the continuities of world 
politics in an attempt to create a parsimonious grand theory. Both the international system 
and the most important units within it, states, are essentially taken as given. This allows 
neorealists to build a relatively parsimonious theory about the structure of the international 
system and how it affects the behaviour of states. Yet as Daniel Deudney has noted,  
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The failure of neorealism with regard to fundamental change is one of omission rather than 
of commission; it’s not that neorealists have sought to understand fundamental change and 
failed but rather that they have not tried (Deudney 1997: 92).     
 
This however has not stopped some writers applying neorealism’s insights to historical 
analysis of periods that pre-date the nation state (Wilkinson 2004). Arthur Eckstein’s work 
on the Hellenistic Mediterranean has attempted to follow “Polybius in offering a 
theoretically informed narrative of world-historical events” (2008: 27) by using 
neorealism’s emphasis on anarchy as an ordering concept to highlight the structural 
elements of Rome’s imperial expansion to the east. Similarly recent studies of the concept 
of the balance of power have used elements of neorealist theory to analyse the structural 
dynamics of political relations in pre-modern times (Kaufman, Little and Wohlforth 2007).  
Whilst there may be problems with using a theory that relies so heavily on static political 
forms across time to analyse world history there are certain elements such as the ‘logic’ of 
anarchy (Buzan, Jones and Little 1993) or the concept of polarity which may lend 
themselves to just such an endeavour. The reason that polarity may be usefully applied to 
analysing world politics in pre-Westphalian time periods is that there is nothing in the 
concept that restricts its use to nation states. In fact, there is nothing in the concept that 
prevents polarity from providing a lens to analyse interaction between unlike units in a 
system (a task made necessary by the non-linear development of political units in world 
history) (Little 2005). As Barry Buzan and Richard Little have written, “international 
systems can be constituted in terms of the interaction among unlike units, and the second 
tier can be opened up without moving away from Waltz’s idea that structure should be 
described in terms of the placement of units” (1996: 411) We can therefore describe a given 
period in world history where unit interaction (whether the units be empires, city states, 
kingdoms, nation states or combinations of these) is sufficient to be described as 
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constituting a system (or even a society) and falling into one of the three categories of 
polarity outlined above.  
The following examples illustrate the standard view of the occurrence of the three forms of 
polarity in history using the neorealist understanding of polarity as the distribution of 
material capabilities:      
Multipolarity 
A multipolar configuration is thought to be the most common in history and is closely 
associated with the idea of a global balance of power (Little 2007a). This particular 
distribution of power has included iconic formulations like the ‘Concert of Europe’ of the 
19th Century (McGowan and Rood 1975) and the interwar years of the 20th Century (Gowa 
1989). Stuart Kaufman and William Wohlforth describe the ancient Middle Eastern system 
at the beginning of the 9th Century BCE as being multipolar as multiple powers operated 
within it including Assyria, Babylonia, and Elam. As Assyria’s relative position increased 
the authors track a rise to unipolar status from 883-824 (Kaufman and Wohlforth 2007).  
Bipolarity 
The relative symmetry of bipolar orders makes them a particularly interesting phenomenon 
in world history. If order in world politics can be described as relating closely to the level of 
hierarchy on the one hand (in its most pure form centring around the power of a single 
political unit whether state, empire, world government or something else) and anarchy on 
the other (represented in its most pure form by the most even distribution of power and 
authority amongst the largest plurality of actors), then bipolarity would seem to be a 
somewhat quaint amalgamation of the two. The lion’s share of the literature on bipolarity 
takes the period of dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union of 1945-1989 as its 
empirical starting point (Goldmann 1972; Thies 2012) but other cases in history have 
56 
 
existed including the period of intense competition between Rome and Carthage in the 
ancient Mediterranean region (Deudney 2007: 153-155).  
Unipolarity 
Because of the single actor at the heart of a unipolar order, images from such times in world 
history are particularly potent. The idea of the seemingly unstoppable spread of the Roman 
model of political and social organisation (Eckstein 2008), the raw power of China in East 
Asia under dynasties such as the Qin (Hui 2005) and the image of so-called American 
‘coca-colonisation’ of popular culture in almost every corner of the globe in the late 
Twentieth Century are particularly evocative (Nye 200s).    
These different polarity formulations are said to have had important effects on alliance 
formation, war, trade, arms racing and other trends due to the theoretical expectations 
associated with each type. The important point to keep in mind here is that these 
formulations of polarity have been superimposed on history with the benefit of hindsight. 
For the way that this study re-introduces the concept of polarity (as the number of states 
who hold a particular social status) such retrospective categorisations of one period or 
another corresponding with a particular type of polarity holds little causal explanation. All 
that matters for the way polarity impacts upon political life in this study is how polarity was 
perceived at the time, not how scholars view it after the fact.     
Applying the Concept of Polarity across Time 
According to one account, the term ‘great power’ has been commonly used in diplomatic 
language since at least the mid-eighteenth century (Buzan 2004a: 58). Yet while the concept 
and the notions of ‘great power responsibility’ that go with it may be a feature of the 
modern Westphalian international order, it is clear from recorded history that varying 
degrees of hierarchy amongst large political groupings (including kingdoms, city states, 
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empires and nation states) have existed throughout different time periods and across 
geographic regions (Watson 2007; Kaufman et al. 2007). Whilst identifying the polarity of a 
political system at any one time provides a useful reference point for analysing the structural 
characteristics of the system there are many potential pitfalls in comparing forms of polarity 
across time.20  
To begin with, as international society has expanded geographically, the role of the great 
powers (or ‘poles’) has not surprisingly evolved in tandem (Bull and Watson 1984; Reus-
Smit 1999). One reason for this is the simple factor of an increasing number of actors 
interacting on an international level. It would seem most unlikely that a multipolar system of 
five great powers in an international society made up of ten states would function identically 
to one made up of 150. The sheer difference in the complexity of inter-state relations – even 
if what has been termed the “interaction capacity” of these states was minimal – between the 
150 as compared to the system of ten would make a difference to the nature of the 
multipolar structure of the system. A simple illustration of this would be to think of the 
relationship between polarity and balancing discussed above (in particular the claim that 
balancing in multipolar systems is largely done externally and therefore requires alliances 
with other states). It is very likely that alliance making in a system of 150 states as 
compared with a system of 10 would be quite different.  
An ahistorical approach (in the sense that it ignores the historical contingencies of a given 
era) to applying the concept of polarity would also be blind to the relationship between 
dramatic ideational changes and the distribution of power (whether it is solely defined in 
material terms or not). This would include things like the changing role of war or diplomacy 
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 For a useful discussion of this issue in the context of the study of international security that makes 
the claim that applying an almost ahistorical approach to applying the concept of polarity is 
particularly problematic see Buzan (1991a: 163-4). Importantly though, Buzan does maintain that 
the concept can still be very usefully applied to specific areas in strategic studies such as deterrence 
theory, alliance politics and arms control (166).     
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in international society across time. An English school understanding of polarity allows us 
to ask questions about the evolution of the primary institutions of international society and 
how the structural effects of polarity might be shaped by these larger societal changes. In 
the case of the institution of the great powers and the special rights and responsibilities 
conferred on them by the members of an international society, changes to this institution 
could almost be said to constitute changes to the very nature of polarity itself, although this 
of course would be denied by those who make the claim for a purely material measuring of 
polarity.  
Another crucial factor that may inhibit the simple application of the concept of polarity 
across time would be changes in technology. Given the crucial role of technology in 
material calculations of the distribution of power (including its role in both wealth creation 
and military superiority) dramatic changes in both innovation and production can be said to 
be a factor that would change the nature of polarity over time. The most obvious and 
perhaps dramatic example of this would be the invention of nuclear weapons in 1945 
(discussed further in Chapter Five). This change in the destructive capacity of military 
hardware had profound effects for the nature of the bipolar system of 1945-1989, not least 
in terms of military competition (ie. the nuclear arms race) and the balance of power (ie. the 
so called ‘balance of terror’) which have no precedent in earlier bipolar periods.  Similarly 
the changes in technology associated with the industrial revolution of the Nineteenth 
Century had profound effects on modes of production and therefore economic growth with 
direct consequences for which states rose to pole status (Buzan and Lawson 2012).  
Whilst placing limits on the type of questions one can ask about the nature of world politics 
by using the concept of polarity as a defining variable, these historically contingent factors 
do not however preclude polarity from being a useful point of departure for analysing 
particular trends in world history. That is to say, polarity may be useful starting point or 
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minimum condition of an international system at a given time that can be used to shed light 
on the relationship between the structure of the system and the actions and interaction of the 
units within it. A correlation drawn between the polarity of a system and a particular trend 
in international society does not mean that other factors (both structural and non-structural) 
have not played a part in shaping the agent-structure relationship but this does not change 
the correlation. An example from the existing polarity literature illustrates this proposition. 
The changing role of war in international society may have made war between the great 
powers more unlikely in general, but this does not change the proposition that if it is to 
occur it is more likely in a multipolar order than a bipolar one as is argued by Waltz, 
Mearsheimer and others. 21  Re-thinking polarity requires a greater focus on historical 
contingency and therefore when applying such an approach to empirical analysis, we should 
expect self-understandings and ideas about others in terms of historical status (whether a 
state has historically been treated as a great/superpower or not) as being important in 
shaping perceptions of polarity.  
Complex Polarity Theory  
One of the main empirical problems that scholars who have used the concept of polarity 
have come up against is the fact that definitions of great power status cannot be neatly 
applied at both the global and regional levels. That is to say, bipolarity as it was used to 
describe the Cold War era told us very little about the kind of role China played from the 
1970s onwards in East Asia (China’s global role at this time is discussed in Chapter Five). 
Unipolarity tells us little about the role of Saudi Arabia and Iran as the dominant powers in 
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 As Bull wrote in his discussion of the ‘institution’ of war in international society, “From the 
vantage-point of the individual state, war remains an instrument of policy, but one that can be used 
only at greater cost and in relation to a narrower range of purposes than before 1945...From the point 
of view of the international system, war remains a basic determinant of the shape of the system. But 
among the great nuclear powers it is the threat of war rather than war itself that determines the 
relationships” (1977: 194-6). It is argued by those who apply the concept of polarity that changes in 
polarity produce changes in the threat not the nature of war amongst the great powers.  
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the Middle East or Brazil and Argentina in Latin America today. Similarly, throughout the 
bipolar era of roughly 1945-1989 and the unipolar era of 1990 – to the current day it is 
rather difficult to effectively characterise the roles played by Britain, France, Germany and 
Japan under the simple concepts of bipolarity and unipolarity.  
As an answer to this problem, Buzan has outlined what he calls ‘complex polarity theory’ 
which, whilst keeping polarity analysis firmly focused on the global level, still takes account 
of two other forms of power (2004a). He does this by breaking the simple terms of great 
powers and superpowers into three categories: Superpowers, great powers and regional 
powers. 
Superpowers are entities which can project military, economic and political power across an 
entire system all the time. According to Buzan, compared to the other two categories 
superpowers must fulfil a much more demanding criteria not only about power projection 
but also relating to their legitimate status as global leaders as conferred by others. The 
existence of superpowers usually means that international society is either unipolar or 
bipolar, although it should theoretically be possible for a multipolar order to exist with three 
or more superpowers.   
Great powers by contrast need not live up to such demanding criteria. A great power need 
not have large capabilities across all sectors (eg. an economically powerful but militarily 
weak Japan or a militarily powerful but economically weak Russia) and also do not need to 
project power and wield influence across the entire world all the time. Yet they must project 
power and influence outside of their own region and act as an important global player. 
According to Buzan, “what distinguishes great powers from merely regional ones is that 
they are responded to by others on the basis of system-level calculations, as well as regional 
ones, about the present and near future distributions of power. Usually, this implies that a 
great power is treated in the calculations of other major powers as if it has the clear 
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economic, military and political potential to bid for superpower status in the short or 
medium term”  (2004: 69-70). This approach is easily compatible with the definition of 
polarity used in this thesis as Buzan is careful to note that it is how these states are 
“responded to by others” which qualifies them for great power status. While material 
capabilities are important in influencing these assessments, they are not ultimately what 
determine status.       
And finally regional powers are those whose capabilities and unequal social role “loom 
large in their regions, but do not register much in a broad spectrum at the global level” 
(Buzan 2004: 72). Buzan writes that “regional powers may not matter much at the global 
level, but within their regions they usually determine both the local patterns of security 
relations and the way in which those patterns interact with the global powers” (2004: 72). 
Like the step from great power to superpower, the clear implication is that a great power 
must first be treated as a regional power (Hurrell 2006: 8).        
This approach allows us to deal with the complexity of inter-state relations (to say nothing 
of relations with non-state actors) by acknowledging that sovereign inequality and varying 
degrees of hierarchy in world politics exist at both regional and global levels. Yet 
acknowledging the role of regional powers does not mean that polarity analysis has to say a 
great deal about the power configurations of diverse regions around the world. The polarity 
of international society refers to the first two categories – superpowers and great powers – 
that which make up the top strata of the global inter-state hierarchy.  
It also raises the possibility of these classifications being applied in a less than uniform and 
objective manner. While complex polarity theory on the one hand adds greater analytical 
clarity to our understanding of exactly what the poles of power in polarity analysis are, it 
also increases decreases the simplicity of the category. By raising the possibility that what 
one actor may perceive as a superpower could, in theory, be perceived only as a great power 
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by another, complex polarity theory, taken to its logical conclusion, suggests the likelihood 
of the kind of confusion and contradiction over the global polarity that was discussed in the 
previous chapter. In other words, by forcing the analyst to think more carefully about 
exactly how a state’s status matches up to its potential or actual peer competitors in a 
relational sense, complex polarity theory suggests that polarity is not simply an objective 
phenomenon but is first and foremost a perceptual one.   
Changes in Polarity  
A particular problem that emerges from the standard literature on this subject is the inability 
of analysts to agree on how to identify changes in polarity. The studies of bipolarity of the 
1960s and 1970s soon gave rise to a debate about whether the system could continue to be 
characterised simply as bipolar (as in public discourse) or whether the US in fact played a 
hegemonic role in world politics (usually associated with unipolar systems) or even whether 
an emerging multipolar order (usually involving the economic powerhouses of West 
Germany, Japan and the almost great power-like China) (Knorr 1966: 163-4) was taking 
form. A similar debate played out throughout discussions about the polarity of the 
international system following the end of the Cold War with some quickly predicting the 
return of multipolarity (Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Bykov 1994; Kegly Jr. and Raymond 
1994) and others finding more analytical purchase in looking through the lens of unipolarity 
(if even with the parenthesis of some kind of time limit) (Krauthammer 1990/1; Wohlforth 
1999; Mowle and Sacko 2007; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008; Ikenberry, Mastanduno and 
Wohlforth 2009a; 2011; both time periods are analysed in more detail in chapters Five and 
Six respectively). At least part of this problem would appear to be a degree of confusion on 
the part of many about the difference between the notions of polarity on the one hand and 
hegemony on the other.  In particular the term unipolarity is often used interchangeably with 
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the term hegemony. Thomas Mowle and David Sacko have captured the problematic nature 
of this confusion, 
While preponderant power concentration is a constituent element of hegemony, the concept 
of hegemony also assigns a particular role for the lead state...This is in contrast to 
unipolarity, which is simply a structural statement describing a specific power alignment. 
Whereas a hegemonic system requires the direct acquiescence of important domestic and 
international actors, a unipolar system does not (2007: 7).               
 
Using this distinction adds a qualitative dimension to what is essentially a quantitative 
description of the international system. This qualitative aspect, amongst other things, 
includes the issue of leadership and, importantly, acceptance of the legitimacy of this 
leadership by the members of international society (Clark 2011). A hegemon is generally 
seen as at least attempting to exert some degree of systemic leadership, a unipole does not 
necessarily need to take up the mantle of global leadership (even if it is most likely that it 
will do so).22 The English school approach to the units within polarity analysis – the poles of 
power – discussed in Chapter Three stands in contrast to Mowle and Sacko’s distinction 
given that the idea of a polar power being based purely on material factors is rejected. 
Instead the framework adopts Clark’s more expansive and theoretically coherent notion of 
hegemony (despite the fact that Clark still distinguishes between primacy and hegemony, 
2011: 34-50), which follows Gerry Simpson (2004) in associating hegemony directly with 
great power status. This means that hegemony can exist in multipolar forms as well (what 
Clark refers to as ‘collective hegemony’; see also Watson 2007: 74). What Simpson refers 
to as ‘legalised hegemony’ derives from “the existence within an international society of a 
powerful elite of states whose superior status is recognised by minor powers as a political 
fact giving rise to the existence of certain constitutional privileges, rights and duties (2004: 
                                                     
22
 However Robert Jervis claims that unipolarity still exerts a structural pressure that would seem to 
blur this more defined line between unipolarity and hegemony arguing that, “A dominant state 
acquires interests throughout the globe. Most countries are primarily concerned with what happens 
in their neighbourhoods, but the world is the unipole’s neighbourhood, and it is not only hubris that 
leads it to be concerned with everything that happens anywhere” (2009: 200).  
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68). Therefore, if polarity is the number of states who hold the special status of 
great/superpower at any one time, the existence of some form of hegemony is implied.       
The relationship between changes in polarity (both within the same configuration and from 
one configuration to another)23 and the occurrence of war is the main area of analysis of 
what has become known as the ‘power transition’ literature in IR. 24  This literature is 
particularly interesting amongst the structural accounts of world politics because it re-
introduces (to a limited degree) what Waltz called the ‘second image’ of his three levels of 
analysis, that of the state. Not going as far as liberal democratic peace theorists in discussing 
the impact of regime-type in the causes of war, power transition theorists add the distinction 
between status quo and revisionist powers to polarity analysis. The dichotomy between 
these two types of great powers, sometimes referred to as ‘satisfied’ and ‘dissatisfied’ 
powers allows for a more nuanced analysis of how the relative distribution of power in the 
international system relates to war. In essence the theory states that when relative power 
shifts in favour of a rising power or ‘challenger’ with revisionist intentions (ie. a desire to 
change the current international order in some regard) then war is likely.25 When in contrast 
the rising power poised to overtake the leader in the system is content with the status quo 
order this threat can be avoided (Chan 2008: 26). Others focused more on the role of 
declining powers rather than rising challengers in questions of stability and great power war 
(Copeland 2000).        
                                                     
23
 Changes within a polarity configuration tend to be most common in multipolar systems as great 
powers decline and other states rise to great power status.  
24
 It is perhaps not surprising that the power transition literature shares a somewhat similar history 
with polarity analysis. Both ideas emerged at about the same time with the idea being first 
introduced in 1958 by A.F.K. Organski, both were primarily developed and used by American IR 
theorists and both were particularly fostered by journals such as Journal of Conflict Resolution and 
International Security (Kugler and Lemke 2000; DiCicco & Levy 1999).     
25
 It should be noted that a revisionist state is said to be one that is not dissatisfied with its relative 
position in the international system vis-à-vis other states as this dissatisfaction would of course be 
alleviated by the power transition itself and therefore not be any more or less likely to cause a great 
power war. Instead revisionist states are driven by a “a fundamental objection to and challenge of the 
rules of the game, and not just how these rules can produce a different distribution of benefits” 
(Chan 2008: 30).      
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Early Twentieth Century European politics, including the origins of the First and Second 
World Wars, have been prime subject matter for analysts applying power transition theory 
to historical instances of great power wars (Stevenson 1997). This analysis would find that 
Great Britain could accommodate a rising status quo power in the United States but was not 
so sanguine about the rise of Germany either under the Kaiser or Hitler.26      
The power transition thesis has been similarly applied to cases as varied as war in the 
ancient Mediterranean in 201 BCE, the Napoleonic era, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, 
and the rise of China today (Eckstein 2007: 75; Kim 1992; Organski and Kugler 1980: 46; 
and Douglas Lemke and Tammen 2003).27 This has subsequently led to the development of 
‘hegemonic stability’, ‘hegemonic transition’, and ‘power cycle’ theories which build on 
this idea that “change in the relative power levels of states is an important factor in issues of 
war and peace” (Morton and Starr 2001: 51).   
Polarity, Perception and International Society 
Neorealist approaches have been described as being “strong on structures but weak on 
politics” (Deighton 1996). This stems from an overreliance on the material sources of power 
to build a parsimonious theory of world politics (see Schmidt 2007) which ignores crucial 
questions of how that power is perceived as well as how material preponderance is 
translated socially in a relational sense as opposed to simple formulation of material power 
possession (Berenskoetter 2007: 4-5). 
While some power transition theorists have touched on issues of perception and 
misperception, largely due to the overwhelming focus on instability and war, this literature 
                                                     
26
 Steve Chan points out that “the U.S. and the U.K. were involved not only in disputes over 
Venezuela’s border but also in other contentious issues such as the demarcation of the Alaskan 
territory from Northwest Canada and the construction of the Panama Canal. These acrimonies, 
however, were all eventually settled in favor of the U.S., with the U.K. making unilateral 
concessions without any expectation of U.S. reciprocity” (2008: 30).  
27
 For a critique of traditional power transition theory in the case of Chinese growth in the late 
Twentieth Century and early Twenty First Century, see Chan (2008).   
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has confined itself to perceptions of material capabilities (discussed further in Chapter 
Two). For example, in outlining a dyadic approach to changes in material capabilities and 
the onset of war, James Schampel writes that states “perceive changes in both their own and 
their potential adversaries' population, technological growth, military growth, and alliance 
formation which, in turn, researchers can measure as share of system power” (1993: 399). 
The way polarity is used in this study brings together the basic quantitative insight of 
neorealism (in the sense that the number of great/superpowers makes a difference to system-
level inter-state relations) with the qualitative insights of the English school about the role 
of the great powers as a social institution. This social institution which exists at the 
structural level of world politics can be studied in history as can the ways in which 
quantitative change (shifts in polarity) have been perceived by different actors.   
The focus on perceptions of polarity on the part of the members of international society (as 
represented by state representatives and analysts who help shape public discourse on 
conceptions of world order), opens up space for the distribution of capabilities to be a 
necessary but insufficient basis for polarity. That is to say, states may be conferred with 
great power status without necessarily having the aggregate capabilities to match for the 
entire period in which they are treated as a pole of power. Larson and Shevchenko have 
observed that “Over time, changes in relative power can lead to a disjuncture between a 
state’s capabilities and its recognised position in the international system. In addition, a 
state’s self-image of its position and entitlements can diverge from other’s perceptions” 
(2010a: 268). This lack of certitude about the status of a contender great power status 
(whether rising or falling) is heightened by the fact that polarity is expressed in a social 
context where ideational factors such as identity, status and legitimacy play as important a 
role as material capabilities. This leads students of polarity towards interpretive methods 
and historical research, as Wohlforth has noted, 
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Perceptions of power are more dynamic than measurements of material relationships. Rapid 
shifts in behaviour may be related to perceived shifts in the distribution of power which are 
not captured by typical measures of capabilities. The relationship of perceptions to 
measurable resources can be capricious and unfortunately discovered only through historical 
research (1993: 294).           
 
Analysis using the theoretical insights of the English school to bring polarity firmly into a 
social setting and world historical perspective allows for the study of the rise and fall of the 
great powers in all its complexity and richness. At a time of debate over the current and 
future shape of the international system as well as the durability or otherwise of modern 
international society, learning the lessons from history of what changes in the perception of 
polarity have meant for the way polarity ‘shapes and shoves’ international society offers 
many insights. In the next chapter we shall examine more closely how bringing polarity 
analysis into the English school of IR’s body of work might offer a way forward in this task.  
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework 
 
As discussed in Chapter One, the questions asked in this study are motivated by the 
theoretical concerns of analytical eclecticism in IR. In contrast to much of mainstream IR 
theory which sets up abstract philosophical divisions between competing ‘isms’, analytical 
eclecticism/theoretical pluralism prioritises “pragmatic engagement” with the real world 
contexts in which “prevailing ideas about world politics have emerged” (Katzenstein and Sil 
2010: 22; Haas and Haas 2009: 101). The approach to theorising polarity, unlike the 
microeconomic foundations of neorealism, takes international practice as its starting point 
from which IR theory must engage.     
Broadly speaking, the theoretical framework developed here can be described as falling 
under the umbrella of social constructivist theory. 28  This general theoretical approach, 
which includes both mainstream and critical varieties of Constructivism (with a capital C), 
the English school, a large part of Neoclassical realism and some elements of foreign policy 
analysis, shares what has been described as a “common philosophy” (Hoffmann 2005: 111) 
that “the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and 
interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material 
world” (Adler 1997: 322). That is to say, any attempt to analyse how the polarity of 
international society causes different outcomes in terms of the interaction of states, must use 
a theoretical framework which is holistic enough to treat both ideational and material factors 
as equally important. It also needs to be able to be flexible enough (even at the expense of 
parsimony) to move between analysing one or more of the levels of analysis in IR theory.    
                                                     
28
 It is now widely accepted that there is no one single theory of social constructivism but instead 
what Nikola Hynek and Andrea Teti refer to as a “multiplicity of ontological and epistemological 
constructivisms” in the Philosophy of Social Science (2010: 173).  
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More specifically, the thesis uses the English school tradition of IR and its idea of the social 
institution of the great powers to analyse the structural factor of polarity – defined as the 
number of great power that exist at any one time – and how we can understand periods of 
history when collective perceptions of its form appear to diverge. It uses the notion of 
fundamental or ‘primary’ institutions as the main expression of the international system’s 
social structure. Couching the analysis in English school terms, allows us to tap into the 
methodological pluralism which is associated with a “historically sensitive and 
comprehensive” approach to IR theory (Little 2009: 79). The framework developed here 
uses this to go even further and suggest an analytically eclectic approach to polarity which 
takes account of the material factors that play out in the social world and vice versa.    
This chapter examines the growing consensus around the need to apply a theoretically plural 
approach to IR theory to be able to truly capture the complexity of world politics. It then 
takes one particular variant of this form of international theory, the English school and 
teases out the ways in this tradition can be used to re-think the nature of polarity as well as 
discussing how this relates to other similar approaches such as neoclassical realism and 
Wendtian Constructivism. We will then turn to the methodological space opened up by the 
English school concept of ‘international society’ and the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions that follow before finishing with an outline of the exact method employed for 
the historical analysis in Part II.    
The Case for an Analytically Eclectic Approach to Polarity  
Waltz has argued that international structures “shape and shove” the ways that states interact 
with each other in an international system (1986: 343). This observation has been the main 
driver behind ‘structural’ or ‘neo’ realism. This thesis takes Waltz’s observation as a 
starting point but combines it with the view put forward by proponents of the English school 
of IR that state interactions occur not only at the systemic level but also at that of a society. 
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This move introduces another level of structure not utilised in neorealist theory – the social 
structure of international society. As state interaction occurs simultaneously in both (Little 
2000) it is ‘shaped and shoved’ by both systemic structure (polarity) and societal structure 
(the primary institutions of international society).   
The central theoretical insight of the approach used here is that analysing the interplay 
between material and ideational change  - which according to Georg Sørensen, “is sorely 
needed” in order to think seriously about international structures (2008: 26) – can allow us 
to analyse the importance of changes in polarity without falling into the traps of the 
rationalist-materialst biases inherent in neorealism.  A theoretically plural approach would 
take account of both the material factors that create ‘great’ and ‘super’ powers (military 
might, economic strength, technological and innovative prowess etc.) as well as the material 
factors that influence the foreign policies of states (hegemonic stability, the military and 
strategic benefits of balancing, bandwagoning and buckpassing, relative and absolute gains 
etc.). Yet at the same time, such an approach would also deal with the ideational factors that 
play a role in establishing both which states become ‘poles’ of power but also the role that 
they play in world politics (identity, status, willingness or otherwise to lead, shared concepts 
of ‘great power responsibility’ etc.). Such an approach would necessarily involve a 
sensitivity to the role of perception in its analysis of the roles of poles of power and their 
affect on the effects of changes in polarity.  The approach here is used not to study 
perception and misperception as they relate to intentions or capability as in most of the 
relevant literature (Jervis 1976; Stein 1982; Schimmelfennig 2005) but instead in relation to 
status – in particular, great power status. It is the fact that this status, which is intimately 
bound-up with (but is not reducible to) the possession or control over material capabilities, 
only exists in a social world that the framework goes beyond theoretical pluralism and 
instead opts for the wider move of analytical eclecticism. This requires the theorist to be 
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able to account for both the material and the social worlds at once rather than switching 
between methodologies that focus on one at the expense of the other.   
This analytically eclectic framework outlined here allows us to deal with both the common 
criticism of neorealism that the distribution of material capabilities “does not explain 
anything in itself” (Sørensen: 11) without engaging with the social meaning that such a 
distribution is given by actors or as Andreas Osiander has put it, “what sets a great power 
apart is really the shared assumptions in the system concerning that power’s status” (1994: 
323). It simultaneously allows for the ability to deal with the neorealist reply to 
Constructivists that ideas, norms, values and identities never exist in a material vacuum.       
Polarity in International Society 
It is in the English school of IR that one finds an analytically eclectic approach that is well 
suited to studying the relationship between changes in the number of great powers (one of 
Hedley Bull’s five  ‘institutions of international society’) and periods of history in which the 
consensus as to the number of poles of power appears to breakdown. English school writers 
have made much of the institutions of international society, one of which is the role of the 
great powers (Bull 1977; Buzan 2004b; Wilson 2007).  Buzan has made an important move 
in closing the gap between English school theorising about international society and both 
neorealist and neoliberal accounts of how states interact in a purely systemic sense by 
drawing a distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ institutions in international society 
(Buzan, 2004b). In this configuration, Bull’s five essentially ideational elements become the 
primary institutions which exist at the societal level while regimes, international and 
regional organisations and other similar cooperative arrangements that exist in the material 
world are the secondary institutions which exist at both the systemic and societal level.    
Using the concept of polarity requires careful consideration of exactly what the term ‘pole’ 
of power (or ‘great’/’super’ power) actually means. Despite neorealism’s reliance on the 
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concept to build a ‘rigorous’ and parsimonious theory of world politics it is in fact English 
school writers (including the very recent wave of English school work which borrows 
considerably from ‘thin’ or Wendtian Constructivism) who have provided the most nuanced 
analysis of the concept of what Hedley Bull called the “great responsibles” (1980). What is 
particularly interesting for this analysis is the way in which English school writers have 
defined great power status. According to Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler,  
A great power, for the English school, is not defined solely in terms of a state’s material 
capabilities as in structural realist accounts. Instead, a great power is one that recognizes – 
and is recognized by others as having – ‘special rights and duties’ by virtue of its military 
and economic strength...Moreover they claim that the idea of the great powers becomes 
meaningful in the context of society...” (2008: 102-3). 
 
What is important here is that being a great power means having a particular status and like 
honour or legitimacy, status is not something that an actor simply gains through its own 
doing but instead is conferred on them by others (Lebow 2004: 347; Clark 2009a: 214).   
The role of the great powers in providing some degree of order to world politics is socially 
understood and at least tacitly agreed upon by the members of international society. When 
agreement as to which states can be said to be exercising this role (and therefore what form 
the polarity of the international system exists) breaks down, then the role of the great 
powers in ordering international society should in theory become fragile.  
This view takes polarity not so much as a material fact but as a socially transmuted and 
understood concept which effects the interactions of members of international society. Clark 
has illustrated the unique role of English school theorists in treating great power status as a 
specifically social attribute. He argues that work of Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and others  
on the great powers as an institution of international society raises two specific and novel 
theoretical issues, 
This is not the universe normally depicted in neorealist accounts...a particular emphasis 
upon the kind of power by which great powers are constituted: it results from a status 
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recognised and bestowed by others, not a set of attributes and capabilities possessed by the 
claimant. To be a great power is to be located in a social relationship, not to have a certain 
portfolio of material assets (Clark 2009b: 473). 
 
If the whole concept of a great power is a social construct used by sovereign states in an 
international society then the impact of changes in the number of great powers can only 
properly be studied in a socially and historically contingent context. As Donnelly has noted, 
understanding “contemporary international political changes... requires attention to the 
concepts and historical practices of sovereign inequality and hierarchy in anarchy” 
(Donnelly 2006: 162).   
The redefinition of polarity outlined and applied in this study relates directly to one of the 
central challenges found in the English school literature. The classical English school 
writers such as Bull, Wight and Watson were careful to distinguish – at least at a conceptual 
– between international systems and international societies. The now almost standard 
definition used by English school scholars was outlined by Bull when he wrote, 
A system of states (or international system) is formed when two or more states have 
sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to 
cause them to behave  - at least in some measure – as parts of a whole...where states are in 
regular contact with one another and where in addition there is interaction between them 
sufficient to make the behaviour of each a necessary element in the calculations of the other, 
then we may speak of their forming a system (1977: 9-10).  
 
By contrast, 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of 
certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and 
share in the working of common institutions (Ibid: 13).  
 
This built on Wight’s insistence that an international society is fundamentally reliant on the 
mutual recognition of total sovereign equality (1977: 135) which raises the bar for the 
existence of international society beyond that which can be reconciled with the historical 
record. This serves to create more of a conceptual chasm than a distinction between system 
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and society and has been criticised by those attempting a structuralist account of the history 
of international society (Buzan and Little 2000: 105).  
Others working as part of the later wave of the English school including Dunne (2005a), 
Jackson (2000) and Little (2009; 2011) have reinforced the distinction between system and 
society. Yet this has not gone without considerable debate both within the English school 
(Buzan 1993) and critics and interlocutors sitting outside of it (Finnemore 2001; Copeland 
2003). The argument goes to the core of where the English school fits in the continuum of 
IR theory, with pure rationalism at one end and radical reflectivism at the other. 
This study joins Buzan (2004Bb), Alan James (1993) and others (see for example Shaw 
1994) in adopting a sceptical approach to the theoretical usefulness of a purely systemic 
approach to world politics when that theory is applied. It may be a useful first-step 
conceptual distinction but it does not stand up to scrutiny as a theoretical idea when applied 
to the historical record. Rather than adopt the highly questionable notion that any inter-state 
relations (particularly within the timeframe of 1815-2012 under discussion here) of any real 
importance can be sensibly thought of as being asocial, we give ontological priority to the 
concept of international society as that which captures both the material/physical and social 
worlds. Once this move is made, international society can be thought of as existing along a 
spectrum from thin more Hobbesian-like (yet still fundamentally social) forms to thick more 
Kantian-like forms (or that which is perhaps better described as a community than a 
society). At any one time any one of the elements of international system-international 
society-world society (or in intellectual terms what Wight and Bull referred to as realist, 
rationalist or universalist understandings of world politics) might be more dominant than the 
other two. However, as one account puts it, “at no time do any of them cease to exert at least 
some influence, however minimal it may be, in the ‘real-world’ of international politics” 
(Wheeler 1992: 463-4).   
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This approach builds directly on Buzan’s understanding of “all human interaction” being “in 
some sense social and rule-bound” (2004b: 100; see also Linklater and Suganami 2006: 53) 
and also Watson’s argument that when one actually looks at the historical record, “no 
international system as defined by Bull has operated without some regulatory rules and 
institutions” (1987: 151-2). This is particularly important for the way this thesis builds an 
alternative to the neorealist conception of polarity. It is the way the perceptions of the inter-
state order on the part of important actors is expressed in history that provides the basis of 
our understanding of the concept. The English school notion of international society as an 
ever present aspect of international practice, provides the appropriate framework for this. As 
Wheeler and Dunne have noted, “Part of the promise of international society theory is that it 
offers a more ‘realistic’ representation of state practice than realism itself” (1996: 91).                 
A failing of neorealism is that it focuses solely on the distribution of material capabilities 
(Clark 2009b: 465) and ignores the social arena in which great power politics plays out 
(including the whole notion of great power ‘status’, the role of the great powers in creating 
‘societal’ relations at the international level, the ‘rights and responsibilities’ of the great 
powers etc.). Much of this failing is addressed by the existing writings of English school 
scholars. Abandoning the distinction between system and society allows us to engage in 
polarity analysis from an English school standpoint rather than abandoning the concept to 
the purely systemic realm of neorealism.        
The English School and its Theoretical Relatives  
It is important to note here why the thesis is framing the discussion in terms of the English 
school and not Constructivism or neoclassical realism. Given the focus on the interplay 
between material and ideational forces, the approach here could appear to fit within what 
has been termed ‘thin’ or ‘Wendtian’ Constructivism. This brand of Constructivism, typified 
by the writings of Alexander Wendt, should be thought of as, at the very least, normatively 
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and methodologically distinct from the more critical forms of Constructivism such as that of 
Richard Price, Karin Fierke and Cynthia Weber.    
Christian Reus-Smit has written that  
Constructivism and the English School are often said to bear striking family resemblances, a 
view encouraged by their mutual concern for the social dimensions of international 
life...though, the discourse of convergence has, in large measure, been based on a series of 
partial or distorted representations (2009: 58).  
 
Reus-Smit characterises the encounter between the English school and Constructivism as 
one where both parties are guilty of selectivity. Constructivists, he argues, while borrowing 
heavily from the early English school writings of Wight, Bull and others29, have focused 
narrowly on the “core ontological propositions” of this writing obscuring the role of 
normative enquiry within the English school “into the relationship between order and 
justice” – usually described as the debate between the pluralist and solidarist strands of the 
school (2009: 59). At the same time, Reus-Smit also argues that when English school 
scholars write about Constructivism and its natural affinities with their work they almost 
always refer to Wendtian Constructivism and homogenize “what is actually a very 
heterogeneous body of constructivist scholarship” (60).  Summarising this restrictive view 
of Constructivism Reus-Smit writes, “A newly arrived Martian, busily surveying English 
School writings, could easily be excused for thinking that Wendt’s articles and major book 
constitute the bulk and essence of constructivist scholarship” (59). This alerts us to the fact 
that there is enough differentiating Constructivism as a broad theoretical approach from the 
English school to warrant treating the two as analytically separate approaches. Yet this 
equally means that the particular discussion here could conceivably be termed Wendtian or 
                                                     
29
 Interestingly Reus-Smit – and others who have written on the relationship between constructivism 
and the English school such as Adler (2005) and Finnemore (2001) – make no mention of Charles 
Manning’s 1962 The Nature of International Society despite its strong links with what would later 
become constructivism (Suganami 2001:92; Wilson 2004; Long 2005). This is most likely due to the 
relative obscurity of what Peter Wilson has called Manning’s “Quasi-masterpiece” within academic 
IR (Wilson 2004).   
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‘thin’ Constructivism, as Reus-Smit’s criticism is not that thin Constructivism and the 
English school are divided by an insurmountable theoretical gap but that there is more to 
Constructivism than its more mainstream proponents. The close proximity of thin 
Constructivism to Bull’s English school writings in particular have been emphasised by Kai 
Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (2000). They point out that “if constructivism means that 
international politics is structured along social as well as material lines…and…international 
social structures are produced and reproduced in the concrete practices of state actors (and 
hence are subject to change), then Hedley Bull was indeed a constructivist” (2000: 44). To 
re-word this in relation to this specific study we could say, if polarity is taken to be the 
social expression of the distribution of material capabilities as perceived by state actors, 
then this study is indeed a constructivist one. However the analytically eclectic approach 
which gives both ideational and material factors equal weighting keeps us at the ‘thin’ end 
of the spectrum, in line with Sørensen’s argument that “the ideas and shared knowledge 
which are in focus in constructivist analysis never operate outside a specific material 
context” (2008: 21). 
Alternatively, precisely due to the very realist-esq focus on the great powers but in the 
context of both the material and ideational factors that constitute great power status, this 
thesis could conceivably fall within the growing literature termed ‘neoclassical realism.’ 
This approach (Rose 1998; Dueck 2006; Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro 2009; Toje and 
Kunz 2012) is sometimes discussed as being an attempt to reinvigorate the neorealist project 
so maligned since the end of the Cold War (Rathbun 2008; Kitchen 2010) by re-introducing 
unit-level variables into the structural focus of Waltzian realist analysis. This allows for 
what Stephen Walt has called “a more open minded eclecticism” (2002: 211) at the expense 
of parsimony, which in turn and in a similar vein to the English school, moves closer 
towards a materialist-ideational synthesis. By its very nature, this is a strand of realism with 
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a more analytically eclectic approach to ontology, epistemology and even methodology than 
either classical or neorealism and is therefore well suited to thinking about power without, 
for example, limiting itself to one level of analysis only (Quinn 2011).30    
The previously mentioned work of William Wohlforth as well as some of the work of 
Gideon Rose on the role of perceptions in translating material power into actual political 
outcomes that this study builds upon is usually labelled neoclassical realism. For Wohlforth 
and Rose, power is still the overriding factor that shapes world politics. Even structural 
power in the Waltzian sense can be said to be perhaps the most important factor in guiding 
the way states interact with each other and other actors. The difference for them is, as Rose 
has put it “foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is 
their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical 
resources or forces in being” (1998: 147).  This approach also broadly fits into what Shiping 
Tang calls a ‘social evolutionary’ approach to realism which, whilst granting material forces 
ontological priority, stresses that such forces can never operate totally independently from 
ideational factors (2010: 34). This approach, Tang argues, allows the analyst of the 
international system to introduce social development into the picture in a way that is left out 
by neorealism and can therefore help to progress stagnated debates such as those around 
defensive versus offensive realism.        
It is therefore clear that the theoretical framework for the current study has much in 
common with both thin Constructivism and neoclassical realism. The choice to couch the 
discussion in English school terms is more one of terminology and language than anything 
else. It is not so much that the analysis here is not compatible with either thin 
                                                     
30
 It is interesting to note for the discussion here about the overlapping concerns and approaches of the English 
school, thin Constructivism and neoclassical realism that in an article on American decline using arguments 
about both the system/structure and units/agents, Adam Quinn chooses the language of neoclassical realism 
but admits that “it might be something of a theoretical land-grab to suggest that only that theoretical 
perspective can accommodate their substance” (2011: 803-804).  
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Constructivism or neoclassical realism but that an English school approach offers much in 
terms of a central framework for analysing the social expression of polarity. Neoclassical 
realism opens up space for analysing the perception of material capabilities but does not 
hold the same theoretical promise of providing an answer as to what those perceptions 
translate into – an understanding of the social phenomenon of the great powers. It is the 
concept of international society and the terminology of primary and secondary institutions 
that most easily allows one to treat polarity as a serious independent variable without falling 
victim to the ideational blind spot inherent in neorealism by highlighting the historical and 
social development of the institution of the great powers. Richard Little has described this as 
an approach that allows an analyst to “capture the essential features of a more complex 
whole” (2009: 84) by using the concepts of international system and society as interrelated 
phenomenon that can be observed and studied only in as much that one presupposes the 
existence of the other: “In other words, although the international system only focuses on 
the material distributions of power, it presupposes the existence of an international society 
that defines the existence of states in the first place” (Little 2009: 84).    
However there are a number of elements that make the choice between Constructivism and 
the English school in particular, an important one. While Constructivism is particularly 
useful for analysing the role of norms and ideas in shifting the domestic interests and 
identities of states (which therefore effects their external relations) (see Kirchner and 
Sperling 2010; Wendt 2010; Katzenstein 1996), this does not necessarily explain the ways 
in which the macro-social relations of states (such as their existence in an international 
society) affects these interests and identities before states even begin to interact in mutually 
constitutive relationships.   
For example Wendt’s analysis of the social structure of the Cold War identifies the ways in 
which the United States and Soviet Union both held an understanding of the ‘other’ as an 
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enemy which in turn constituted their own identities and interests (Wendt 2010: 314). Yet 
this analysis does not go the next step offered by English school analysis by explaining how 
the relations of the two superpowers were shaped by the other shared identity that both 
actors had in common – holders of ‘superpower’ status in international society. This 
requires a more holistic approach which, while acknowledging the historically contingent 
relationships between the great powers at any one point in time and the ways in which these 
mutually constitutive relationships shape their identities, also understands the ways in which 
state identities are shaped by their role in societal relations as a whole (which cannot be 
captured in Wendt’s spectrum of enemy-rival-friend).  Booth and Wheeler have summarised 
this well, 
States can evolve from ‘enemies’ to different identities characterized by motives and 
intentions that are predictably peaceful...Yet constructivism...presupposes that which it seeks 
to explain. The proposition that interactions can transform state identities does not explain 
what causes the interaction to take the form it does: where do the changed moves come from 
that constitute new identities and interests? (2008: 105) 
 
An English school analysis can point to what causes the interaction to take the form it does, 
in that it takes place in a social setting defined by the workings of the institutions of 
international society such as the special role of the great powers. To put it differently, as 
Tanja Aalberts has pointed out, while Constructivists hold that norms and rules can change 
the identities of states, “Ordinary state conduct hence presupposes norms and rules” (2010: 
259) because, in Bull’s words, “the identity of being a member of international society 
generates an obligation to follow the rules” (in Aalberts 2010: 259). What is particularly 
important for the English school is that the complex mix of social relations which we refer 
to as ‘international society’ does not have its roots in the particular logic of anything other 
than the operation of primary institutions. That is to say that the English school provides an 
explicitly reductionist approach to praxis. While international society has been described as 
being an ‘ideal type’ (Suganami 1983; Finnemore 2001; Keene 2009), it is rarely, if ever, 
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used as a construct that could exist outside of the interaction of actors and their shared 
understandings of these interactions. This is precisely why an English school approach pays 
such close attention to “the language of actors and to the way they explain and justify their 
actions” (Navari 2009: 42). Navari explains the way international society derives directly 
from international practices even in its ideal-type form, 
When traditional English school theorists set out to explain the norms of any state-system, 
they did not restrict themselves to categories identical to the categories of the participants. 
Rather, they used terms that would have been recognised by the participants...It means that 
the analyst may (and indeed should) abstract from the categories employed by the 
analysand, but not so far that the analysand would not recognize his own actions, or the 
meanings behind them (2009: 42-3).            
 
The English school also provides a fuller explanation not just of social interaction but of 
discernable patterns of world politics at the macro-level (as a very precise and historically 
contingent social space) (Hoffmann 2005 p. 112). While Wendt’s Constructivism does make 
the case for the importance of macro (or systemic)-level analysis as “some causal 
mechanisms exist only on a macro-level, even though they depend on instantiations at the 
micro-level for the operation” (Wendt 2010: 154), it still maintains that until the structure of 
the system shifts along the friend-rival-enemy spectrum it is to the micro-foundations of 
bilateral relationships we must turn to analyse the ‘self/other’ relationships which shape 
identity. This approach therefore loses the focus on the continuity over time of social 
institutions such as great power status or the balance of power in shaping the systemic 
interactions of states, regardless of whether the system is operating in a Kantian, Lockean or 
Hobbesian way. Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr have captured this in their critique of 
Wendt, Dessler (1989) and others arguing that they “inadequately attend to the social 
structural context within which this social construction occurs” (Friedman and Starr 1997: 
55).  They go on to argue that Constructivism’s “tendency to treat intersubjective structure 
as enabling and positional structure as constraining is misguided…the positional model of 
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structure should also be acknowledged as enabling agency social action” (sic) and even that 
“the enabling quality of capabilities must also be acknowledged” (57-58).  This is precisely 
what the concept of the great powers being an institution of international society does by 
emphasising not only the special rights but also the associated responsibilities (Bukovansky 
et al. 2012) of the great powers.    
Therefore ultimately, the framework used here can be thought of as theoretically compatible 
with neoclassical realism, Wendtian constructivism and the English school. This is 
summarised  in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1. The theoretical inputs to an analytically eclectic approach to polarity
 
The choice of the latter as the main body of theoretical literature of which to adopt 
language, concepts and assumptions from is largely based on what the English school most 
easily offers that the other two don’t in an ‘off-the-shelf’ sense. Neoclassical realism is 
certainly helpful in highlighting the material biases inherent in the simple neorealist model 
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whilst ensuring the emphasis on the importance of great power politics, even in an 
interdependent and globalised world. This move opens up the theoretical space to focus on 
the importance of perceptions of power as well as analysing the relative distribution of 
material capabilities. Yet this literature is stronger on highlighting the need to move beyond 
a purely material description of the international system but is less helpful in pointing to 
what should replace this methodology. Constructivism would, initially, appear to fill this 
void. Yet whilst providing a methodological and epistemological path to studying the social 
world an ontological gap still exists in terms of the exact form this has taken history. For 
this research a firmer sense of what we should be looking for is required in terms of what 
the ‘poles of power’ that are traditionally found in materialist understandings of the 
international system exist as in a social sense. This can be found in the English school and 
especially in the work of Bull in its concept of the social institution of the great powers. 
This concept is offered by the English school not as a parsimonious theoretical model but 
instead as an analytical construct born directly from historical experience. The great powers 
exist not necessarily because the international system, as defined by Waltz, naturally creates 
such units through socialisation and competition (although an English school approach with 
its system/society distinction would not preclude this hypothesis in theory) but instead are 
constructed through the actions, words and ideas of social actors. The United States is a pole 
of power not because its material capabilities mean that it so but instead because those 
material capabilities have been historically interpreted as being the basis of a particular 
social status that is conferred by the other actors in a social setting. The meaning given to 
material capabilities (and other factors such as leadership, prestige and legitimacy) has 
historically evolved into a social institution known as ‘great power status’ that exists in what 
can be thought of and analysed as international society.        
Contribution to the Theoretical Literature 
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The contribution that this thesis makes to the theoretical literature is to develop a way of 
analysing the element of international order known as polarity (that which is defined by the 
number of major poles of power) in a way which can take account of breakdowns in 
collective perceptions of which states are and which are not great/superpowers. In doing so, 
the discussion takes from neorealism the quantitative emphasis on the importance of 
changes in the number of great powers and adds it to the qualitative focus in English school 
writing on the role of the great powers in international society. As Buzan has written, “Both 
emphasise the leading role of the major powers in defining the character of the international 
system: Waltz’s poles of power taken up by neorealists, and Bull’s ‘great responsibles’” 
(2004b: 252). Adam Watson also pointed to the integral role of systemic power in providing 
part of the make-up of international society as a whole when he argued that “For an 
international society to function effectively, the dialogue between its major powers must be 
system-wide” (1982: 218 emphasis in original). Yet if one were to remain in the systemic 
realm of neorealism and not make the English school move of analysing the great powers at 
the level of society, there is little theoretical space left for there to be different perceptions 
of polarity. In neorealist analysis, polarity is not perceived, it simply is. In principle, it could 
be inaccurately assessed but there is very little expectation that this will ever happen. This 
position has been characterised by Jeffrey Legro as polarity being,  
like an invisible fence that shapes states as if they were dogs with electronic collars or a 
Skinner box that conditions national “rats.” States can choose to ignore the fence or box, but 
if they do, they must pay the consequences (2011: 342).         
 
Re-defining polarity not only contributes, in an obvious sense, to the polarity analysis 
literature itself, but by using the conceptual lens of ‘international society’ it adds to the body 
of work which aims to build links between the English school and other areas of IR theory 
(Buzan 1993; Wheeler 1996; Williams 2005; True 2005; Ralph 2007). By returning to the 
‘mainstream IR’ realm of great power politics and inter-state orders, the theoretical 
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framework of this study makes the most of the English school as a via media and 
analytically eclectic approach to theory. While English school writers have considered at 
length questions of order (Hurrell 2007) and power (Dunne 2003), none so far have 
attempted to treat the concept of polarity not as a component of neorealist theorising but as a 
key concept used by practitioners to understand the structure of international society. The 
English school’s theorising of international society not only provides a set of ideas and 
terms for understanding the interplay of the material and ideational elements of power, it 
also resonates with one of the key aims of this thesis: to draw polarity theory closer to 
historical practice. The concept of international society (whether referred to as such or as 
‘the international community’ or something similar) is used by practitioners for much of the 
period under review here. This is as true of the British liberal international thinkers of the 
Victorian era (Bell and Sylvest 2006) who spoke of creating a ‘universal society’ as it is of 
post-Cold War diplomats discussing the responsibilities of the ‘international community’ to 
prevent genocide (United Nations General Assembly 2005).     
The concept of ‘bringing polarity back in’ within an English school approach also resonates 
with Buzan’s nascent “vanguard theory of social structures” (2004b: 222-7). For Buzan, it is 
by analysing the distribution of power in history that one can see that “at least in terms of 
the historical record, a vanguard model is a prominent feature of how interstate and 
international societies develop” (252). A vanguard model takes the idea “common to both 
military strategy and Leninist thinking that a leading element plays a crucial role in how a 
social movement unfolds” (222). As Buzan notes, there are interesting parallels with 
Waltz’s thinking on the way that anarchy works to socialise the units of a system, via 
competition, into becoming “like units.” Yet what differentiates a vanguard model within 
the English school from Walztian neorealism is the way in which agency is combined with 
structure to give an historically contingent picture of the role of the vanguard (the great 
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powers) in shaping international society. As Emanuel Adler has asked, “what, for example, 
turns a regional ‘vanguard’ into a global social structure, if not agents?” (2005a: 178). This 
agential element highlights the importance of polarity analysis at the current time. If, as 
many are predicting, the distribution of power is spreading (broadly speaking) from West to 
East as part of a shift from the current unipolar order to a new multipolar one, then issues of 
the domestic character of the poles/great powers/vanguard and even questions around their 
cultural or civilizational dispositions become particularly important (O’Hagan 2005; 
Camilleri 2008; Buzan 2010). An a-historical and a-social neorealist reading of this change 
in polarity would be entirely blind to this element.         
Methodology 
A potential downside of the use of an English school approach to frame the analysis is that 
the question of methodology is made particularly difficult. Cornelia Navari has illustrated 
the problematic nature of trying to find method in the ‘classical’ (ie. early) English school 
literature 31 : “The classical English School theorists generally disdained discussion of 
methodology. As for method, it is treated somewhat in the nature of underclothing – 
assumed to be there but scarcely discussed in polite society” (2009:1).   
Yet this reluctance to explicitly deal with methodological issues by the early writers of the 
school does not mean that the English school offers no methodological preferences. Hedley 
Bull famously made the case for what he called a “classical” approach to IR (1966) in an 
article which criticised the preference for scientific positivism in the increasingly dominant 
North American approach to IR in the 1960s. This has led many writers to associate the 
English school with a broadly reflectivist approach (Reus-Smit 2009: 6).   
                                                     
31
 Whilst there are debates around exactly which literature and writers should be characterised by 
being inside ‘the school’ and which should not (see Little 2003: 444; Linklater and Suganami 2006: 
259-260), this project treats the classical English school literature as essentially the output of the 
British Committee of International Theory and the canonical texts as the 1966 volume Diplomatic 
Investigations edited by Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, Wight’s 1977 System of States and 
Hedley Bull’s 1977 The Anarchical Society.  
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Due to the role of perception in this thesis, the English school preference for analysing the 
self-understandings of actors is highly relevant for investigating the social ‘fact’ of polarity. 
Again Navari is instructive, 
English School theorists spend little time engaging in power calculus’s or theorizing the 
objective qualities of power, since it is the perception of power that they deem to have 
explanatory efficacy, and perceptions are revealed by quizzing the actor, not the 
environment (2009: 9).  
 
This is consistent with the idea of international society being reducible to the shared values 
and ideas, as expressed in discourse and action, of its members. If polarity exists in as much 
as it exists in the minds of policy makers and policy influencers, then ‘measuring’ polarity 
can only be done by interrogating perceptions through historical analysis. It has been noted 
that in the work of Charles Manning in particular, the English school provides a useful 
avenue for focusing on perception in studying the construction of social institutions at the 
international level (Buzan 1993: 329). While Manning’s approach to the ways in which the 
so-called ‘realities’ of world politics are often socially constructed was perhaps “too 
convoluted and eccentric in expression to attract a following” (ibid) its insights have infused 
both Constructivism and subsequent English school work. It also builds on the earlier work 
of E.H. Carr who argued that “There is a world community for the reason (and no other) that 
people talk, and within certain limits behave, as if there were a world community” (1939a: 
162). In other words, if an international society (and all its component parts including the 
institution of the great powers) exists, it is so because it is perceived.  
Yet the importance of Carr’s formulation of a “world community” (which he used 
interchangeably with the term “international community” and can be thought of in English 
school parlance as international society not world society) is that he was totally convinced 
that this fell short of “the unity and coherence of communities of more limited size up to and 
including the state” (ibid) in which social relations are defined by equality rather than 
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hierarchy. Carr’s view that the relations between states in which a “widespread assumption” 
(ibid) of something more than a system is at play still held that inequalities of power would 
define the structure of international society. To illustrate that on the question of equality, “In 
the international order, the role of power is greater and that of morality less (1939a: 168), 
Carr highlighted that when Hitler claimed that “all peoples ought to have an equal share of 
the goods of the world” he “hardly intended to convey that Lithuania ought to enjoy as 
much of ‘the goods of the world’ as Germany” (Ibid: 165). It was the fact that states make 
claims to their being the need for equality between the great powers that demonstrated for 
Carr the existence of an international society with certain accepted norms and 
characteristics. It follows from Carr’s idea of an observable society demonstrated by the 
actions and discourse of decision makers that a methodology that goes beyond a quantitative 
analysis of power and can be used to map perceptions of power in history is necessary.     
As outlined above one of the reasons why it is argued here that a return to polarity is timely 
and useful is that it would appear that the international system may be at a point of change 
in the number of major powers – either currently or in the coming decades. Whilst a 
methodology that preferences historical contingencies rather than theoretically parsimonious 
models is not without problem when it comes to discussing the prospects for the future, 
Albert and Cederman have noted that: 
From studies of complex systems, it is well known that positive feedback effects makes 
history fork in radically different directions as a consequence of small variations in the 
initial conditions. Such conditions conspire to make prediction extremely hard, but by no 
means excludes systematic search for the historically specific mechanisms that generated the 
outcome in question (2010: 12).  
 
Such an approach should, at least in principle, allow for some historically informed 
discussion of the prospects for different forms of polarity to be perceived by different actors 
into the future. Colin and Miriam Elman have made a similar case for the utility of a 
methodology which biases historical comparative analysis noting that a number of 
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approaches in IR (including the English school, Constructivism and neoclassical realism) 
have turned back to historicist and qualitative techniques to analyse concepts such as 
sovereignty, the balance of power, democracy, non- intervention and hegemony arguing that 
such analysis “cannot be done outside of history – there are no timeless, universal facts of 
international relations” (2008:360).   
Epistemology and Ontology 
John Hobson and George Lawson also emphasise that despite the dominance of the 
‘scientific turn’ in IR throughout the second half of the Cold War period, “in recent years 
the (re)turn of history has been one of the most striking features of the various openings in 
IR theory ushered in by the end of the Cold War” (2008: 415). This methodology draws on 
the approaches that characterise (and broadly sit within) what Hobson and Lawson refer to 
as the second-wave of historical sociology in IR. Second-wave historical sociology 
represents “not so much a reversion to extreme particularity (as in traditional history) but an 
historicist approach which is able to construct a narrative while simultaneously being open 
to issues of contingency, unintended consequences, particularity and contextuality” (2008: 
431). Such an approach, according to Lawson, requires the analyst to adopt a position of 
ontological realism (Hollis 1994; Bhaskar 1997) and epistemological relationism,  
It understands there to be an underlying social reality, but equally clearly understands that 
all social relations exist in constitutive inter-relation with others, hence the need to 
problematize difference, multiplicity and interactions, to go beyond immediate context and 
to transcend narrow viewpoints (2007: 358).       
 
This strong emphasis here on historical empirical research rather than complex modelling to 
capture the way that changes in polarity have been perceived during periods which have 
been labelled as constant in post-hoc analysis (by focusing closely on historical perceptions 
rather than quantifying capabilities and ordering states accordingly) is driven by an 
acceptance of Wohlforth’s claim that “we can capture the ways power influences history 
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only by studying perceptions and ideas. The elusiveness of power becomes clear only when 
the clarity of hindsight is removed by careful historical research” (1993: 306). In this sense 
perceptions of polarity exist before any analyst can ‘crunch the numbers’ and decide what 
the polarity of any given time was in hindsight therefore it is only through historically 
biased methodology that such an ontological position can be brought out.  
The importance of historical contingency for the ontological question of when a form of 
polarity can be said to exist (in the minds of decisions makers and analysts at the time or in 
the post-hoc analysis of an historian years later) and therefore the epistemological question 
of how we can study its effect (through historical perceptions or contemporary quantitative 
studies) is summed up by Ole Holsti: 
If, with the advantage of a century or more of hindsight and meticulous research, scholars 
are unable to agree whether specific events represented major turning points in the structure 
of the international system, is it any surprise that even sophisticated and well informed 
leaders and their advisers may disagree sharply about the fundamental features of the system 
within which they are trying to make policy… In short, perceptions of the international 
system may be as important as the system itself in shaping actual policies (1991: 87).     
 
As is discussed in Chapter Five, this is particularly important when studying the effect of 
changes in polarity over long periods of time as perceptions of polarity, based on the 
number of great powers that are treated as such, are not necessarily tied to what in hindsight 
we now think of as momentous changes in diplomatic history. As Holsti notes, “Because no 
one rings a bell to announce that one type of international system has replaced another, 
competent and informed leaders can disagree as to the main features of the contemporary 
system and their implications for policy choices” (1991: 87).     
Perception and Social Cognition 
While firmly grounded in IR theory, this study does draw upon a number of ontological and 
epistemological elements from other areas, most particularly, social psychology. The central 
argument running through each of the chapters here is that it is perceptions of polarity, 
91 
 
rather the experience of an objective polarity that exists in the ‘real world’, which affects the 
interactions of states. Social psychologists have long held that “the most basic beliefs about 
the spatial world have their contents only in virtue of their standing in certain relations with 
perceptual experiences” (Brewer 1999: xiv). Much research has been carried out into why 
and how perceptual experiences shape empirical beliefs, much of which starts from debates 
between rationalists and anti-rationalists in philosophy (Brewer 1999: 3-17; Snowdon 
1992). 
This literature focuses on the importance of concepts and reasoning for social cognition in 
terms of making sense of incoming information. This aligns well with the way in which the 
English school framework, within the broader family of broader social constructivism, 
employed here pushes the theorists to examine the concept rather than the ‘fact’ of polarity. 
The concept itself is entirely reliant on a particular social category – great/superpower status 
– and therefore, in a sense, doubly indebted to cognitive processes. Firstly 
great/superpowers are perceived and then following this, depending on how many are 
perceived as existing at a single moment in time, the polarity of international society is 
perceived as either uni, bi or multipolar. This perception of the power structure of world 
politics uses the ‘concept’ of polarity as an “interpretive function” to help order complex 
information. As one account from the social cognition literature puts it, “When we observe 
our social world, we do not merely watch an objective reality unfold before our eyes. 
Rather, we take part in shaping our own reality; the concepts we impose on events 
determine the meaning we extract from them” (Kunda 1999: 19).  
What is important to note here is that the way the theoretical framework employed here 
draws upon the social psychology literature situates in more in the ‘middle ground’ 
constructivist (or perhaps more accurately the analytically eclectic) sphere of the IR theory 
literature than other accounts that draw similarly on psychological studies (see Neumann 
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1996; Doty 1997; Checkel 1999). An English school version of polarity allows for both the 
systemic and the societal (or material and ideational) elements to exist simultaneously, 
thereby allowing for the possibility of what psychologists refer to as “inconsistency between 
cognitions” (Brehm and Cohen 1962) or cognitive dissonance. Leon Festinger first outlined 
the theory of cognitive dissonance in 1957 in which pairs of cognitions (knowledge) are 
consonant if one follows from the other, and are dissonant if the opposite of one follows 
from the other (1957; Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999: 3). For example knowledge about the 
material capabilities of a state lagging behind other major poles of power (in a material, 
systemic sense) and continuing to treat that state as a great/superpower (in a societal setting) 
would produce cognitive dissonance. Such a situation leads to other sets of expected 
behaviours to reduce dissonance including self-persuasion (Aronson 1999), self-affirmation 
(Steele, Spencer and Lynch 1993), and attitude change (Zuwerink and Devine 1996).                  
Drawing on the social psychology literature in this way in terms of raising the expectation 
of finding differing perceptions of polarity on the part of different actors when analysing the 
historical record, makes the English school a useful framework to use within the IR 
literature. The English school is analytically eclectic and therefore flexible enough to 
incorporate such elements while offering up a set of usefully clarified concepts/reference 
points (such as primary institutions) and an overarching framework (international society) 
within which to use them.    
An International Society Framework: Both ‘Analytical’ and ‘Eclectic’  
The approach employed here follows Buzan’s positivist framing of the analytical (as 
opposed to normative) wing of the English school (2004). This conception of positivism is 
one that still allows for a high degree interpretivist method as the analyst searches for 
patterns in history. According to Buzan, this approach is positivist in that it involves 
“finding sets of analytical constructs with which to describe and theorise about what goes on 
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in the world, and in this sense it is a positivist approach and not a materialist approach” 
(2004b: 14). To put it more simply, whilst any analysis framed in terms of ‘international 
society’ requires a broadly interpretivist approach (particularly if the focus is to be not only 
on the social role of the poles of power but also the perception of that role), this should not 
be seen as preventing the analysis from investigating the ways in which the trends identified 
have causal effect ‘out there’ in international society – even if that society only exists in the 
minds of practitioners and scholars.  
Buzan, Little and Linklater have all pointed to the need for such a methodologically pluralist 
approach if the concepts of international system and society (and, whilst it does not apply to 
this thesis, their writing also includes world society as well) are to be studied together. That 
is because they argue; different approaches require a slightly different method: international 
system requiring positivist methods and international society requiring hermeneutics and 
interpretivism (Buzan 2004b, Little 2000). As it relates to this study, this distinction could 
be thought of in the following terms, while a purely positivist approach may be able to 
answer questions about changes in the number of poles of power in history (in the 
international system that exists in a material sense), the meaning of these changes can only 
be analysed using an interpretive approach as they expressed through the societal relations 
of states (that only exist in an ideational sense). However, the approach adopted here is a 
more eclectic (Katzenstein and Sil 2010) than pluralist (Jackson 2011) reading of the 
English school which gives international society ontological precedence over a purely 
systemic understanding of the role of the great powers. Given the blurring of the distinction 
between international system and international society discussed previously, this moves the 
framework out of the realm of pluralism and into the “complexity and multidimensionality” 
(Katzenstein and Sil 2010: 19) of analytical eclecticism. While Patrick Jackson and others 
opt for the “dialogical encounters between arguments inhabiting different parts of the 
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logical space formed by the combination of basic wagers of philosophical ontology” (2011: 
210) of theoretical pluralism, the framework outlined here requires greater holism. If the 
great/superpowers are a product of both system and society but never only one of these 
realms, then switching between different ontological assumptions becomes problematic. 
Instead analytical eclecticism, while being attuned to pluralist position offers a 
“combinational logic” which “depends not on the multiplicity of methods but on the 
multiplicity of connections between different mechanisms and logics normally analyzed in 
isolation in separate research traditions” (Katzenstein and Sil 2010: 18). This is particularly 
so given the argument developed in this thesis that it is possible to bring polarity analysis 
‘in’ to the English school rather than simply investigate how neorealist ideas about polarity 
might interact with English school ideas about international society.          
The relevant English school literature also holds that an international society exists 
ontologically prior to the sorts of interactions analysed here.32 This is a distinction between 
the social structure (what Buzan calls “primary institutions”, Holsti calls “foundational 
institutions” and Reus-Smit calls “fundamental institutions”) and the multilateral 
arrangements designed by its constituent units (Buzan’s “secondary institutions”, Holsti and 
Reus-Smit’s “procedural rules” and Ruggie’s “regulative rules”) (Buzan 2004b). Such a 
distinction allows for the kind of analysis that still deals with cause and effect – for 
example, the effect of changes in polarity on particular forms of multilateral cooperation – 
but that does so in an historically contingent and social context.    
The approach to the agent-structure problem used here highlights the need to move beyond 
a narrow neorealist reading of polarity that presents an overly deterministic picture of the 
                                                     
32
 One needs to be careful to distinguish analytically between the everyday practices of states which 
can be said to be what constitutes, defines and redefines international society or what Dunne claims 
“are only given meaning by their conscious participation in common institutions” (1995: 384 )and 
the more complex forms of multilateral arrangements which can institutionalise particular forms of 
polarity such as the United Nations Security Council.  
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(material) structure of an international system. Inherent in much English school writing is 
the idea that international society is constructed by its members as part of a mutually 
constitutive relationship between agent and structure (a relationship explored in detail by 
much of the Constructivist literature).33  In particular, the predominantly influential and 
(therefore) powerful members play a distinct role in shaping this social construct. This role 
plays out as what English school writers refer to as ‘the institution of the great powers.’ Yet 
whilst the great powers play a major role in shaping international society, this social 
structure equally “shapes and shoves” (to use Waltzian language) the behaviour of its 
members (states), including the great powers. The key to understanding the structural 
dynamics of international society for the English school is the actions and words (ie. the 
physical and discursive expression of their perceptions) of the members of international 
society. Amongst English school scholars, there is a “shared rejection of the notion that an 
international society can be produced by forces that exist outside of individual human 
agents...evidencing the ‘fact’ of international society requires evidencing human 
engagement in, and human understanding of, such a society” (Navari 2009: 44).      
Method for This Study 
The specific method used here follows Alexander George and Andrew Bennett’s concept of 
“structured, focused comparison” (2004). George and Bennett described this approach in the 
following terms: 
The method is “structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the 
research objective and that these questions are asked of each case study under study to guide 
and standardize data collection, thereby making a systematic comparison and cumulation of 
the findings of the cases possible. The method is “focused” in that it deals only in certain 
aspects of the historical cases examined (2004: 67).  
 
                                                     
33
 Dunne characterises the ‘agent-structure problem’ in relation to international society in the 
following terms: “international society should be thought of in ontological terms (as a social 
structure) and agential terms (a capacity for action)” (2005: 68). 
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The question asked of each case study is: can perceptions of polarity on the part of decision 
makers and analysts that are outside of what would be expected by the standard history of 
the period be identified? This specific question focuses the discussion solely on the role of 
the great powers in playing the role envisaged by English school analysis.      
Whilst the genuine perceptions of polarity that significantly affect foreign policy decisions 
may lie in the minds of decision-makers, public intellectuals and individual citizens, the 
modern age with its penchant for recorded communication gives the historian a wide variety 
of discourses to analyse. Clues to understanding the perception of power lie in 
understandings of self-consciousness and also consciousness of others (Navari 2009: 41).      
The main data for this thesis are primary historical documents such as memoirs, diaries and 
newspapers as well as secondary sources of historical analysis. Navari describes the use of 
such data as wearing grand theory lightly but being anchored in the ‘practice’ of world 
politics. She writes that:  
The sources for such an approach would include foreign office documentation, memoirs of 
the major political actors of the time, interviews and historical archives. What they are 
looking for in this material is the self-conceptions of the actors who are participating in the 
processes that constitute international life (2009: 12).  
 
This methodological choice is driven directly by the idea of international society (even as 
ideal type) as derived from international practice rather than from a particular theoretical 
logic (eg. the logic of competition that drives the microeconomic foundations of 
neorealism). It is historical practice which dictates the main features of the framework of 
international society (or what is referred to as its primary institutions). As Buzan has put it 
“the concept of society fits with the observed data and offers a way of understanding that is 
not available using alternative concepts” (1993: 329-330). Little has pointed to the ways in 
which, even if polarity was used in the traditional sense of the distribution of material 
power, such a method would also add to the larger English school project: 
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…for the ES to progress, it is also essential to enter the diplomatic archives, particularly 
when it comes to assessing whether decision makers are being influenced by systemic 
changes in the international distribution of power or by the intersubjective norms that help to 
define and maintain international society (2009: 98).  
 
Given the redefinition of polarity used here, these two factors no longer need to be in 
competition with each other – it is no longer an either/or question between material factors 
and ideational ones. Building knowledge of historical perceptions of polarity, through 
analysing which states were treated as poles of power (both through actions and discourse) 
pushes the English school agenda even further than that envisaged by Little in this quote. 
The interpretations of who is and who is not given the social status of great/superpower at 
any one time by diplomats, politicians and analysts sheds light on how decision makers are 
influenced both by power (as they interpret it) and norms (as they are accepted and 
internalised consciously or unconsciously). In this case it is the norm of great power 
management.    
Of course such sources are not epistemologically unproblematic, as Lene Hansen has 
written in regards to memoirs: “It would however be impossible for any memoirist...to give 
as complete account of everything that has ever happened in one’s life...and literary non-
fiction is therefore dependent not only on the author’s truthfulness and memory but also on 
the author’s selection of what is most important” (2006: 69). Again it is an English 
framework that allows one to overcome such a hurdle for if international society and its 
constituent parts (institutions such as the great powers) only exist in as much as its members 
produce and reproduce it through their language and actions, then the historical record 
should act as a corrective to any disjunction between, for example, the perception of the 
polarity as expressed in a memoir years later and as it was internalised at the time. For 
example, if a decision maker claimed in a memoir that she was acting at the time as if the 
world was multipolar when her actions seem to suggest she believed the world was instead 
unipolar then the latter should be given epistemological priority in the analysis of how this 
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perception affected the role of the great powers. Put another way, it is the actions of the 
decision makers inside the members of international society (states) not their recollections 
afterwards that constitute an international society.  
However, such a problem is rarely likely to be encountered in a study of this kind given that 
what is being looked for in the data are clues to the perception of something relatively 
uncontroversial. Unlike the perceptions of the diarist, for example, of fellow political 
leaders or the level of public support for a foreign war, polarity is unlikely to be consciously 
articulated by the writer let alone done so in an attempt at revisionism.34  What is more 
likely to be challenging to this method is making judgements as to when a perception of 
polarity can or cannot be discerned in a given speech, memo or diary entry. Yet given the 
popular use of the concept this is unlikely to pose insurmountable hurdles for this kind of 
analysis. As Buzan has noted, “The terms bipolarity and unipolarity, and to a lesser extent 
multipolarity, act as a common currency across academic journals, government statements, 
diplomatic discourse and media reporting and commentary” (2004a 33).        
In terms of secondary material, this data serves two purposes. The first is in the normal 
sense favoured by qualitative social science research, and that is to supplement the primary 
sources with historiography. Therefore and particularly given the large time period under 
review here, the method follows the historical sociologist, Theda Skocpol’s argument that:  
If a topic is too big for purely primary research – and   if excellent studies by specialists are 
already available in some profusion – secondary sources are appropriate as the basic source 
of evidence for a given study. Using them is not different from survey analysts reworking 
the results of previous surveys rather than asking all questions anew (1984: 382).  
 
While there are pitfalls associated with relying entirely on secondary documents (see 
Goldthorpe 1991), the combination of secondary sources with selected primary sources can 
                                                     
34
 It is unsurprising that most of the postmodern or poststructural literature that raises serious 
epistemological issues with analysing historical narratives (such as Campbell 1998) deal with highly 
contentious issues around identity and conflict.  
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be used for “a more intimate dialogue with historical evidence” (Skocpol 1984: 385) in 
order to challenge orthodoxies and conventional wisdoms. The second purpose that the 
secondary data serves in this theoretical framework is slightly more complex in that it 
somewhat blurs the distinction between primary and secondary data. Given that both 
popular commentary (that which the author intends for a wide public, rather than specialist, 
audience) and scholarly work is normally treated as secondary data (as opposed to 
interviews, surveys, official documents, speeches, memoirs etc.), the distinction is blurred in 
that the commentary and scholarship about the great/superpowers published at the time, is 
actually treated here as a source of primary data. The standpoint adopted in this thesis is that 
the way that scholars and analysts describe the world – in this case the polarity of 
international society – can influence the perceptions of practitioners and therefore can 
provide a kind of litmus test for how the members of international society perceive 
themselves and each other. For example, one of the pieces of contemporary 
commentary/analysis used in Chapter Four is a book on British foreign policy published in 
1939 by E.H. Carr. The book includes an introduction from the Foreign Secretary at the 
time, Viscount Halifax (Carr 1939: v-vi). Given that the serving Foreign Secretary was 
confident enough in the analysis to put his name to it (literally in the case of the original 
1939 edition in large print on the front cover), it is likely that he had at least some idea of 
Carr’s assessment of the world order and Britain’s place in it. Not only that, in the 
introduction, Halifax describes Carr in the following terms: 
Mr Carr was for some years a member of the Foreign Office, where he distinguished himself 
not only by sound learning and political understanding, but also in administrative ability. 
Now the Wilson Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth, he is an eminently 
suitable person to survey the history of British foreign policy in recent years, and I think it 
will be found that he has performed this task admirably (Ibid: v).   
 
Therefore the quotations from Carr in the following chapters can be thought of as not simply 
as a representation of perceptions of world order within the academic community but 
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outside of it as well. The argument could be made of course that in this example, Carr is an 
atypical scholar given his previous civil service career. However a further example from the 
same time (which of course pre-dates the myriad of ways in which social commentators of 
all types are able to influence public debates via the electronic media, blogs, social 
networking websites etc.) illustrates the impact of scholarship on decision makers. In a book 
in which he recounts a trip to Germany in 1936 to give a lecture where he was unexpectedly 
invited to have an audience with the then Chancellor, Adolph Hitler, the historian and 
Director of Studies at Chatham House, Arnold Toynbee states that he spoke directly to 
Hitler on the issue of Germany’s status in terms of global power, 
In then said that what made us, in the countries to the west of Germany, anxious was the 
possibility that Hitler might be going to go to war with Russia. In a duel between Germany 
and Russia, I went on, we expected that Germany would be the winner...In that event, 
Germany would shoot up to the stature of a super-power on the scale of the United States; 
and then we, Germany’s western neighbours, would be overshadowed and dwarfed by this 
vastly expanded Third German Reich (1967: 282).      
 
Toynbee goes on to describe how he found out why he had been invited to discuss such 
matters with Hitler. The Director of an important state-controlled research institute and 
speech writer for the German Foreign Minister, who had organised the visit had read 
Toynbee’s criticisms of the Nazi regime in the yearly Survey of International Affairs 
published by Chatham House of which Toynbee was the editor. When he brought these 
criticisms to the attention of Hitler, the Chancellor had requested the meeting in order to 
influence Toynbee’s future writing. As Toynbee himself speculated, 
‘This Englishman,’ I think Hitler had rapidly reflected, ‘this Englishman produces a Survey 
of International Affairs every year. Before I am in a position to stop him by putting pressure 
on his Government, he may have produced half a dozen more of these volumes, and it is 
possible that they may have some effect on public opinion in the English-speaking countries 
(Ibid: 285).        
 
101 
 
Again, therefore, we can think of Toynbee’s analysis of world politics at the time not simply 
as secondary data but as a primary source of how polarity was perceived. This is as true for 
the likes of Carr and Toynbee in the 1930s as it is of scholars today, particularly those who 
go out of their way to influence public opinion and/or policymakers. As one such scholar 
(whose work is used similarly in the post-Cold War analysis in Chapter Six to Carr and 
Toynbeey’s is in Chapters Four and Five), Stephen Walt has put it, 
When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, 
therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in 
military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, 
and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have 
devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional 
stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer 
review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, 
etc.) (2011: 3).   
 
Not only then do reports from think tanks and articles in journals with a readership outside 
of academia such as Foreign Affairs, The National Interest or Survival become important 
sources of data, but so too does more specialist literature which helps to influence 
perceptions of the academics that advise governments and help shape public opinion.  
Using this method and data, understandings of the polarity of the international system will 
be analysed throughout part II. The next three chapters will trace the history of great power 
politics between 1815 and 2012 applying the redefinition of polarity outlined over the 
previous chapters with a view to identifying shifts in perceptions of world order. These 
chapters serve not only as a kind of testing ground for seeing whether this new definition of 
polarity can be applied in history to shed lights on particular empirical puzzles but also to 
provide a series of conclusions discussed in Chapter Seven for theorising polarity into the 
future.  
Before beginning the historical analysis in Part II, it may be useful to briefly summarise the 
main tenets of the theoretical framework described throughout Part I. This framework 
allows for an understanding of polarity which: 
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• Accepts neorealism’s claim that states are still centrally important actors in world 
politics and that the number of major ‘poles of power’ will be a significant factor in 
shaping the inter-state order which can be studied in history. But does so in a way 
which builds on Buzan’s formulation of complex polarity theory which distinguishes 
between superpowers, great powers and regional powers and highlights the often 
subjective nature of these classifications; 
• Rejects the neorealist assumption that polarity can ultimately be reduced to the 
distribution of material capabilities in the international system at any one point in 
time. Instead adopts the English school understanding of the existence of the 
great/superpowers as constituting a primary institution of international society and 
therefore redefines polarity as the number of states perceived as holding the social 
status of great/superpower at any one time; 
• Uses the framework of polarity in international society to bring the insights of 
historical sociology, social psychology, thin Constructivism and neoclassical realism 
to bear on the central importance of perceptions of polarity; 
• Opens up the theoretical space for a historiography of polarity in which breakdowns 
in collective perceptions of world order are possible and to therefore ask questions 
about the sources of such perceptions, both material and ideational.        
This framework is based around the key ontological position of blurring the traditional 
English school distinction between international system and international society and an 
epistemological assumption that perceptions of polarity can be studied in the words and 
actions of analysts and practitioners. This leads to a methodology of comparative 
historical analysis informed by both primary and secondary materials.  
The historical analysis of the next three chapters will be used to demonstrate not only 
the need for a redefinition of polarity but also the specific utility of the analytically 
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eclectic version built up over the last three chapters. It will also allow us to set up a 
number of conclusions to be discussed in chapter seven about the sources of perceptions 
of world order and what this might mean for taking polarity analysis forward in the 
future.  
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Part II: Historical Case Studies 
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Chapter Four: From the Concert of Europe to the World Wars (1815-
1945) 
 
On the eve of the War of 1914…the existing Great Powers were assumed to be permanent features 
in the landscape. 
Arnold J. Toynbee, The World after the Peace Conference (1925: 7).   
 
 
Previous chapters explored the ways in which a re-envisioning of great power status should 
affect our expectations of how changes in polarity influence inter-state interactions. Part I 
outlined a framework for understanding the poles of power in polarity analysis as the 
members of international society that hold a particular social status in the hierarchical inter-
state order. This chapter applies this framework to the period of 1815-1945. This period is 
generally thought of as being clearly multipolar and is closely associated with theorising 
about multipolar systems. With a focus on the central role of perception, the discussion 
examines the ambiguity that arises when a more analytically eclectic approach to polarity is 
used, and considers the implications for polarity analysis and what is described in this study 
as an English school treatment of polarity. It illustrates the key arguments of this thesis that 
our expectations about the effects of polarity in world politics cannot be based on an 
assumption that polarity is an objective phenomenon based on which states possess military, 
economic and other quantifiable resources and that polarity analysis must be able to take 
account of the element of perceptions of power.  
The Great Powers in International Society 
The argument put forward here is that polarity is not simply ‘known’ by all actors uniformly 
at a given time but is instead perceived and therefore open to interpretation. As Alexander 
Wendt puts it: “It is actor’s beliefs that make up shared knowledge, and their practices 
which confirm or falsify that knowledge over time” (2010: 188). If we think of knowledge 
and particularly shared knowledge as reliant on beliefs, perceptions and experience this 
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opens up the theoretical space for different opinions on which states are, and which are not, 
poles of power as well as particular periods of transition when the exact form of polarity 
that exists (uni, bi or multi) is unclear. So far we have discussed the continuing utility of 
polarity analysis as well as the shortcomings of the standard materially-determined view of 
polarity that fundamentally misses the constructed nature of international order (Hoffmann 
1998: 203; Clark 2001: 20) due to its neglect of the central role of perception. This chapter 
will discuss the role of the great powers over the period of 1815-1945 including perceptions 
of power across Europe, East Asia and the Americas. The approach to polarity taken here, 
discussed in Part I – in which polarity is redefined not as the distribution of material 
capabilities but instead the number of states holding a particular social status – is tested by 
examining the extent to which perceptions differed over space and time. Using the 
indicators of how states are treated in diplomatic practice, how they are discussed in official 
statements and how they are evaluated by analysts, the study of the post-1815 order up to 
the end of the Second World War will provide the empirical basis for the re-envisioning of 
polarity analysis previously outlined. This approach is deemed necessary for as William 
Wohlforth has argued, “changes in perceptions, as troublesome as they are for building and 
testing theory, do expand the explanatory utility of the distribution of power by accounting 
for a greater variation in behaviour and outcomes” (1993: 294). This, it is argued here, helps 
to bridge the gap between the ultimately inconclusive attempts discussed in Chapter Two to 
create a parsimonious theory of polarity based on power as quantified possessions and the 
everyday use of the concept of polarity by practitioners (Buzan 2004a: 33).               
Hamish Scott has argued that while the relative distribution of power amongst political units 
had been long regarded crucial to political relations, it is not until the middle of the 
eighteenth century that the term ‘great power’ and the idea of a state with special rights and 
duties in the international system emerged (2006: 117-21; Black 2008). This is at odds with 
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Hedley Bull’s account which traces at least some of the attributes of great power status 
(such as the recognition of special spheres of influence, interest or responsibility) to the 
fifteenth century (1977: 219; Little 2006: 111). Andreas Osiander adds a third dimension by 
stressing the novelty of this “two-tier setup” of managerial great powers and managed non-
great powers that was set in place at the Congress of Vienna in 181535, 
Frequently, the expression ‘great power’ is used regardless of the period being dealt with, 
but this leads to nineteenth-century assumptions about what a great power is and does being 
read into historical processes in which  such assumptions were not present ... There have 
always been big powers, of course. But both at Münster and Osnabrück and at Utrecht, the 
big powers had little sense of special rights and responsibilities (Osiander 1994:323).    
 
By the early nineteenth century the concept was well established and it is almost universally 
accepted that 1815 marks a high point (if not the starting point) in the development of  
social norm of great power management.36  According to English school theorists such as 
Bull, Martin Wight and others, this is a bi-product of the larger development and expansion 
of ‘international society.’ Depending on whose account is accepted, such an international 
social development can either be traced back to seventeenth century European diplomacy or 
much further back (and not necessarily geographically confined to Europe) (Little 2005; 
Onuma 2000; Watson 1984). Using the English school idea of international society should 
lead us to examine the way in which polarity (or which and therefore how many states held 
great power status) was perceived at the time. Richard Little alerts us to the fact that this 
was implied in Bull’s original research into the development of societal relations that 
extended beyond the systemic interactions of states. This is evident in that “Accurate 
assessments of the distribution of power…require the kind of stable environment that Bull 
associates with the existence of an international society” (2006: 111). As the post-1815 
                                                     
35
 Hans Morgenthau seemed to echo a similar sentiment when he wrote that the great powers as an 
“institution of international politics and organization…sprang from the brains of Castlereagh” (1973: 
459).  
36
 While some such as Steiner (1997: 536) argue that it was not until 1815 that the distinction really 
took hold, it is very rare for scholars to refer to a later date in discussing the origins of the concept.   
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order became consolidated and modern international society found its form in the primary 
institutions studied by Bull and others, how actors viewed the shape of the diplomatic 
world, dominated as it was by the great powers, became increasingly important, and 
therefore central to understanding power in world politics.    
The Pre-1815 Order 
The period in which we pick up our historical analysis here comes in the immediate 
aftermath of a succession of conflicts in Europe including the Napoleonic wars from 1803–
15 which had followed the French Revolutionary wars of 1792–1802. Paul Schroeder has 
characterised the period from 1815–1854 as more stable and peaceful than any comparable 
period during the preceding century (1986: 1). This point is important for our analysis as 
major war and in particular the peacemaking that generally follows such systemic upheaval 
has often been used, in practice, as an indicator of the polarity of the day in that the major 
victors are generally taken to be the main poles of power (ie. those granted great/superpower 
status) (Gilpin 1981: 203; Clark 2001: 56-78). One account goes so far as to state that “The 
postwar years constitute a unique period in which states know where they stand in the scales 
of world power” (Wohlforth 1993: 59).         
While there are differences in the lists of major powers drawn up by different scholars who 
have conducted systemic analysis for the years prior to 1815 (which implies that the 
revisionist approach to polarity employed here is at least theoretically possible for periods 
before that which is analysed in this study), most depict a firmly multipolar system in the 
decades immediately preceding 1815 (Levy 1983; Modelski and Thompson 1988). However 
David Wilkinson has argued for attributing unipolar status to France under Louis XIV and 
again under Napoleon Bonaparte (1999: 149-50) and George Liska appears to elude to a 
bipolar rivalry when he writes that, “In reality, the eighteenth-century  conflicts  between 
Britain and France were precipitated  and extended  in Europe by the competition  between 
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the two powers  for the same overseas  territories;  this competition  was far from minimized 
by the availability  of unlimited  open space” (1963: 123).37 While in theory both Britain 
and France should have been competing with at least one more power in a multipolar (or ‘3 
+’) system, in this account, the peer competitor focus in London was Paris and vice versa.  
Even when scholars have characterised the immediate period to 1815 as multipolar, change 
within this configuration is commonly referred to in the recent decline of a number of 
empires. Relying primarily on Modelski and Thompson’s use of data relating to global 
naval capabilities, Woosang Kim considers Spain a great power until 1808 and the 
Netherlands until 1810 (Kim 1992: 160; Modelski and Thompson 1988). It is important to 
note that in a large multipolar system (with say five or six poles of power), change within 
this order such as one power dropping out or another coming in should make little 
difference to the perception of the form of the overall systemic polarity (as opposed to 
changes within the same form of polarity). Yet when a multipolar order is at small numbers 
(three or four) this changes. However, mapping changes in perceptions of which states are 
considered to be great powers, and therefore be included in the polarity of the day, in large 
multipolar systems should still generate important insights for the re-envisioning of polarity 
that is undertaken in this study as it still calls into question the whole basis for treating great 
powers as simply those states with the greatest number of material capabilities.     
The Post-1815 Concert System 
The conventional wisdom on the century following the establishment of the Concert of 
Europe in 1815 is that it was distinguished from the preceding three centuries by the relative 
stability in the polarity of the European system. According to this account, two major 
changes occurred, the rise of a unified but relatively weak Italy and the disintegration of 
Prussia (subsumed by Germany) within the multipolar order neither of which had the 
                                                     
37
 In the same article Liska also refers to an earlier period of “bipolar struggle between the 
Hapsburgs and the Bourbons in the pre-revolutionary system” (1963: 130).  
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dramatic effect of the rise and fall of great powers (involving Spain, the Netherlands, 
France, Britain, Russia and Prussia) during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries (Scott 2006: 362). 
At the heart of the Concert of Europe or the ‘Congress system’ established at the Congress 
of Vienna in 1815 was the formalisation of the social differentiation between the great and 
non-great powers in Europe. F.H. Hinsley has captured the importance of the diplomatic 
practice at Vienna in signifying the collective understanding of the polarity of the society of 
states in the aftermath of the defeat of France. He notes that the ideas about order of those 
present “found expression at Vienna in the spirit in which the assembled victor states agreed 
among themselves about the detailed resettlement of Europe” (1967: 194). The Concert 
system was to underpin international order not only by providing an avenue for the 
management of relations between the great powers, but also as a means of highlighting their 
unequal power over the rest of international society (Hurrell 1999: 254). This understanding 
of the Concert’s purpose is highlighted by the approach to the great powers outlined in Part 
I in which these states are those that enjoy a very specific social status rather than simply 
control a certain share of the system’s resources. Status, unlike brute force, requires public 
displays of power in order to be affirmed and therefore the high-profile meetings of the 
Concert system provided an avenue for this.      
The Congress of Vienna was aimed at settling the geopolitical issues arising from the 
French defeat at the end of the Napoleonic wars. This included redrawing the boundaries of 
France, the Netherlands, parts of Italy, and a number of Duchies and provinces such as 
Warsaw and Saxony. The Final Act of the Congress established the right of the signatories 
to uphold its provisions which in one way or another essentially redrew the political map of 
Europe (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 108).  
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The Concert was based around a number of principles such as great power management and 
balance of power politics and took the form of regular meetings and summits aimed at 
establishing negotiated solutions to Europe’s greatest security threats. Yet ongoing disputes 
about the principles underlying the Concert’s operation (eg. how Concert powers should 
react to the revolutionary movements that threatened the old monarchical orders at various 
times throughout the nineteenth century) as well as questions of form, particularly around 
membership (eg. whether or not to admit actors such as France and the Ottoman Empire) 
remained throughout the period.  
Table 1. below lists the consultations, meetings and conferences which are associated with 
the Concert of Europe. While this summary gives an impression of a line of unbroken 
action, in fact many characterise a number of points where the Congress system effectively 
broke down. Some date the Concert’s demise from 1823 (Jervis 1982: 130) and the French 
intervention in Spain, others in the revolutionary era from 1848 (Sked 1979). Others again 
point to the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854 (Miller 1994) as the point of collapse 
while a final school of thought argues that the Concert remained in one form or another until 
the eve of World War I in 1914 (Holbraad 1970).  
Table 1. Main conferences associated with the Concert of Europe 1815-1913 
Date Location Main issue addressed 
1814-15 Vienna and Paris Peace Treaty, Quadruple Alliance 
1818 Aix-la-Chapelle France, Quadruple Alliance 
1820 Troppau Naples revolution 
1821 Laibach Naples revolution 
1822 Verona Italy, Spain, Eastern question 
1830-2 London Belgian independence 
1831-2 Rome Government of the Papal States 
1838-9 London Belgium (implementation of Treaty of London) 
1839 Vienna Egyptian revolution 
1840-1 London Egyptian independence 
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1850-2 London Schleswig-Holstein conflict 
1853 Vienna Eastern question 
1855 Vienna Eastern question 
1856 Paris Peace Treaty 
1858 Paris The Principalities (implementation of Paris 
Treaty) 
1860-1 Paris Syrian revolution 
1864 London Schleswig-Holstein, the Ionian islands 
1866 Paris Navigation on the Danube 
1867 London Luxembourg  
1869 Paris Cretan revolution 
1871 London Black Sea 
1876-7 Constantinople Eastern question 
1878 Berlin Peace Treaty 
1880 Madrid Morocco 
1884-5 Berlin Africa 
1906 Algeciras Morocco 
1912-13 London Settlement of Balkan Wars 
Adapted from Luard (1986: 301) and Hinsley (1967: 214). 
What is abundantly clear is that in 1815 there was a very widespread consensus on the 
existence of four undisputed great powers, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia. France, 
reeling from its defeat to the Fourth Coalition (also referred to as the Quadruple Alliance) 
was not treated as a peer with equal claim to great power rights and responsibilities in the 
settlement of the Napoleonic wars. This despite the fact that even after the military losses 
endured in the final years of this conflict, France remained militarily stronger than Britain, 
Austria and Prussia (Bridge 1979: 34). It was not until 1818, and after much diplomatic 
manoeuvring and negotiation that France was included as a Concert power. The United 
States was “well established” but its role “marginal to power relationships elsewhere” 
(Black 2008: 101) and Japan had yet to be considered by the European powers – those both 
claiming and developing the notion of great power status – as one of their number. This 
reinforces the notion that “status attribution is a perceptual phenomenon, but one that ought 
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to have behavioural consequences” (Volgy et al. 2011: 13) such as states with considerable 
material capabilities or even ‘rising powers’ experience economic and military growth 
should not always be expected to be automatically included into pre-existing great power 
clubs. The ‘Concert powers’ were a kind of social clique in which notions of an historical 
claim to great power status, ideas about civilisation and geography were centrally important.         
Robert Jervis has emphasised the central importance of a shared expectation about the future 
of the Concert for its survival (Jervis 1982: 366). The participants expected it to survive and 
therefore risked a higher degree of cooperation, compromise and trust in order to achieve 
their (individual and collective) aspirations of order in Europe (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 
109). Clearly, a key aspect of the Concert’s survival was understood to be its membership. 
The issue of membership of the Concert related directly to which states were and which 
were not conferred great power status. This is captured in the statement of French Prime 
Minister Richelieu who at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle insisted that France would:  
…no longer consent to receive notes signed collectively by the ministers of the four Powers. 
This Areopagus sitting in Paris and discussing the affairs of Europe and of France herself 
can no longer exist unless France forms part of it. If this surveillance is to be tolerable, it 
must be reciprocal: France may be called on to suppress a revolution in Prussia just as much 
as Prussia to suppress trouble in France (quoted in Bridge 1979: 37). 
 
Exclusivity was the order of the day given the privileged position of the initial four and 
eventual five great powers that were setting the peace and security agenda for the European 
continent. Therefore, ideas about the Concert’s future (and their subsequent effect on the 
success or otherwise of the whole arrangement) were intimately linked to perceptions of the 
polarity on the part of these powers.  
While the polarity of the system, in its limited geographical configuration as used in practice 
by the Concert powers, at least at the outset, was perceived as being stable at the time of the 
Congress of Vienna and the period immediately after, this was to be short-lived. Many of 
the crises that assailed the Concert system throughout the nineteenth century were greatly 
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influenced, if not directly caused, by changing perceptions of how power was distributed 
amongst this group of peers. 
Problematic Powers in the Concert System 
Two of the ‘undisputed’ powers of the nineteenth century raise interesting questions about 
great power status and therefore about the role of perception in defining the causal power of 
polarity. As was discussed in Chapter Two, the role of non-material factors in the 
determinants of great power status has been empirically downplayed and theoretically 
ignored in the literature on polarity. Yet Austria’s status as a great power alerts us to the 
importance of non-material considerations. As Scott has noted,  
Austria retained the status of a great power until the First World War, more due to her 
geographical extent and European role than her own intrinsic strength ... Austria thus 
remained, as she had been ever since her seventeenth-century political emergence, a state 
with the responsibilities of a great power but with an exposed and precarious strategic 
situation which she lacked the means to defend (2006: 360-1).  
 
For Herbert Butterfield, it was Klemens von Metternich’s brilliant and effective use of 
diplomacy that secured for Austria a “commanding influence in European politics totally 
out of proportion to that state’s actual power” (Schweizer and Black 2006: 624). This is 
important for the theoretical argument advanced here about the way that polarity actually 
affects inter-state relations (ie. through actor’s perceptions) as, if Butterfield was right and 
structural power can come through agency, then there is no theoretical reason why this 
should be a quirk of history associated with a particular Austrian statesmen. Of course, 
Metternich’s actions were based on a perception of Austria’s material capabilities, albeit one 
which may have been outdated or inaccurate. To put it differently, this does not mean that 
we should presume that in theory that if a diplomat as skilled as Metternich was to have 
emerged, for example, in Denmark at the time, then it too should be expected to be 
perceived as a great power. For as was outlined in Chapter Three, an analytically eclectic 
approach to polarity does not simply mean neatly substituting hard power for soft power. 
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Instead this way of analysing polarity takes material capabilities as a necessary but not 
sufficient basis for a claim to great power status. Just as important as how a contender does 
in quantitative terms is how the power is perceived and therefore treated by its peers.  
Even the agency of particular individuals or groups of diplomatic elites may not be enough 
to explain the success of Austria in ensuring its treatment as a great power for so long as this 
trend continued well past the era of Metternich. Samuel Williamson has written of Austria, 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as a so-called great power without the 
“latent material and economic resources to allow for a competitive military build-up; it 
could not keep up with the Joneses, so to speak” (2010: 104). Yet Austria’s historical 
legacy, largely thanks to the hugely dominant role Metternich had played in European 
politics right up to his resignation as Foreign Minister in 1848, clearly carried Vienna’s 
status well past its material capabilities allowed.           
Similarly, Prussia was without doubt treated as a great power throughout the Napoleonic era 
and immediately after yet was in reality, as was even noted by the French minister 
Talleyrand at the time, a great power in name only (Scott 2006:4). Prussia had suffered 
greatly during the Napoleonic wars – so much so that one account talks of it being “nearly 
eclipsed as a great power” after its military defeat in 1806 (Rosecrance 2010: 21). Yet at the 
Congress of Vienna, Prussia was treated as a full partner and acted accordingly demanding 
recognition of its claim to Saxony. This claim was disputed by Austria but the British 
Foreign Secretary, Viscount Castlereagh persuaded Vienna to accept a deal giving far 
greater concessions to Prussia than was expected (Bridge and Bullen 2005: 28). Scott has 
written that these cases demonstrate the important but not sufficient role of material 
resources in the emerging great power system at the time, “international leadership rested 
not merely on resources and administrative, military, and where appropriate, naval power, 
but on the willingness of the established elite to treat a newcomer as one of their number” 
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(2006: 4). Again the balance between material capabilities and ideational factors in the way 
scholars think about power relationships appears to affect the role of Prussia as a pole of 
power throughout the period. Mathew Rendall goes a step further to argue that the use of 
hard power (as well as its actual or potential possession in terms of capabilities) greatly 
affects the way states such as Prussia are viewed with hindsight by offensive realists such as 
John Mearsheimer. Rendall states that most scholars regard Prussia as one of the great 
powers for the entire nineteenth century, yet is only considered so by Mearsheimer from 
1862 onwards with the coming to power of Otto von Bismark (Rendall: 525). From his 
defensive realist position, Rendall argues that this is partly because “making potential and 
actual military power criteria for being a great power means excluding some states that 
exercise restraint” (525).   
The Ottoman Empire is often discussed on the margins of the story of the great powers of 
the nineteenth century and it only makes it onto some of the list of contenders in the 
standard polarity literature (see for example Levy 1981). If we consider the way in which it 
was treated at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, it is interesting to note that Castlereagh went 
to some effort to try and include a mention of the Ottoman Empire in the Vienna Final Act. 
Yet this was far from providing Constantinople a “seat at the table” out of a recognition of 
the empire’s prestige as great power (Larson and Schevchenko 2010: 192; Schweller 1999). 
Instead Castlereagh’s plan was to include a guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire that “the Powers” would sign up to and even agree to enforce in a kind of collective 
security arrangement (Hinsley 1967: 200). This demonstrates that it was treated as a state 
which the great powers would need to protect from the designs of one another and not as a 
peer.   
What historians now, in hindsight, refer to as the decline of the Ottoman Empire (known at 
the time as the ‘Eastern Question’) not only raised questions about the role of this former 
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major player but also encouraged rivalry and competition between certain members of the 
Concert order. The period of 1821-41 presented the Concert powers with a number of 
challenges as to precisely how the holders of great power status were to manage the gradual 
decline of Ottoman influence in the Balkans and what is today referred to as the Middle 
East. In particular, the Greek war of independence of 1821-33 and the two Egyptian revolts 
of 1831-33 and 1839-41 became, according to Schroeder “the most complicated, persistent, 
and dangerous question in European politics” (1986: 6) at the time.     
In the latter half of the century, Britain and Russia viewed the growing power vacuum in the 
East as an opportunity to increase their respective power in Europe. It is reasonably clear 
now in hindsight that Russian leaders overestimated the extent to which the other European 
powers would allow it to dictate the terms by which the decline of the Ottoman power 
would be managed. As Paul Schroeder has highlighted, the Crimean War “began  with  a 
clearly superior  allied  coalition (Britain,  France,  and  the  Ottoman  Empire)  facing  a  
Russia  diplomatically isolated,  politically  and  militarily threatened,  aware  of its peril,  
and  looking for an  honorable  retreat” (1994: 122).  
Yet, towards the middle of the nineteenth century we see an increase in diplomatic efforts 
with Constantinople appointing an ambassador to London in 1836 and re-establishing 
permanent embassies in Vienna, Paris and London in 1835-6. Such moves were part of a 
gradual move towards greater status recognition throughout the nineteenth century.  By 
1853, British Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston was discussing the indispensable role of the 
Ottoman Empire for the European continent. Writing to the Foreign Secretary, the Earl of 
Clarendon he observed that “the activity, spirit & the Energy, moral & Physical, military & 
political which the Turks have displayed in dealing with their present Crisis, must surely 
convince any impartial & unprejudiced Person that Turkey is not a dead or dying Body, but 
that on the Contrary it possesses Powers of Life & national Resources which render it worth 
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maintaining as a useful Element in the European Balance” (quoted in Brown 2002: 161-2). 
Ian Clark notes that by 1856, the Ottoman Empire was being “coopted by the European 
powers” (1989: 95). This relates directly to the fact that it was treated as great power at the 
Congress of Paris that year following the Crimean war and not simply as a victim of great 
power aggression. It was not until the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1856 that the Ottoman 
Empire was formally admitted into the Concert of Europe.38     
Late Nineteenth Century Rising Powers 
Further to the east, the final two contenders for major power status throughout the period, 
and particularly in the latter part, were the rising Pacific powers of the United States and 
Japan. Clark suggests that the United States was being treated as a great power “towards the 
closure of the century if not earlier” and that Japan’s status during this time is best 
symbolised by the 1902 treaty signed with Britain (1989: 95). This treaty established an 
alliance between London and Tokyo and explicitly recognised each party’s special interests 
in Northeast Asia.    
While it was Britain who had fought the revolutionaries in the previous century during the 
War of Independence, many of the European great powers had been directly involved on the 
North American continent (including Spain, France, and Russia). Yet the days of the United 
States being a newly emerging independent state still providing a setting for European 
‘offshore balancing’ had passed by the middle of the nineteenth century (Little 2007b: 72). 
By 1857, Palmerston was observing that “We have given way Step by Step to the North 
Americans on almost every disputed matter, and I fear that we shall have more or less to do 
so upon every other Question except the maintenance of our own Provinces and of our West 
Indian Islands” (quoted in Little 2007b: 75). One account notes that by the 1870s the United 
                                                     
38
 It should also be noted that this recognition by the Concert powers did not necessarily ensure the 
Ottoman Empire’s territorial integrity (Adanir 2005).  
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States had already overtaken Britain as the world’s largest and most advanced economy 
(Cox, Dunne and Booth 2001: 11). 
However, the history of the rise of the United States into the league of great power status in 
a perceived multipolar order also provides evidence of the inability of traditional definitions 
of polarity as the distribution of material capabilities to capture the reality of how power 
operates in world politics. By taking a purely materialist approach to polarity, which 
assumes that polarity is uniformly understood across space and time due to the objective 
quantitative foundations of great power status, the United States should not only be well 
established as a pole of power by this time. In fact, by the turn of the century, according to 
John Mearsheimer, the United States was far ahead of Britain in the two principal indicators 
of military might; population and industrial strength (2001: 246). The Correlates of War 
project data shows that by 1920 the United States was producing 33.1 millions of tons of 
iron and steel than its nearest competitor (Britain) and consuming 482 millions of metric 
tons of coal equivalent more than Britain (again the second highest consumer at the time) 
(quoted in May 2010: 229). This would appear to place Washington in something more of a 
unipolar position – in purely quantitative terms – yet the way great power status was granted 
by its peers does not bear this out at all. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is 
a period in which the rising Pacific powers of the United States and Japan slowly learned to 
translate their growing material capabilities into diplomatic attempts to gain this much 
sought after social status and the gradual reciprocation by the established European powers 
by conferring at least ‘rising power’ status.             
In particular it was the ‘Far Eastern crisis’ of 1895-1905 that, according to Clark, 
demonstrated the arrival of Washington and Tokyo as centres of global power: 
It offered a stage for the United States to convert its growing economic and technological 
muscle into a degree of diplomatic leverage: its stake in the Philippines in 1898, the ‘Hay 
Open Door’ notes in relation to China and the hosting of the Portsmouth peace settlement 
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between Russia and Japan in 1905 all bore witness to America’s coming of international 
age.  At the same time, Japan’s war against China in 1894-5, her alignment with Britain and 
her symbolic victory over Russia in 1905 testified to an Asiatic presence in the world power 
structure (1989: 95).   
 
Writing of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, Seung-Young Kim notes that following the 
Japanese victory, the British government asked the United States to join her alongside 
Russia, Germany and France in an intervention with a view to achieving Korean 
independence. The invitation was declined as according to Kim, “In the view of American 
leaders, a strong Japan would counterbalance the European intrusion in East Asia and could 
promote a favourable balance of power for the United States in the region” (2009: 18). Two 
years later, Japan lost the Korean peninsula to a coalition intervention by Russia, France and 
Germany. 
By the turn of the century, Japan clearly saw itself as a great power (modelled on the great 
powers of Europe and North America) and was clearly treated as such at the peace 
conference at Portsmouth, New Hampshire in 1905 following the Russo-Japanese war. The 
war had effectively reversed the outcome of the previous Triple Intervention (Mearsheimer 
2001: 178) and by 1907, Japan and Russia were negotiating with each other over Korea, 
Manchuria and Outer Mongolia as states of roughly equal status within a multipolar system. 
The earlier Anglo-Japanese alliance formalised in the signing of the 1902 treaty mentioned 
above (subsequently renewed and extended in scope in 1905 and then again in 1907) 
marked “a major effort to incorporate Japan into equations of international strength and the 
algebra of great power calculations” (Black 2010: 164). However the fact that Britain’s 
allies, particularly France, did not feel equally compelled to do the same suggests that the 
geographic, historical and cultural barriers to accepting Japan as a great power may have 
been surmountable for Britain with its eastern interests and recent rivalry with Russia, but 
were perhaps not yet for Paris.        
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Mearsheimer paints China’s role throughout these years of unrest in Northeast Asia as very 
much a minor power (particularly after its military defeat to Japan in 1895) and following 
the intervention of the three European powers in Korea, Russia replaced China as Japan’s 
main rival in the region (2001: 177). Symbolically, China lost Korea as the vassal state that 
it had once been to great power competition of which it was not seen to be involved as a 
major player. Mearsheimer, focusing solely on material capabilities, writes that “Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States played key roles in checking Japan between 1895 
and 1945” while China “remained economically backward until well after 1945” (176). 
Interestingly, writing in the North American Review in 1898, Archibald Colquhoun argued 
that “The two generative factors in the Far Eastern development…are, of course, Russia and 
China, which possess between them, in an altogether peculiar degree, the procreative 
properties which evolve great events” (513). Yet Colquhoun is not referring to the two states 
as equal powers but Russia as “comparatively poor” but “confident in her own power to 
dominate  and appropriate the resources of her gigantic but inorganic neighbour” and China 
as lying “like a vast terrestrial depression with a body of water pent up alongside of it” 
(514). He goes on to describe Britain, Germany, and importantly, Japan as “world powers” 
competing for the spoils of China. This reinforces the significance (but not sole importance) 
of material strength in shaping perceptions of great power status. During the period in 
question, China clearly was neither treated as, nor had the material basis for a claim to being 
treated as, a pole of power. It may also lead to the conclusion that as international society 
expanded the criteria for great power status was not equally applied. While history and 
culture seemed to work in favour of states such as Austria and Prussia it counted against 
potential powers outside of Europe. Equally material capabilities seem to count for more 
outside of the traditional realms of European great power politics allowing entry into the 
club for the United States and Japan but not for China.       
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Some such as Schweller (1999) have included Italy, in the list of late nineteenth century 
rising powers alongside the United States and Japan. Yet there is little evidence that Italy 
was thought of in this way at the time, regardless of military and economic developments 
which have been analysed since. This not to say that Italian decision makers did not think of 
Italy as a great power after unification in the 1860s (Bridge and Bullen 2005: 1). Paying 
particular attention to the importance of self-perception in understandings of polarity alerts 
one to the difference between aspiration and peer recognition for rising powers. The Triple 
Alliance of 1882 between Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy was for the two ‘central 
powers’ simply a “makeshift measure to cope with an emergency” (the Russian response to 
Vienna’s attempts to put down the October 1881 Bosnian rebellion and the possibility of a 
Franco-Russian alliance) (ibid: 221). However, for Italy, the Triple Alliance “represented 
the fulfilment of a long-cherished aspiration” (ibid) – status recognition as a peer by other 
European powers. Yet this was still a limited recognition. It was recognition as a useful ally 
by two of the six European powers and only in as much as it might provide an extra 
disincentive to Russia, and particular its somewhat belligerent General Skobelev, to ally 
with France and make war with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Interestingly, the Triple 
Alliance, while officially replacing the previous Double Alliance between Germany and 
Austria, did not prevent only these two countries (and not Italy) in making joint military 
plans in the event of hostilities in the east (ibid: 224). Italy continued to attach itself to other 
powers for the rest of the century to guarantee its security (including first Britain and then 
France) further signifying its inability to convincingly act like a great power and therefore 
be treated as such in turn (Taylor 1974: 382-3).   
What the Triple Alliance also signifies is the relative decline of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. The fact that Italy was included at all tells us something of the diminished status of 
Vienna in terms of the balance of power in the late nineteenth century. Richard Little has 
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pointed out that alongside the influence of Eurocentrism, a purely materialist methodology 
accounts for why, for example, Kenneth Waltz (1979; see also Corbetta et al. 2011: 223) 
regards Italy and the Austro-Hungarian Empire as poles of power during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries well after others such as Buzan (2004a: 49-50) have relegated 
them to the role of regional powers (Little 2007a: 187). The Austro-Hungarian Empire 
struggled to keep up with the other powers in the latter half of the nineteenth century and 
into the beginning of the twentieth and at least in military terms by 1914 was really viewed 
as a regional power in the limited sense (ie. a central European power) than a Europe-wide, 
let alone a global one (Strachan 2006: 12).  
Perceptions of Bipolarity 
Once a sole focus on the distribution of capabilities is substituted for a more social and 
historically contingent version of polarity a slightly more complex picture of the polarity 
emerges. Not only does the revisionist approach to polarity developed in this study help to 
explain the discrepancies in the way that post-hoc analysis has treated certain great power 
contenders, but it also points to a weakness in the blanket characterisation of the whole 
period under review in this chapter as multipolar. In other words, not only does it point to 
changes within polarity that are not captured in the standard approach but also highlights 
potential changes of polarity as well due to the central role of perception. In the latter half of 
the century, and particularly throughout the 1870s, perceptions of a Russo-British bipolar 
order can be detected amongst policymakers and analysts. One of the pitfalls of relying on 
historical analysis that focuses on material capabilities, and often (particularly during the 
period under review in this chapter) a disproportionate focus on military capabilities, is that 
gradual systemic change is overlooked. Instead systemic change is treated as points of major 
upheaval in diplomatic history – as discerned in post-hoc analysis. Yet if the structure of the 
international system provides sets of incentives and disincentives (Pelz 1991: 49) for 
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decision makers and analysts at the time, then a more historically contingent approach is 
necessary to discern the degree of interaction between system structure and decision 
making. As Ole Holsti has written, “although some dramatic events are widely perceived as 
marking the beginning of new eras in international affairs – these are often the start or 
termination of major wars such as the years 1648, 1815, 1914, or 1945 – systemic changes 
may occur far less dramatically and over a more protracted period” (1991: 87). Again such a 
starting point opens up the theoretical space for perceptions, and particularly differing 
perceptions, to become all important.        
While some in other European capitals were still clearly thinking in multipolar terms (see 
for example John Westlake’s influential Chapters on the Principles of International Law of 
1894), William Langer has noted Bismark’s concern over the outbreak of hostilities between 
Russia and Britain in 1877 during the Russian-Turkish war which “might well end in a 
cataclysm” (1931: 123). Langer’s own assessment of the crisis is that Britain “together with 
Russia, had come to play the leading role in the whole Near Eastern problem, so that the 
history of the crisis began to centre more and more on the relations between these two 
countries” (122).  By March of the following year the idea that the main centres of power in 
Europe were Britain and Russia appeared to have been accepted in London when Prime 
Minister Disraeli spoke to his cabinet of “the overshadowing interference of Russia” in the 
East (Langer 1931: 137).   
The bipolar image of the late nineteenth century is evident in military terms when one 
considers the limits to British naval dominance posed by Russia. While Russia posed a very 
serious threat on land, it had no equivalent to the Royal Navy whose might was unmatched. 
Yet Russia relied on a relatively small amount of seaborne trade (most of which could in 
fact be diverted overland anyway) and therefore could not be effectively threatened by naval 
blockade (Papastratigaki 2010: 643). Added to this, continental Russia presented Britain 
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with few strategic targets which could be targeted by sea (Papastratigaki 2010: 643) making 
Russia much less vulnerable to direct attack by Britain’s most potent military capability than 
other powers in Europe, North America or East Asia. The bipolar image is also strongly 
hinted at by William Thompson when reflecting on the parallels with the later US-Soviet 
bipolar struggle of the Cold War in the latter half of the twentieth century. In demonstrating 
the clearly multipolar order in which particular regional bilateral rivalries took place within 
in the lead up to World War II, Thompson writes that “Indeed, the U.S.-USSR rivalry more 
closely resembled the older Anglo-Russian rivalry than it did the Anglo-French or Anglo-
German rivalries” of the inter-war years (1997: 63).  
While this bipolar rivalry was at its most potent in the late nineteenth century, it had its 
roots in a much earlier period. The perception of a bipolar order based around the two poles 
of Britain and Russia is important for thinking about the success or otherwise of the Concert 
of Europe. The decline of the Concert would mark a major change in the form of 
multilateral security cooperation in Europe. Castlereagh was clearly concerned about the 
endurance of a multipolar system given that the whole notion of the balance of power was 
entirely thought of solely in multipolar terms. Therefore his view of the conservative Holly 
Alliance (of Russia, Austria and Prussia) was coloured by the fact that he thought it would 
increase Russian influence in Europe which equated to an end to a multipolar balance 
(Davis 2004: 36).  
Palmerstone’s enthusiasm for the 1834 British-French-Spanish-Portuguese alliance (known 
as the Quadruple Alliance despite the same term being used to describe the original anti-
Napoleonic alliance of 1813) had as much to do with Russia as it did the monarchical 
struggles in Spain and Portugal. Palmerston was convinced of the need of a strong counter 
to Russian ambitions and was at pains to convince the Cabinet of Viscount Melbourne of the 
need for a proactive approach to thwarting Russian influence (Davis 2004: 38). Palmerston 
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was unequivocal when he stated that there was “the same principle of repulsion between 
Russia and us that there was between us an Bonaparte” (quoted in Bridge and Bullen 2005: 
96).     
Schroeder has gone even further than to argue that the late nineteenth century was bipolar 
but in fact that the entire Concert system from 1815 onwards was not based on a multipolar 
balance of power but in fact what he has referred to as a “factual condition of leadership or 
primacy” enjoyed by Britain and Russia (1992: 705-6). This evidenced, according to 
Schroeder, by the fact that “nothing prevented Britain and Russia, whenever they chose, 
from combining to impose their will on the rest of Europe” (1992: 692). Similarly, but with 
a greater attention to the post-hoc nature of the description, William Wohlforth paints a 
picture of the period under review here as being mostly bipolar (with a multipolar interlude 
in the middle). Yet, for Wohlforth it is not just a matter of a simple Russo-British rivalry. 
Instead he writes that “From 1815 to 1853, it was a Pax Britannica et Russica; from 1853 to 
1871, it was not a pax of any kind; and from 1871 to 1914, it was a Pax Britannica et 
Germanica” (1999: 39).   
This certainly gives the impression of an order in which two major states dominate the 
entire system (at least in terms of potential) for large parts of the period. Yet this claim to a 
much longer bipolar period does not stand up to the test applied in this study – that of 
perception on the part of a pole’s fellow states (both major and minor powers). As Clark 
points out, Schroeder’s overly materialist view (which is partly echoed by Wohlforth in the 
quote above) is contradicted by the contemporary account of one of the Concert’s officials 
and most famous figures, Friedrich von Gentz who talked of the Concert “uniting all the 
states collectively with a federative bond, under the guidance of the five principal Powers” 
(quoted in Clark 2011b: 79). Despite the “factual conditions” that Schroeder points to from 
the vantage point of the historian, what is important for thinking about how the polarity of 
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the day actually affected the foreign policies of states is what Clark describes as “the 
perception” that a new order based around multiple poles of power having special rights and 
responsibilities “was also being conferred a quasi-legal basis” (2011b: 79). It is quite clear 
that there was a generally widespread perception of a clearly multipolar order (with four, if 
not five) major poles of power in the period immediately following 1815, even if this gave 
way to a bipolar perception in some quarters at a much later stage.  
The sense of a changed perception on the part of Russian leaders of the polarity is evident in 
the Anglo-Russian rapprochement that culminated in the convention of 1907. Pressure from 
not only British diplomats but also their French counterparts combined with the shock of the 
defeat to the Japanese in 1905 as well as the Franco-German crisis over Morocco (March 
1905–March 1906). All of this, according to  Marina Soroka “reconciled Russia’s rulers to 
the idea of a shift in its political orientation that necessitated a settlement with Britain, its 
traditional rival” (2010: 1). A more multilateralist approach to security in Europe appeared 
to be an imperative for Nicholas II’s Russia once the perception was of a more complex 
multipolar order rather than a more evenly based bipolar competition with Britain. The 
Russian ambassador in London, Count Aleksandr Konstantinovich Benckendorﬀ repeatedly 
warned colleagues after 1905 of the dangers of a rising Germany and was only convinced of 
Russia’s safety from German attack after the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention was signed 
(Soroka 2010: 5).  
Perceptions of Unipolarity 
The standard view of an unchanged multipolar order from 1815-1945 in the polarity 
literature is also challenged by the idea of a potentially unipolar image centred on what is 
often referred to as Britain’s hegemonic role. A great deal of the attention given to Britain’s 
potential unipolar role at this time relates specifically to its economic strength and the 
changes to its military power brought about by innovation in its world-class navy. In 
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relation to the former Keohane goes so far as to say that “Britain in the nineteenth century 
and the United States in the twentieth met the material prerequisites for hegemony better 
than any other states since the industrial revolution” (1984:36). Yet others have summarised 
this position as stemming not only from London’s economic primacy and naval supremacy 
but also as embodying the “successful state that others might emulate” (Clark 2011b: 117). 
This is echoed by David Calleo who claims Britain became a world power “out of scale 
with traditional European states” which “inevitably promoted imitation” (1987: 138). This 
idea that a polar power has a certain attractiveness in terms of imitation is a common theme 
in the polarity literature, particularly throughout the Cold War.    
In terms of diplomatic practice, the unipolar perception is also underscored by the persistent 
recourse to isolationism, mainly under conservative governments in Britain. This tendency 
in British foreign policy towards Europe was rarely, if ever, based on a sense of being an 
equal partner in the great power manoeuvrings of the day but wishing to play a minor role in 
this. Instead the idea was of Britain enjoying a sense of primacy that meant that it was less 
reliant on traditional strategies of balancing, alliances and intervention. While it is the late 
nineteenth century era of British foreign policy, under the leadership of Prime Ministers 
Disraeli and Salisbury, that is usually associated with Britain’s so-called ‘splendid 
isolationism’ (and aligns with the unipolar image of the same period), such sentiments can 
be traced back as far as the 1820s when Foreign Secretary (and later conservative Prime 
Minister) George Canning decried getting “deeply in all the politics of the Continent, 
whereas our true policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies, and 
then with commanding force” (quoted in Chamberlaine 1988: 63). The tendency amongst 
liberals to eschew this mix of isolationism and unilateralism (associated closely with 
unipolarity –Buzan 2004a) seems to have added to a more multipolar perception. For 
example in 1853, in discussing the importance of the Eastern question, Palmerston was 
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concerned with maintaining a balancing coalition to counter Russian power, arguing that 
“unless England & France are prepared to sink down into the Condition of second Rate 
Powers they must prevail” (quoted in Brown 2002: 162). Russia is certainly being discussed 
in polar terms as are both Britain and France in this quote.    
The unipolar perception is reflected in E.H. Carr’s view of Britain’s dominant role not only 
in Europe but in the Pacific as well. During a period (discussed above) in which the purely 
European dominance of the very top of the social hierarchy of international society was 
being challenged by the rising powers of the United States and Japan, Carr depicts a world 
in which Britain calls the shots, playing lesser powers off against each other. Carr sees an 
all-powerful Britain enjoying economic supremacy based on leadership of world markets as 
a manufacturing and exporting country and political supremacy based on matchless naval 
power in the Pacific. He notes that when “towards the end of the nineteenth century Russia 
began seriously to encroach on China’s land frontier and, supported by France, to challenge 
British predominance, Britain called in the rising, but still modest, power of Japan to redress 
the balance” (1939b: 55). Duncan Bell has noted that while not the only motivating factor, 
the rise of competitor powers (such as Germany, Russia and even eventually the United 
States), was one of the reasons that a debate formed within Britain towards the end of the 
nineteenth century about the need to form ‘Greater Britain’ (2007: 26). Greater Britain 
revolved around the idea of consolidating British global power in the face of relative decline 
through a closer union with the settler colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and parts 
of South Africa. Bell argues that this push for colonial unity under the banner of a Greater 
Britain “was driven in part by the perceived need to theorize and construct a bulwark against 
the encroachment of a powerful set of global challengers” (2007: 2).     
However the actions and statements of diplomats and statesmen in the early twentieth 
century appear to significantly challenge the idea of Britain holding unipolar status and even 
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cast doubt (at least from the vantage point of a decade or so later) that this status had ever 
been held in the final decade of the previous century. As tensions increased between Russia 
and Japan in Northeast Asia, the British tried to intervene by sending Sir Charles Hardinge 
to negotiate with his Russian counterpart Count Benckendorff in 1903. Instead of acting as a 
unipolar power able to organise “major politico-military action anywhere in the system” 
(Brooks and Wohlforth 2008: 13), Hardinge complained of Russia encroaching on British 
interests and provoking hostility in the years prior by “pursuing an aggressive policy in 
China, Persia, and Afghanistan” (quoted in White 1995: 37). This sentiment was echoed by 
the British diplomat Cecil Spring Rice who remarked later that year that “England is warned 
that the defence of India will become a far more serious matter if Russia is opposed in the 
development of her Far Eastern possessions” (quoted in Ibid: 40) and Hardinge later 
recollected of the negotiations over Tibet and Manchuria that London was “losing ground 
all the time” (Hardinge 1947: 1947: 84). Even the fact that Russo-Japanese rivalry had risen 
to the extent that Britain felt compelled to attempt to intervene (and interestingly France 
also attempted to play a role) in the early years of the twentieth century, points to the fact 
that in the minds of decision makers even in London, international society was no longer 
perceived as unipolar. Yet the apparent shock with which British policymakers appeared to 
view London’s fortunes on the international stage at this time strongly suggests that a 
unipolar perception, at least in some quarters, had not disappeared overnight and was only 
gradually receding. The rapid push towards signing a series of international treaties in the 
first decade of the twentieth century (including the Hay-Pauncefote treaties with the United 
States in 1900 and 1902, the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, and the ententes with first 
France in 1904 and then Russia in 1907) were a sign of Britain “becoming more like other 
European powers” (Salmon 1997: 142). In a speech in 1905, the Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Edward Grey, described the “spirit” of the entente agreement with France as being “more 
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important than the letter of the agreement” (quoted in Otte 2003: 80). Even if the perception 
of polarity had changed sooner in other capitals than it had in London, this alerts us to the 
fact that understandings of power structures are far less pervasive and robust than the 
standard literature claims. It also reinforces the point that these understandings of power 
should be “accorded a major explanatory role in the framing of national policy” (Rosecrance 
and Steiner 2010: 351). 
The World Wars, the Inter-War Years and the Consolidation of Multipolarity 
By the era of World War I and the inter-war years, the perception of a potentially unipolar 
Britain had subsided and a multipolar order was once again the dominant image of the 
international structure. Perhaps the clearest indicator of the multipolar perception is the 
provision in the original text of the Covenant of the League of Nations for the Council 
having a permanent membership of five powers (Britain, France, Italy, the United States and 
Japan). There was even provision for an eventual enlargement to include Germany and 
Russia as permanent members as two states with what were perceived to be legitimate 
claims to great power status.   
Yet by 1939, Carr – an influential British analyst who had only a few years earlier worked 
for the Foreign Office – appeared to be characterising this period leading to World War II in 
bipolar terms when he wrote that “Not only can Britain never contemplate war with the 
United States, but she could never contemplate any war with a first-class Power in which 
she could not count on the benevolent neutrality of the United States (1939b: 44). Carr goes 
on to describe the United States as “assuming the position of one of the two great world 
Powers” and of acquiring “responsibilities which they can scarcely evade and interests 
which they feel impelled to defence” (46). The tendency towards a perception of bipolarity 
seems to have reappeared in the analysis of the time but this time with a more global focus 
rather than a European one.  
132 
 
The years of World War II of 1939-45 are again generally thought of as firmly multipolar 
given the central role that this period has played in the literature on the effect of multipolar 
systems on instability and war. This period which Schweller (1993) characterises as tripolar 
can only be truly said to be so on narrow material terms (Little 2007a: 187 Fn26) and 
therefore cannot be expected to be a large factor in perceptions of polarity which, as we 
have seen, are based as much on non-material dynamics as they are on military, economic 
and other material considerations. The post-war settlement and the creation of the United 
Nations, with its Security Council dominated by five permanent members with veto power, 
institutionalised the multipolar perception. Yet, as the next chapter discusses, this 
institutionalisation disguised a shift towards what would become a deeply entrenched 
bipolarity for decades to come.   
Conclusion 
The period of 1815-1945, whilst often being depicted in hindsight as an unending multipolar 
era (Wilkinson 1999) was in fact a far more complex one in which the systemic picture is 
somewhat confusing and at times contradictory. Using the theoretical framework developed 
in Part I to guide the historical analysis we have identified a number of points of friction in 
the conventional understanding of polarity as being uniformly ‘known’ and accepted by the 
mebers of international society throughout the period. Holsti points out that even post-hoc 
analysis is not always aligned here and it is therefore to be expected that contemporary ideas 
about the polarity which gave international society its hierarchical form at any one point in 
time were similarly inconsistent. He notes that while Richard Rosecrance identifies four 
distinct systems between 1815 and 1890, Stephen Pelz sees only one (a multipolar order 
based on a classical balance of power) (Holsti 1991: 87). For Holsti, the point is “not to take 
sides between Pelz and Rosecrance, but to illustrate that even long after the fact rigorous 
scholars can disagree about whether systemic change took place” (87).   
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What the analysis in this chapter has shown is that the standard treatment of polarity in 
mainstream theories of IR simply don’t capture the complexity of how systemic or structural 
power actually operates in practice. Through an analysis of the words and actions of key 
players in history, we have seen that some states are granted the special social station of 
great power status based not only on material capabilities. We have also seen that changes 
both within and of polarity can be perceived differently and therefore should not be 
expected to structure “the horizon of states’ probable actions and reactions” uniformly and 
in totally predictable ways (Ikenberry,  Mastanduno and Wohlforth 2009b: 5).  
In particular, the evidence presented here suggests that geography, culture and history have 
mattered in the construction of polarity in the past. This is important not only for the way in 
which we tell the story of the expansion of international society but also for how we use 
history when discussing the effect of different forms of polarity, power transitions and 
historical world orders. The discussion has also suggested that, in line with the expectations 
of the theoretical approach outlined in the previous chapters,  both material and non-
material aspects are important in the granting of great power status. However it has also 
suggested that this is not necessarily equally so in different time periods and across different 
regions in the world, particularly as European international society expanded. This also 
raises the key issue of legitimacy and its role in the attribution of great power status. The 
discussion of the Concert of Europe in particular highlights that that principles of legitimacy 
have been central to the historical construction of the social institution of the great powers 
(Clark 2011b: 73-97) and therefore which states end up constituting part of the systemic 
polarity. This reinforces the notion that the English school is the appropriate theoretical 
home for this kind of revisionist treatment of polarity. As a school of thought that starts with 
diplomatic practice in history and then uses this as the basis of theorising order is well 
suited to the task of analysing issues around which states have been treated as great powers 
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as well as which states were discussed in these terms in official statements and influential 
analysis in order to understand perceptions of polarity.    
Finally, the analysis of the perceptions of polarity throughout the period of 1815-1945 has 
highlighted that contradictory views can be held, even within one state, regarding the 
polarity of international society at any one time. This strongly suggests that current 
approaches to understanding the way different forms of polarity affect inter-state interaction 
in key areas of war, stability, trade, cooperation and governance must take into account the 
ambiguities inherent in the functioning of the social construction of world order. If Adam 
Watson is correct and for international society to “function effectively, the dialogue between 
its major powers must be system-wide” then the way we theorise great power management 
and international society as a whole must be able to theoretically handle the kinds of 
breakdowns in collective perceptions discussed in this chapter.  
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Chapter Five: The Cold War (1946-1989) 
 
This chapter investigates the importance of perceptions of global polarity in what is 
generally thought of as the clearest example of bipolarity in history, from the end of the 
Second World War up to the late 1980s. Yet the period involves a more gradual transition 
into this new order than is often portrayed in post-hoc accounts that fail to distinguish 
between knowledge imposed on the analysis in hindsight and perceptions at the time. The 
period also includes the rise of three challenges to a uniform and unbroken perception of 
bipolarity.  
The chapter takes the discussion from a supposedly long period of multipolarity 
(Mearsheimer 1990: 11) which was questioned in the previous chapter to a period in which 
traditional ways of looking at polarity – as the global distribution of material capabilities – 
should, at first glance, be able to explain much of the diplomatic history being analysed.  If 
this was the case, the redefinition of polarity put forward here might be said to be of use 
only in certain circumstances, for example only in the case of power transitions occurring 
without the incidence of major war or something similar. However this chapter 
demonstrates that even in the case of the supposedly unambiguous bipolarity of the Cold 
War years, an analytically eclectic approach to polarity helps to explain a number of 
contradictions in this story that have often been marginalised. Such challenges to the picture 
of a clear and unbroken bipolar structure raise a number of theoretical issues for the 
standard approach to polarity analysis. For example, expectations about what Glenn Snyder 
calls “alliance security dilemmas” being weak in bipolar systems (1984) or our certainty that 
“In a bipolar world, a 10 per cent increase in the arms spending of power A must be 
answered by an equal increment in the arms of B” (Deutsch and Singer 1964: 402) become 
increasingly unreliable when perceptions of polarity diverge amongst actors. Even if Robert 
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Jervis is right and despite the debate between realists who view bipolarity as more 
dangerous and unstable than multipolarity and those who argue the opposite, there is in fact 
uniform agreement that “bipolarity significantly changed world politics” (1998: 984), this 
position still assumes clear agreement at all times of this period that the global structure was 
actually bipolar.     
After examining the nature of the transition from multipolarity to bipolarity, the analysis 
will cover perceptions of US decline and the rise of China and India and their effect on ideas 
of order and disorder in international society as well as the final decline of bipolarity with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.    
From Big Four, to Big Three, to Big Two 
With hindsight, we know now that in the final years of World War II, the world was moving 
from a multipolar to a bipolar order. Yet the approach to polarity taken in this study points 
to the importance of shared perceptions of polarity breaking down particularly during times 
of major transition. If the contention of a recent critique of power transition theory is correct 
and “for purposes of status and balancing, perceptions of power appear more important than 
actual power or capabilities” (Lebow and Valentino 2011: 234), then such pivotal moments 
in diplomatic history require a more holistic approach to power itself. Despite the relative 
clarity normally associated with the shift to a bipolar order in the wake of the allied defeat 
of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the redefinition of polarity developed in this study 
encourages the analyst to probe a little deeper into how the ordering of the top tier of 
international society was actually perceived at the time. The emphasis on historical 
contingency coupled with the dual focus on the material and ideational aspects of power 
operating in a social hierarchy alert us to the fact that the coming US-Soviet power balance, 
couched in a larger East-West ideological confrontation, grew organically and unevenly. As 
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discussed in Chapter Three, perceptions of global polarity, as with perceptions of anything, 
are often hostage to historical experience and contemporary world views.    
George Kennan, the American diplomat and author of the February 1946 ‘long telegram’ 
that laid the grounds for the American policy of Soviet containment throughout the early 
stages of the Cold War, argued that even in the years before the outbreak of World War II, 
the United States was a power that could “have affected perceptibly the course of world 
affairs” (Kennan 1952: vi). Yet an American perception of its own central role in an 
emerging bipolar order as the European theatre of war gradually diminished the material 
basis of French, British and German power does not necessarily correlate with an 
understanding of the growing bipolar rivalry between Washington and Moscow. Reflecting 
some eight years on, Kennan pointed out that as late as 1944, the US was administering 
“lavish and almost unconditional aid” to the Soviet Union (1952: 86). This would suggest 
that the older ideas about a multipolar order based on the need to balance multiple great 
powers against each other still held sway in the minds of decision makers. In terms of 
rivalry and potential flashpoints, according to C.J. Bartlett, American military planners gave 
little thought to a Russo-American rivalry and were more concerned about a British rivalry 
with the Soviet Union. This they thought might drag the United States into Europe as a 
mediator between these two states. Bartlett notes that this was a “theme in American 
policymaking which persisted well into 1945” (1984: 248). It is also reflected in the fact that 
at the earlier conference held between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union in 
1943, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt had “horrified Churchill with the suggestion that 
Britain and Russia alone” would be left to determine Europe’s post-war fate (Haslam 2011: 
33). Given the history of US isolationism, it is perhaps not surprising that decision makers 
and analysts in Europe at the time would be slow to grasp the coming order in which the 
United States, who as was discussed in the previous chapter had only been admitted to the 
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great power club towards the end of the nineteenth century as a new ‘Pacific power’, would 
play one of the two leading roles.  
Antonio Varsori has argued that “during the late stages of the Second World War very few 
decision makers thought that partition of Europe and the outbreak of a ‘cold war’ would 
characterize the postwar period” (2002: 10). Certainly leaders in London, Paris and Moscow 
were still thinking in terms of “Big Three” or “Big Four” with the latter, at least for 
European leaders, including France with a restored status as a great power. This was 
particularly important for Britain which looked to France to assist with a post-war setting in 
which Soviet power would need to be balanced and the government of Winston Churchill 
assumed that it would be Britain that would be primarily taking on this task. Jonathan 
Haslam has noted that for Moscow after the end of the war, “working out who in the West 
would predominate after hostilities had not been as easy as it would appear in hindsight” 
(2011: 33).   
It was only in the very final stages of World War II that France had been able to “restore, 
albeit in theory, the status of a great power” and this still did not stop Britain, the Soviet 
Union and the United States from excluding French official participation in the Yalta and 
Potdsam post-war planning conferences (Varsori 2002: 4). Not only this, but Roosevelt 
began talking of a ‘Four Policemen’ proposal that would include the United States, Soviet 
Union, Britain and not France but China (Gaddis 1972: 24-5).        
In the years immediately after the war, France was increasingly discussed in, for example, 
US government foreign policy documents in terms of a regional power at best. One such 
document included France in a list of states that included Belgium, Denmark and the 
Netherlands that needed to be brought to “an enlightened understanding of the necessities of 
the German situation” (referring to the post-war administration of the country) and even 
raised the idea of France descending into civil war (US Department of State 1947: 775-7). 
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This was at odds with France’s self-perception given that history appeared to give Paris a 
claim to great power status. As Bertrand Badie has noted, “In Locarno (1925), Stresa 
(1935), Munich (1938), as well the Council of the League of Nations, France became used 
to being part of the oligarchy that had the charge of ruling the European Continent and even 
the world” (2011: 98).  
Following the demotion of France in terms of global status through the post-war planning 
activities, the idea of a ‘Big Three’ became more widely accepted. This maintained a 
multipolar vision of international society even if it was at the lowest possible number of 
great powers (Wight 1966:167). Britain joined the United States and the Soviet Union in 
being one of the so-called architects of the new order following the war. The importance of 
the Big Three was reinforced by the repeated meetings and conferences of the leaders of 
each state which of course forged some degree of personal bond between them as a specific 
collective. One account of the psychological effect of this on Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin 
notes that “the Big Three behaved as a group with specific relations between the members, 
with common memories, even with jokes that only they could understand” (Zubok and 
Pleshakov 1994: 59). In fact, despite the fact that the concept of superpowers would come to 
be associated exclusively with the two main protagonists in the Cold War, the United States 
and the Soviet Union, the earliest uses of the term were actually applied to Britain as well. 
Nicholas J. Spykman’s The Geography of the Peace (1944) argued for the importance of 
two superpowers, Britain and the United States and W.T.R. Fox’s Superpowers: the United 
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union—Their Responsibility for Peace (1944) held a 
multipolar interpretation of the coming order.   
Yet Britain’s role in this was far from being as certain as the other two poles of power. As 
multipolarity gave way to bipolarity, London slowly lost its claim to superpower status. 
What is particularly important to note for this study is that there is a great deal of variation 
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in terms of when different scholars have placed the decline of Britain as a pole of power. 
Tim Dunne has written that “By 1948, the country was a policy-taker on the world stage and 
not a policy-maker, despite the fact that its diplomatic network remained global, its 
language remained dominant, and its values ascendant” (2008: 278). This according to 
Dunne was not enough to “configure the system in multipolar terms” (Ibid). Dunne’s 
characterisation is symbolically illustrated by the British diplomat Harold Nicolson’s 
account of Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s arrival at the Paris Peace Conference in July 
1946, 
The minor delegates and experts enter first, meeting all their friends from San Francisco, 
making polite handshakes and bows. Then at 4 pm. precisely the main delegates emerge 
from the back of the stage and walk across it, down the steps to the proscenium and then up 
among the stalls. Molotov and Vyshinsky stride across the stage with all the consciousness 
of power; Byrnes and his delegation walk slowly and sedately with all the consciousness of 
great virtue; and then in trips little Attlee, hesitates on finding himself on the stage, tries to 
dart back again into the door through which he has come, and is then rescued by an official 
who leads him across the stage with a hand upon his elbow (1968: 69).      
 
This observation (and the account of a number of discussions on the margins of the 
conference) recorded in his diary at the time, give a strong impression of Britain having 
joined the ranks of the ‘lesser powers’. This would of course create a bipolar structure at the 
global level. Yet four years later, the American minister in London, Julius Holmes reported 
to Washington only then that British leaders “feel they are now fighting a last-stand battle 
for survival as a world power” (US Department of State 1950: 1601). In many quarters this 
was seen as a fight that could still be won and upon the return to power of Winston 
Churchill in 1951, one of his advisors remarked “And England will start on her long journey 
back to greatness” (Holland 1991: 240). This is perhaps not surprising given that only years 
earlier, at the London Foreign Ministers Conference in September 1945, Britain had been 
treated as an unambiguous global power expected to endure. Soviet Foriegn Minister 
Vyacheslav Molotov had publicly complained of Britain’s “monopoly in the 
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Mediterranean” which left no room for the other powers such as the Soviet Union (Reynolds 
1994: 93). In fact the perception that Britain maintained an independent role in global 
politics had not entirely subsided under Churchill’s predecessor in the immediate aftermath 
of the war, Clement Atlee (Kent 2005: 163). His Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin had been 
at pains to stress that “we must free ourselves of financial dependence on the United States 
as soon as possible” in order to be able to “pull our weight in foreign affairs” (quoted in 
Ibid).  As a leader of Western Europe and the Commonwealth, Bevin thought Britain could 
achieve its “own power and influence to equal that of the United States” (quoted in Ibid).    
One of the key findings of the previous chapter’s discussion of the period of 1815-1945 was 
that ideas about agency played an important role in perceptions of polarity. Britain’s role in 
the early Cold War years also relates to this notion of claiming, or in this case reclaiming, 
status in international society playing a part in shaping perceptions of global order. As late 
as 1953, Churchill was projecting his aspiration, if not genuine perception, of British great 
power status when he called for “a conference at the highest level” (quoted in Portsmouth 
Times 1953) which would include Britain as a “leading power” (Ibid). The conference took 
place in Geneva in July 1955 (and included France). Yet a year before, in 1954, the 
influential American analyst and former presidential advisor, James Warburg had published 
an article claiming that the Second World War had “left the  nations of Western  Europe 
with the habit of exercising a world power which  they no longer possessed” and that “With  
power  polarized in  only two  surviving superpowers, the  traditional European method  of  
preserving peace  by balance-of-power maneuvers had finally become totally obsolete” 
(1954: 327). This followed an earlier article in a leading American academic journal which 
claimed in 1950 that “The United States and the U.S.S.R. are two poles acting like magnets 
around which cluster most of the other nations of the world...Hence unlike in the past, 
power relations today are bipolar” (de Huszar 1950: 157). Jeremy Black has highlighted that 
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the post-war transition and decline of Britain and France was most notable in the shift from 
the four power summit in Paris in 1960 to the US-Soviet summit of 1962 (2010: 209). 
However even those within the US government who were quick to perceive the shifting 
from a multipolar to a bipolar order like Kennan, still did not necessarily view this new 
configuration as lasting over the long-term. In a November 1947 Policy Planning Staff note 
titled Resumé of World Situation, in which he talked about world politics being “dominated 
by the effort undertaken by the Russians” to “extend their virtual domination over all, or as 
much as possible of the Eurasian land mass” he also argued that: 
Our best answer to this is to strengthen in every way local forces of resistance, and persuade 
others to bear a greater part of the burden of opposing communism. The present “bi-
polarity” will, in the long run, be beyond our resources (US Department of State 1947: 773).     
 
By 1948 a top secret US National Security Council report contained the clear expression of 
the perceived shift towards bipolarity stating that the war had “left the world with only two 
great centers of power, the United States and the USSR” (US National Security Council 
1948: 546). This perception of a bipolar international society was closely bound up with the 
growing perception of a global ideological confrontation. The underpinnings of what we 
would in hindsight refer to as ‘Cold War thinking’ is reflected in the assertion that “The 
United States is the only source of power capable of mobilizing successful opposition to the 
communist goal of world conquest” (Ibid). This shift to a bipolar perception was evident in 
Moscow as well. Sergey Radchenko has noted that despite how little he travelled abroad, 
Stalin was obsessed with geographical maps. This helped him create a mental map which 
“was a point of reference for Stalin as he planned his post-war policies” (2011: 27). The 
way Stalin viewed the world, “witnessed a readjustment of Stalin’s mental map, a transition 
from a multipolar to a bipolar frame of reference” (Ibid).    
Waltz has highlighted that “Britain and France continued to act as though they were great 
powers, and struggled to bear the expense of doing so, well into the 1950s” and that The 
143 
 
Economist “apparently believes that Britain and France were great powers well into the 
1950s, claiming that the Suez Crisis of 1956 ‘helped destroy Britain and France as great 
powers’" (Waltz 1993: 49). Despite the so-called reality of power politics that Realism 
posits that states must adhere to, two states were acting to the contrary. This sits uneasily 
within the Waltzian idea of “The range of expected outcomes” in world politics being 
“inferred from the assumed motivation of the units and the structure of the system in which 
they act” (1988: 618). The structure of the system only changes “with variations in the 
number of great powers” (Ibid.) yet by Waltz’s own admission, this variation can be 
perceived differently by multiple actors at the same time.     
The actions of Britain and France in what became known as the Suez Crisis, in which both 
states colluded with Israel in order to orchestrate an invasion of Egypt to restore Western 
control of the canal that links the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, strongly 
suggests that London and Paris thought they could resist the bipolar interpretation of the 
world. Both London and Paris saw the Middle East as falling within its traditional ‘sphere of 
influence’: an area in which a great power “exerts a predominant influence, which limits the 
independence or freedom of action of political entities within it” (Keal 1983: 15). The idea 
that the great powers have their own spheres of influence has long been considered an 
“operational rule” of international society (Bull 1977: 71) that prescribes the behaviour of 
its members. This is perhaps the most obvious product of the whole notion of the special 
rights and responsibilities of the great powers that, as was discussed in Chapter Three, is 
expressed through the social institution of great power management. While the great powers 
(or what are treated in this study as ‘poles of power’) are given the legitimate right to exert 
such influence in their “positions of local preponderance” (Ibid: 219), they are also expected 
to respect the spheres of influence of other great powers as a way of creating global order. 
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Therefore, the establishment and recognition of spheres of influence is one of the clearest 
ways that a state can claim membership of the ‘club’ of the great powers (Clark 2011b: 37). 
Using the framework of the English school to analyse polarity in a social context helps to 
explain the reaction of the United States, Soviet Union and others to the actions of Britain 
and France. Both countries clearly had the material (military) capabilities to carry out the 
operation in Egypt. Yet as Christian Reus-Smit has argued “Stable, effective political power 
is never the product of material resources alone; it is also the product of legitimacy, of the 
perception, on the part of other social actors, that the exercise of power is rightful” (2005: 
88).   
For the United States though, the inaccurate assessment of the polarity of international 
society by the French and British (and perhaps the Israelis as well) was obvious. As Waltz 
describes it, “Enjoying a position of  predominance, the  United  States  could  continue  to  
focus  its  attention  on  the major  adversary  while  disciplining its  two  allies” (1988: 
621). The fact that the United States and the Soviet Union both exerted pressure on Britain 
and France not only helped to destroy the perception of London and Paris as centres of 
world power but also helped entrench the perception that it was Moscow and Washington 
that would exert the ‘special rights’ of what was traditionally thought of as the great powers 
but was increasingly being described as the ‘superpowers’ (see for example Warburg 1954: 
327; Morgenthau 1954: 83). It is worth noting in that the year of Suez Crisis, Soviet 
President, Nikita Khrushchev is reported to have told a dinner of foreign air force chiefs that 
“the only two countries that matter are Russia and the United States” (cited in Wight 1991: 
33). That this assessment of the polarity of international society was not shared by 
Khrushchev’s British and French counterparts adds weight to Van Evera’s claim that the 
kind of socialisation that a neorealist would expect to take place can be thwarted by a 
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“failure to self-evaluate” which “impedes national learning and allows misperceptions to 
flourish” (2003: 163).   
By the early 1960s, the notion of Britain being able to change its relative position in the 
global power hierarchy had faded and the perception of a ‘Big Three’ world gone. The 
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 in particular, served to reinforce the perception of bipolarity 
when the two superpowers came to the brink of nuclear war in a thirteen day crisis of 
brinkmanship. In this sense, military capabilities (or more precisely nuclear weapons 
capabilities) became the decisive factor during this time in shaping perceptions of the 
structure of international society. The crisis, had firmly established an image of “a single 
planet shared by superpowers who shared the means of wiping each other out” (Gaddis 
2005: 83) in the minds of both policy elites and publics around the world. In this sense, the 
Cuban Missile Crisis might be thought of as the point in which the distinction between the 
East-West ideological struggle and the geopolitical confrontation between the two sides of 
the bipolar order became solidified via the threat of use of the massive military capabilities 
built up by both sides.  
But as we shall see in the discussion below, these capabilities also had other effects as well 
giving rise to ideas of great power disorder, non-alignment and the importance of economic 
rather than military power in an age where war between the supwerpowers was considered 
un-thinkable. The immensely destructive nature of nuclear weapons meant that war between 
the poles of power in the system – one of the central factors in their rise and fall in all 
previous periods – had fundamentally changed. What Hedley Bull identified as one of, if not 
the, oldest institution of international society acted as a “basic determinant of the shape the 
system assumes at any one time” (1977: 187) became almost substituted (at least in the 
sense of overt military conflict between the superpowers) for the concept of mutual 
deterrence. Instead of war as an instrument of state policy (to, for example preserve the 
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balance of power [Ibid: 189]), mutual deterrence “requires the reciprocal cancellation of 
options for war at any level between advanced powers” (Quinlan 2009: 59). The effect of 
this on perceptions of polarity would play out over the period and beyond (discussed in the 
next chapter) and has led one analyst to claim that “The Cold War may well be remembered, 
then, as the point at which military strength, a defining characteristic of ‘power’ itself for 
the past five centuries, ceased to be that” (Gaddis 2005: 263).  
US Decline and the Perception of Multipolarity 
One of the most important challenges to a collective perception of bipolarity was the notion 
of US decline in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was a discussion of relative rather than 
absolute decline and was not always thought of only in relation to the Soviet Union – which 
in theory could have eventually led to a unipolar order if the decline had been complete.  It 
is perhaps not surprising that multipolarity was seen as the natural replacement of bipolarity 
given the neglect of the concept of unipolarity in the academic literature on the subject 
(Mowle and Sacko 2007; Hansen 2011; Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth 2011). This 
neglect by scholars would come to influence perceptions of polarity again after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the associated post-Cold War period (discussed in 
the next chapter).  
The basis of perceptions of US decline often had more to do with ideas about the future 
(based on a trajectory towards a shift in polarity) rather than a sense of international society 
being in the midst of a power shift. This is an important theme in thinking about the 
ideational factors involved in changes in perceptions of polarity and will be discussed in the 
next chapter in relation to the nature of narratives of structural change.  
The perception of US decline was particularly emphasised by President Nixon and his 
National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger in their advocacy of the creation of a multipolar 
order. Again, the issue of agency becomes all important in explaining shifts in perceptions 
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of polarity in a way which is missed in the existing literature. Before joining government, 
Kissinger had been a member of the Department of Government and at the Center for 
International Affairs at Harvard University where he had written his PhD thesis on the 
Concert of Europe entitled "Peace, Legitimacy, and the Equilibrium (A Study of the 
Statesmanship of Castlereagh and Metternich)" later published as A World Restored: 
Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822 in 1954. He was a keen 
student of the concept of the balance of power (Little 2007: 274) and believed that “the only 
practical solution to Cold War stalemate and Soviet risk-taking was to transform the 
structure of the international system, encouraging a diffusion of power on terms favourable 
to the United States” (Suri 2007: 180). For Kissinger, this was “fully compatible with our 
interests as well as our ideals” (Kissinger 1979: 69). The Nixon-Kissinger approach to 
polarity blurred distinctions between analysis and prescription or in other words, the 
distinction between the way the world was and the way they wanted it to be.   
In an important interview in the January 1972 edition of Time magazine, President Richard 
Nixon stated that “I think it will be a safer world and a better world if we have a strong, 
healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not 
playing one against the other, an even balance” (quoted in Brzezinski 1972: 54). This had 
followed a public statement the previous year in which he had admitted that “When we see 
the world in which we are about to move, the United States no longer is in the position of 
complete pre-eminence or predominance” (Nixon 1971c). While he was clear to point out 
that he saw the United States as exercising a role of “preeminent leadership” (Ibid), neither 
a unipolar or bipolar configuration was accurate according to Nixon – especially if one 
looked a decade or so towards the future. What is important to note here is that this 
perception of a changing world order was being expressed by a US President in public 
statements. This can be expected to have a much more powerful and long-lasting effect on 
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collective perceptions of polarity around the world than the same ideas being expressed by 
an academic analyst or even rumours of such a perception being held by a head of state but 
not expressed in public. Such statements from President Nixon and his close advisors 
became the subject of much discussion triggering a process in which narratives of rising 
powers (to be discussed further, in a different historical context, in the next chapter), can 
become an important dimension in collective perceptions of polarity.    
Yet this perception of either current or imminent multipolarity did not go unchallenged. In 
the two leading US foreign policy journals, Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy, influential 
analysts such as Zbigniew Brzezinski (who would later become National Security Advisor 
to President Carter) and Alastair Buchan (an influential British journalist and first Director 
of the International Institute of Strategic Studies) criticised Nixon’s characterisation of the 
global power structure (Brzezinski 1972; Buchan 1972a). Buchan argued that the 
President’s statement in the Time interview “assumes that, as in the eighteenth century, the 
five powers concerned have broadly the same range of resources at their disposal. This 
simply is not true today. The Soviet Union and the United States possess a degree of 
strategic, military and economic resources which the other three partners do not” (1972a: 
644). Waltz himself criticised the way Nixon “slipped easily from talking of China’s 
becoming a superpower to conferring superpower status on her” (1979: 130). Yet Waltz’s 
materially-dependent approach to polarity prevented him from engaging with the theoretical 
implications of Nixon doing so (given that Neorealism has no way of theorising about the 
conferring of social status based on anything other than material capabilities) and was 
instead confined to making the argument that Nixon was empirically ‘wrong.’   
The response of Nixon’s critics demonstrates clearly the inadequacy of materially-
dependent theories of power in IR theory as Buchan’s approach (broadly that of the standard 
polarity literature) cannot explain the shift in Nixon’s perception nor take into account its 
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impact on global perceptions regardless of whether they are well-founded or not. While the 
onset of what became known as the ‘second Cold War’ after the breakdown of the détente 
era at the end of the 1970s seemed to many to reconfirm a bipolar structure in international 
society, the strength of the perception of a change in polarity was such that as late as 1984, 
one leading IR scholar felt compelled to state that “I believe the present system should still 
be classified as bipolar, even though there has been some movement toward multipolarity” 
(Snyder 1984: 484 fn23).  
Yet this was not simply a question of a perception of US decline within the United States. 
Soviet perceptions of US decline had been strongly influenced by the notion of a relative 
shift in their favour in the late 1950s and early 1960s. William Wohlforth has pointed out 
that while the numerical figures point to an even bipolarity, “what the numbers fail to 
capture is the dramatic rise in Soviet power which captivated the political world after 1955” 
(1993: 139). What is particularly important to the way polarity is re-defined in this study is 
Wohlforth’s observation that,  
Coupled with hindsight, the figures tempt us to dismiss the importance of Krushchev-era 
perceptions. Since we now know that Soviet-style socialism posed no real challenge to the 
American-led liberal camp...And it is true that both the Soviet and American political 
systems seemed to induce exaggeration of Soviet power gains. But that should not obscure 
what Cold War veterans on both sides of the old iron curtain affirm: that the rise in Soviet 
power seemed every bit as real in the late 1950s and early 1960s as its decline did thirty 
years later (1993: 140). 
 
In Soviet decision making circles, the perception of a declining United States was 
encouraged by the notion of American power being constrained by domestic pressures. One 
Soviet writer noted in 1971 of US domestic politics that “the popular masses are demanding 
increasingly, decisively, and loudly, the renunciation of military adventures abroad and the 
Administration’s turning to face the internal socio-economic problems” (Trofimenko quoted 
in Aspaturian 1980: 705).   
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Yet while notions of a relative rise in Soviet power vis-à-vis the United States may have 
been one outcome of a perception of US decline, another, perhaps more important in that it 
signalled the potential for a multipolar order, was the rise of a new Eastern power.    
The New ‘Triangle’: Perceptions of China  
If, as was argued in Chapter Three, scholarly analysis of global power structures can be 
thought of as being both influential upon and also therefore a kind of litmus test of 
perceptions of polarity, the early-mid 1970s again appears to show a shift towards a 
multipolar perception. The rise of China as a potential third pole of power in international 
society was discussed at length in a number of influential journals (Gittings 1969; Buchan 
1972b; Dittmer 1981) and the concept of triangular diplomacy became popular in the 
literature. In some cases, the traditional US-USSR-China triangle even became substituted 
for a Japan-China-USSR configuration (Simon 1974). Carsten Holbraad even went so far as 
to suggest in 1979 that the triangular structure made up of the United States, Soviet Union 
and China,  
Though possibly representing only a stage in a transition from the duel of the Soviet Union 
and the United States to a complex system of more than three powers, may be the dominant 
relationship of the late seventies and early eighties. Perhaps it will survive long enough for 
us to gain a better understanding of the nature of great-power triangles (1979: 118).  
 
Importantly for this study, Holbraad also noted that: 
However different  their subjective notions of foreign policy and great-power diplomacy may be, 
objectively the three actors form a system in the more limited sense of maintaining an observable 
pattern of interrelation, a pattern which stands out from the rest of the international relations of the 
world (Ibid: 120). 
  
Again this statement highlights the inadequacy of the ‘common sense empirical’ approach 
of Waltzian Neorealism in simply quantifying the relative distribution of capabilities in a 
given system rather than analysing the number of states relating to each other in a social 
sense as peers in a great/superpower club. The ambiguous and often contradictory nature of 
the way great power status is conferred and perceived in practice, is captured by Doak 
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Barnett’s characterisation of China’s global role in the post-war period: “In a formal sense, 
China achieved recognition as a major power when it was accepted as one of the so-called 
Big Four during World War II. But the Chinese Nationalist regime then ruling China was 
never able to assert its rights, exert a significant influence beyond its borders, or assume an 
active role as a major power” (1977: 3). This quote again raises the issue of multiple and 
contradictory perceptions of polarity being held simultaneously by different actors. As the 
discussion above pointed out, the fourth power in the potential ‘Big Four’ was for some 
people France but for others it was China.    
In terms of US perceptions of China’s importance in the global structure, the 1960s in 
particular, appears to be a period of confusion and even contradiction. For example, in a 
1965 speech in which he made a series of arguments to justify the US military operation in 
Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson spoke of the “the deepening shadow of Communist 
China” over all of Asia (Johnson 1965). In the speech he couched the need to counter 
Chinese power in Southeast Asia in terms of an attempt to “strengthen world order” and 
argued that there were “great stakes in the balance” (Ibid). This would seem to suggest that 
Johnson was including China in system-level considerations in terms of relative power and 
questions of global (rather than just regional) order. In specifically addressing China’s role 
in the region, Johnson stated that “There are those who say that all our effort there will be 
futile – that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all southeast Asia. But there 
is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up” (Ibid). As was 
discussed in Chapter Two, the theoretical boundaries between what Buzan refers to as 
regional, great and superpowers (2004a: 63-76) are often blurred in practice. This is evident 
in Johnson’s speech as a threat to Asia becomes subsumed with a threat to world order 
making China’s role appear to be one of either an existing or potential pole of power.  
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Yet contradictions within policymaking and intelligence circles in the US are evident in the 
fact that the following year in 1966, a special long-range study on China conducted by the 
State and Defense departments concluded that Beijing’s strength was “simply inadequate for 
the international role” that it hoped to project (NSF Country File 1966). In fact the report 
went on to predict that it would be Japan and not China that would take on the role of “the 
great power in Asia” (Ibid). Yet six months later in Johnson’s 1967 State of the Union 
Address to the US Congress, after discussing the importance of working with the Soviet 
Union on key arms control and confidence building initiatives, China was again singled out 
for particular mention. Johnson talked of the importance of “working together in all the 
tasks of arms control, security, and progress on which the fate of the Chinese people, like 
their fellow men elsewhere, depends” (1967). Despite the analysis of civil servants and 
advisors, Johnson appears to have been convinced of China’s role as a major player in world 
politics. This assessment was carried forward and even enhanced by the coming to power of 
President Richard Nixon. As was discussed above, Nixon and Kissinger were at the 
forefront of a public discussion about a changing world order characterised by a shift 
towards multipolarity. Most important in this was the role of China.        
In his 1971 Foreign Policy Report, President Nixon noted that, 
“It is a truism that an international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers 
remains largely outside it and hostile toward it. In this decade, therefore, there will be no 
more important challenge than that of drawing the People’s Republic of China into a 
constructive relationship with the world community, and particularly with the rest of Asia” 
(Nixon 1971a). 
 
The day of the report’s release, Nixon gave a radio address in which we again see the way in 
which perceptions of regional power structures interact with ideas about the trajectory 
towards a future global order. In his address, Nixon hinted strongly at a multipolar 
conception when he claimed that: 
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In Asia, we can see tomorrow's world in microcosm. An economically powerful democratic 
free nation, Japan, is seeking new markets; a potentially powerful Communist nation, China, 
will one day seek new outlets and new relations; a Communist competitor, the Soviet Union, 
has interests there as well; and the independent non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia 
are already working together in regional association. These great forces are bound to interact 
in the not too distant future (Nixon 1971b).  
 
In a public address later in the same year, Nixon argued for the indispensable nature of 
China in the global order stating that “there can be no stable and enduring peace without the 
participation of the People's Republic of China and its 750 million people” (Nixon 1971d). 
This quote demonstrates the extent to which China was being “responded to by others on the 
basis of system-level calculations, as well as regional ones, about the present and near future 
distribution of power” (Buzan 2004a: 70) – or in other words, being judged against the 
criteria of a ‘pole’ of global power status. Without the introduction of complex polarity 
theory into the theoretical framework in Chapter Two, these contradictions in the Nixon 
administration’s analysis simply could not be theoretically accounted for. What emerges 
here is the blurring of the distinctions between regional, great and even superpower by 
different actors within one state (let alone the potential for the same thing to happen across 
multiple states).     
In the two years following the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the United 
States and China, the countries signed no less than thirty-five agreements, treaties and 
protocols with each other (Foot 1995: 225). According to Rosemary Foot, for President 
Jimmy Carter, the whole question of US-Sino relations went well beyond containment of 
the Soviet Union (Ibid: 229). Given their assessment of the importance of China for global 
stability, deepening bilateral ties “almost appeared as a duty” for the Carter Administration 
(Ibid). 
Yet perceptions of the power of potential peers does not have to be shared across the major 
powers. In contrast to their American counterparts, Soviet decision makers and analysts 
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appeared, at least publicly, to be less persuaded by the idea of the arrival of China as a third 
major pole of power in the global structure in the 1970s. For example, an analysis of 
China’s diplomatic manoeuvrings and grand strategy in the leading Soviet IR journal in 
1972 chastised Chinese leaders for “ignoring the existence of the two opposing socio-
political systems” and trying to “present the world as a conglomerate of countries and to 
depict the principal conflict of our day not as a struggle between these two systems...” 
(Pavlov 1972: 17; see also Agranov 1974; Horn 1976). Such a statement directly contradicts 
the position of Waltz that “counting great powers of an era is about as difficult, or as easy, 
as saying how many major firms populate an oligopolistic sector of an economy” (1979: 
131). The power of a firm can be objectively measured in terms of turnover and market 
share, attributes that can be divorced from a social and historical context, the same cannot 
be said of states.      
Central to understanding Soviet perceptions of China throughout the period under review in 
this chapter is the issue of ideological leadership. Buzan has argued that “the interplay 
between the identity of the major powers on the one hand, and how they relate to each other 
and lesser powers through the society of states on the other, is a key element of how one 
interprets the configurations of polarity” (2004a: 28). For Soviet leaders and analysts, a 
greater global role for China would not only signal a change in the system’s structure from 
bipolarity to multipolarity but also a challenge to the USSR’s role as the unambiguous 
leader of global communism.       
Following the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, Beijing’s attempts to portray China’s role in 
the world as the champion of Third World emancipation in the face of US imperialism on 
the one hand and Soviet revisionism on the other was driven by psychological and historical 
memories as much as it was by strategic considerations (Camilleri 1980: 10). As Joseph 
Camilleri has noted, “When confronted with the formidable obstacles facing the enterprise 
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of undermining the dominance of the two superpowers, Mao and his associates tended to 
point to China’s own experience and to the overwhelming odds that had to be overcome 
before the final victory of October 1949” (1980: 10). Like the case of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and the diplomatic style of Metternich discussed in the previous chapter, the idea 
that agency has a central role in determining structural power appeared to be unproblematic 
for Chinese strategists. If Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton are correct and “agency is 
located in structure but not determined by it” (2001: 27), then it is perhaps not surprising 
that polarity should be viewed through this lens – as something that can, over time and with 
the right mix of material capabilities and social interaction, be manipulated. Even if this is 
not the case, the perception that it might be is enough to affect the way that the polarity of 
the day is perceived by some actors.      
Important for understanding Chinese perceptions of the structure of international society in 
the 1970s is the notion not of order but instead of disorder. Premier, Zhou Enlai spoke of the 
“great disorder on earth” created by the “power politics of the superpowers” in his report to 
the Tenth National Party Congress against which the world was witnessing the “awakening 
and growth of the Third World” (Peking Review, January 1972 quoted in Camilleri p. 140). 
This concept was echoed later in Hedley Bull’s writing on the evolution of the great powers 
during the ascendancy of the United States and the Soviet Union from the “great 
responsibles” to the “great irresponsibles.” (Bull 1980). This Bull thought was a 
fundamental shift in the social institution of the great powers from being a pillar of world 
social order to something else. In an a-social (or purely systemic) situation, the shape and 
character of the order comes from the number of materially preponderant states. However, 
as was discussed in chapters two and three, the history of the great powers if looked at from 
the perspective of actual diplomatic practice is a very different one. An English school 
perspective highlights the role of great power management in providing a degree of social 
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order. In the absence of effective management between the poles of power, the order itself 
changes and can even break down entirely.   
This idea of disorder and upheaval (interestingly, for the argument put forward in this study, 
the word in Mandarin Chinese, luan, perhaps best translates as confusion [Camilleri 1980: 
139]) led Chinese strategists and policymakers to create what became known as a Three 
Worlds theory (for a discussion of this idea in Chinese public discourse see People’s Daily, 
Beijing, 1 November 1977). The then Vice Premier, Deng Xiaoping, in an address at the 
United Nations in April 1974 outlined the idea arguing that “The socialist camp which 
existed for a time after World War II is no longer in existence” while the “the Western 
imperialist bloc, too, is disintegrating” (Deng 1974). Instead of a simple bipolar split, in 
which the two superpowers led competing blocs of states, he announced that “the world 
today actually consists of three parts, or three worlds, that are both interconnected and in 
contradiction to one another” (Ibid). The First World was inhabited by the two superpowers, 
the Second by their major allies (eg. the Western bloc countries of Japan, Australia, Britain 
etc.) and the Third by the rest of the underdeveloped and often newly independent states. 
The idea of a ‘Third World’ in the structure of international society gave rise to the notion 
of non-alignment from the two major power blocs (discussed below). This was a different 
conception of the ‘three worlds’ used in Western analysis in which the United States and its 
close allies made up the First world whereas the Second World constituted the Soviet Union 
and its allies.  
It is interesting to note that in the Chinese view, both superpowers operated in a ‘world’ of 
their own. This would appear to suggest a perception in Beijing of a clear bipolar order 
which did not include China (in contrast to the US perception discussed earlier). The First 
world, in this sense could be thought of as the structure of global polarity. Yet this 
characterisation of the world by Chinese policymakers is not simply an analytical one. The 
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‘three worlds theory’ was part of strategic attempt to influence the world view of others, in 
particular about China’s role and status in the world.      
A closer reading of the purpose to which this analysis of world politics at the time was 
meant to serve in Chinese strategy and diplomacy highlights a perception in Beijing of 
China being able to play a much larger role in the international system. Kissinger’s memoirs 
document the extensive discussions that he held with Chinese policymakers and in 
particular Mao Tse-tung, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping during the rapprochement between 
the United States and China in the early 1970s. Whilst ostensibly focused on the Sino-US 
relationship, much of the dialogue centred on the global balance of power, and in particular 
Chinese concerns over the Sino-Soviet relationship. An initial concern about a potential 
Soviet invasion – perhaps even with the implicit or explicit support of the West – led Mao 
and Zhou to urge the United States into a more aggressive confrontation with the Soviet 
Union in the name of containment and global stability (Kissinger 1982: 46-55). This was to 
take the form of an anti-Soviet alliance “stretching from Japan, through China, Pakistan, 
Iran, and Turkey to Western Europe” (ibid.: 55) – what the Chinese called the ‘horizontal 
line’ – with the United States in the lead. What Kissinger’s account of the Sino-US 
discussions demonstrates is the extent to which the Chinese viewed a confrontation between 
Moscow and Beijing as inevitable. This was so not simply due to geopolitical 
circumstances. But, like the Soviet perception of China’s global role discussed above, 
according to Kissinger, policymakers in Beijing saw the ideological competition between 
the two Communist giants as over “who controlled the liturgy that would inspire the 
political orientation of Communist and radical parties around the world” (Ibid.: 47). The 
role of ideological leadership is particularly important to consider at this time given the 
larger context of the period of détente in the US-Soviet relationship. It has been observed 
that “Except in extremely conflictual international systems, superpowers will also be 
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fountainheads of ‘universal’ values of the type necessary to underpin international society” 
(Buzan 2004a: 69). Not only does Kissinger’s account of the Chinese perception of its own 
self-importance in terms of global ideological leadership (which if one thinks of the Cold 
War as fundamentally a geo-ideological struggle [Tuathail and Dalby 1998] makes a bipolar 
interpretation of the global structure therefore much more open to interpretation) suggest 
that bipolarity was not the only way of viewing the world from Beijing but also telling is 
Kissinger’s recollections of the United States’ own strategy. It was Washington’s view that 
“Should the Soviet Union succeed in reducing China to impotence, the impact on the world 
balance of power would be scarcely less catastrophic than a Soviet conquest of Europe” 
(1982: 53). While this quote highlights the fact that the Nixon Administration viewed China 
as being militarily inferior to the Soviet Union, it did view its survival against possible 
Soviet aggression as being a matter of global stability, or in other words, central to the 
maintenance of international society. This means that the United States was at the time 
clearly dealing with China on the basis of system-level considerations. It was for this reason 
that while there was concern within policy circles in Washington about how domestic 
opinion would view the improvements in the Sino-US relationship (particularly given the 
scale and divisive nature of the domestic debate over the Vietnam war), “We in the Nixon 
Administration felt that our challenge was to educate the American people in the 
requirements of the balance of power” (Ibid.: 50).     
Even later when the ‘horizontal line’ concept was superseded by the Three Worlds view by 
Chinese policymakers and diplomats, which would appear to present China as holding a 
lower status, Kissinger has described the way in which this was more of a strategy than an 
objective analysis of the world. Being a major power with a need therefore for the freedom 
to operate globally in ways of its own choosing, the Three Worlds theory “permitted 
differentiation between the two superpowers for temporary convenience. It provided a 
159 
 
vehicle for an active, independent role for China through its role in the developing world, 
and it gave China tactical flexibility” (Kissinger 2011: 304).   
During the period of rapprochement when the establishment of full diplomatic relations 
were prefaced first by liaison offices, the United States sent David K. E. Bruce, someone 
both Nixon and Kissinger felt was “one of our ablest ambassadors and most distinguished 
public figures” in order to “symbolize the importance we attached to the assignment” 
(Kissinger 1982: 62). The importance of official diplomatic relations appears to be a key 
indicator of the status accorded to China during this period. Despite major tensions over the 
issue of Taiwan, full diplomatic relations were established by the beginning of 1979 as “our 
common concerns with the balance of power required regular and intimate political contact” 
(Ibid 63).  
Yet as the period moves on, as with the notion of US decline, the perception of China as a 
third pole of power in a multipolar order gradually waned. In the United States, the Reagan 
Administration in the early 1980s conceptualised the world in starkly bipolar terms. In 1983, 
Secretary of State, George Shultz gave speeches in which he avoided using the term 
‘strategic’ when discussing the US-Sino relationship (Foot 1995: 230). Beijing was viewed 
by the Administration as being “less than vital” (Pollack 1984: 162) in terms of the global 
power balance. By 1987, even in analysis by Chinese scholars keen to stress the importance 
of the Third World in Chinese perceptions of the global power structure, accounts stressed 
that while the Third World “is clearly the main component of the international system in 
terms of population”, nevertheless “None of them is as powerful as the United States and 
the Soviet Union, and none of them was involved in the decision taken in Yalta that still 
dominates the international system” (Shuzhong 1987: 22-3). Writing in 1990, one influential 
China watcher gave the clear impression of Beijing having lost ground in terms of 
perceptions of its international status noting that in the wake of the Tiananmen Square 
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massacre, “China’s leaders have not been able to play off Moscow against Washington in 
ways that were possible during the heyday of tri-polarity” (Yahuda 1990: 183).    
The Non-aligned Challenger: India 
In the mid-1950s, once the perception of a clear bipolar order was wide-spread and the 
dangers of its escalation were vividly demonstrated in the Korean War, India emerged as a 
leading advocate of non-alignment. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and diplomat 
and later Defence Minister V. K. Krishna Menon started using the phrase to describe a post-
colonially inspired rejection of the inevitability of being drawn into the East-West 
confrontation. Yet non-alignment was not simply a strategy or foreign policy option in 
response to the deepening of the Cold War divide. The movement had a considerable 
normative dimension in its rejection of the militarisation and realpolitik-driven nature of the 
superpower confrontation which left little room for issues of development, self-
determination and sustainability in global ‘high politics’ (Kumar 1981). Non-alignment also 
provided India with an opportunity to project itself as being a major power in world politics 
in terms of its leadership role for this ‘third force’ in the world, representing the majority of 
the world’s population. According to Rajesh Basrur, “Historically, Indian leaders, conscious 
of their country’s rich culture and long civilizational history, have tended to take for granted 
its status as a major global power” (2011: 191). Nehru had long talked of an almost 
inevitable rise to great power status for post-independence India (Nehru 1946: 547). Just as 
Britain and France held on to the self-perception of their own great power status informed 
by a sense of historical destiny, so too did a non-Western state such as India, despite the fact 
that leaders needed to reach further back into history to back up this claim.    
By the 1950s, Nehru perceived that India’s time had come and that it would lead the non-
aligned states as the rigid bipolar structure ‘loosened’ and opportunities arose to moderate 
the nuclear-armed competition between Moscow and Washington (Nehru 1964: 361-2). In 
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this sense, again we see the role of agency – or more specifically perceptions of agency – in 
shaping perceptions of polarity. In this case India’s self-perception of its role as an 
indispensable mediator and leader of the Third World (Vertzberger 1984: 76) fuelled a sense 
of status higher than that which was granted by seeing the world in bipolar terms. A purely 
materialist version of power is blind to this shift in perception of polarity as the shift is 
based at least as much, if not more, on the purpose of Indian foreign policy as it is on India’s 
material capabilities and resources.          
At times throughout the period under review here, the actions of the two superpowers and 
other potential contenders appeared to give weight to this assessment. For example, in late 
1952-early 1953, the United States, Soviet Union and China all came to accept India’s 
proposal for an armistice to end the war on the Korean peninsula. Later in the wake of the 
1958 Lebanon crisis, the Soviet Union suggested that a five-power conference should be 
called that, while not including China, did include India (Vertzberger 1984: 77). 
Interestingly a number of analysts have pointed to the fact that throughout the 1980s, the 
United States appeared to treat India at least as a regional power and even according to one 
as a “great power on the world stage” (Copley 1988: 6). Basrur has highlighted the way in 
which Washington acknowledged India’s self-assumed role as a “regional security 
manager” well before the end of the Cold War (2011: 189). 
However, in time, and as before, the Indian challenge to the global perception of bipolarity 
receded. The concept of non-alignment endured but this served to reinforce the perception 
of bipolarity rather than to undermine it. This in turn, undermined the perception of India as 
a potential pole of power as this perception had been so closely tied to India’s leadership of 
the non-aligned countries.   
The Decline of the Cold War and the Collapse of Bipolarity 
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A recurring theme in this historical analysis is the role of major war between great powers, 
and in particular the outcome of major war, in influencing perceptions of order and therefore 
of polarity (Gilpin 1981: 203; Clark 2001: 56-78). Therefore the end of the Cold War 
between the United States and the Soviet Union should be expected to play some role in the 
final breakdown in perceptions of polarity of the period under review in this chapter. Nick 
Bisley has argued that “part of the reason why the Soviet state was made fatally vulnerable 
to its economic, social and ethnic problems at this time was the removal of the international 
conflict from its structures of power” (2004: 3). This is confirmed by the later reflection by 
Gorbachev’s foreign policy advisor, Anatoly Chernyaev, that the Soviet President was 
convinced “that we had lost the ideological war which we had been conducting for so many 
decades in the international arena” (quoted in Wohlforth 2003: 20-21). The role of 
perceptions here is particularly important. A changed perception of Moscow’s global role 
(and therefore of the existence of bipolarity) based on the ending of the Cold War can help 
to explain the arguments of scholars such as Robert English that the narrative of inevitable 
Soviet collapse due to material ‘realities’ are “empirically and analytically flawed” (2003: 
245). English has gone so far as to argue that “For all its now well-documented 
weaknesses…the Soviet economy was nevertheless strong enough to sustain the country on 
a largely status quo course well into the next century” (ibid; also Ellman and Kontorovitch 
1998).     
Regardless of where one now pinpoints the precise causes of the collapse of the Soviet state, 
the fact that there has been such disagreement about this issue in the years since (Clark 
2001: 115) alerts us to the fact that at the time, this shift from bipolarity to unipolarity was 
to some degree ambiguous, drawn-out over a number of years and therefore at different 
times open to interpretation. This, like the other examples discussed in this chapter of 
different perceptions of world order, is important given the way the end of bipolarity is 
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generally taken in the IR literature to simply be a ‘fact’ that states reacted to (Paul 2005; 
Nexon 2009), and not something that was perceived first and foremost. If the relatively 
uncontroversial end of bipolarity provided openings in the global agreement about the shape 
of the world structure then polarity and its impact on the foreign policies of states becomes 
much more complex than is the case in the existing literature. The approach to polarity put 
forward in this study takes account of the fact that even if one adopts an overly-materialest 
view of Soviet decline, “there is always likely to be some lag between perceptions of a 
material shift and a major behavioral response” (Brooks and Wohlforth 2000: 29). If one 
also accounts for the ideational aspects of power and perceptions of world order, then this 
lag between material decline and behavioural response should be expected to be even larger 
and more complicated.       
While we might think of the end of the bipolar era that took place in the late 1980s and early 
1990s as being one of the most clear-cut cases of a change of global polarity (something that 
will be discussed in the next chapter), in fact depending on whose account one focuses on, a 
roughly four year period of transition emerges. Somewhere between 1988 and 1991 
different actors perceived that bipolarity was coming to an end. Given the way in which the 
Cold War confrontation and the structural condition of bipolarity was so often conflated in 
public discourse, it is perhaps not surprising that the end of bipolarity is difficult to pin 
point. In 1988 British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher announced that “we are not in a 
Cold War now” (AP 1988). While in the same year a leading Sovietologist (who at the time 
actually departed from conventional wisdom by describing the Soviet Union as an 
‘incomplete superpower’) proclaimed that the Soviet Union “is not now (nor will it be 
during the next decade) in the throes of a true systemic crisis, for it boasts unused reserves 
of political and social stability that are sufficient to endure the most severe foreseeable 
difficulties” (Dibb 1988: 260). The US National Security Advisor at the time, Brent 
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Scowcroft has recalled how throughout 1989, the advisors to the new Administration of 
George H. W. Bush were still thinking in clearly bipolar terms under the framework of the 
Cold War confrontation. He has written that, in thinking about Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s attempts to revive the previous US-Soviet détente, “My fear was that 
Gorbachev could talk us into disarming without the Soviet Union having to do anything 
fundamental to its own military structure and that, in a decade or so, we could face a more 
serious threat than before” (Bush and Scowcroft 1998: 13-14). The US Secretary of State, 
James Baker has stated that for him it was not until August 1990 when the United States and 
the Soviet Union jointly protested against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait that the Cold War 
ended (quoted in Dockrill 2005: 12). If for Baker the Cold War did not end until mid-1990, 
it is difficult to see how bipolarity could have ended any earlier. Even for those who had a 
clear view at the time that the Cold War era was coming to an end, its larger meaning was 
far from certain. As one piece of analysis put it “what will the winding down of the Cold 
War mean for the international system?  There can be no unambiguous answer to the 
question” (Cox 1990: 35).    
Amidst the analysis of governments, journalists and academics trying to make sense of the 
change in the Cold War relationship and what this might mean for global polarity, some 
were even thinking in terms of the decline of not one but both superpowers. 1987 saw the 
release of Paul Kennedy’s best selling The Rise and Fall of Great Powers which set off a 
renewed debate about US decline (Kennedy 1987; Giddens, Mann and Wallerstein 1989; 
Nye 1990b) and by 1990 Michael Cox was arguing that despite the United States’ ability to 
devolve some global responsibilities to allies such as Germany and Japan, this:  
... will not prevent the United States from declining - no more than will its new deal with the USSR. 
And when great powers decline this inevitably weakens their ability to organize their imperial 
affairs. So far, nobody has convincingly demonstrated why the United States should be an exception 
to this obvious but undeniable historic rule (1990: 36).     
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Scowcroft has described the surprise in Beijing in the late 1980s when the Soviet Union was 
forced to ask China for loans recounting that the Chinese admitted being “quite taken aback 
when they first raised this” (Ibid: 177). The importance of putting changes in polarity in 
particular historical context is underscored by the shock with which the decline of bipolarity 
was greeted in the IR literature and popular analysis at the time. The sudden shift in the 
structure of international society “astonished almost everyone, whether in government, the 
academy, the media, or the think tanks” (Gaddis 1992-3: 5). It is not the argument of this 
study that an analytically eclectic or even a specifically English school approach to polarity 
will allow scholars to predict the rise and fall of great powers in such a way that this kind of 
surprise would be avoided. However, the approach to polarity constructed here in which the 
central units of analysis are the holders of a particular social status in international society, 
changes the way one treats the impact of changes in polarity such as the end of the bipolar 
era. In particular, the immediate effect of this change becomes not one of a simple shift in 
the balance of power to which all other states in the international system adjust accordingly, 
but instead a more ambiguous shift in the shape of international society. Theoretically, we 
can expect this change to be less clear-cut and its effects non-linear and more diffuse as an 
historically-contingent conception of polarity highlights often over-looked factors such as 
the role of perceptions of continuity. While in hindsight analysts can attempt to identify 
precisely when the polarity shifted away from a bipolar structure, a sensitivity to 
perceptions at the time means that any discussion of the reactions of other states to the end 
of bipolarity must include the idea that in the absence of the specific actions of Gorbachev 
and others, the Soviet Union could have endured for years if not decades (Dibb 1987; Odom 
1998). As the former Director of the US National Security Agency later recounted, 
Gorbachev’s particular actions were the "critical precipitating factor" in, for example, the 
collapse of the Soviet military (Odom 1998: 393). This is particularly so given the 
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perception of the degree to which Soviet power had less than a decade before been in a 
relatively strong global position was prevalent in much of the Western analysis at the time 
(Sakwa 1989). Historical contingency therefore is central to understanding the actual, as 
opposed to theoretically possible, effects of power transitions.      
The lag-between material changes and perceptions of polarity changing in the minds of 
practitioners and the almost traumatic shock to the IR discipline after being caught out by 
the collapse of bipolarity reinforces the notion found in the psychology literature that 
varying degrees of ‘perceptual readiness’ are possible. A reluctance to look for change, 
categorise and process this change and confirm these categorisations, will likely result in 
major changes such as the end of bipolarity coming as a major surprise (Pohl 2004: 373). As 
one of the seminal studies on this topic concluded, “the ready perceiver who can proceed 
with fairly minimal inputs is also in a position to use his cognitive readiness not only for 
perceiving what is before him about in foreseeing what is likely to be before him” (Bruner 
1957: 148).  
Conclusion 
The analysis of what is normally referred to as an unchanging bipolar period in this chapter 
has lent further support for the theoretical argument pursued in this study that polarity is a 
far more complex structural factor than traditional theorising allows for. When a more 
eclectic approach to polarity is adopted, firmly located in the historical and social context in 
which power is “expressed diffusely through the discourses that create social meaning and 
make society possible” (Bially Mattern 2008: 693), a number of important issues arise.  
This chapter has added three conclusions in particular that inform the reformulation of 
polarity theory. These relate to the indeterminacy of power transitions in the short-medium 
term, the changing nature of power itself and the potential for ideas about the future to 
influence perceptions even under what is later recognised as a stable form of polarity. It has 
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also reinforced a number of conclusions already discussed in the previous chapter 
examining the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries including the importance of 
perceptions of agency, the importance of perceptions of regional powers in shaping ideas of 
global polarity and the likelihood of contradictory views about polarity being held at a given 
time.    
Even when one focuses on the continued utility of military capabilities in world politics, a 
change in the criteria for great power or even superpower status may be observed. One of 
the key questions, and particularly pertinent to the discussion of the post-Cold War period in 
the next chapter, is whether the role of military capabilities in the power calculus of decision 
makers and analysts underwent at least some degree of change post-1945. With the 
invention of nuclear weapons and the development of strategies of nuclear deterrence and 
mutually assured destruction, particularly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, power itself may 
be said to have changed (Nye 1990a). Like the Cold War and the rise of its two main 
protagonists and the associated onset of bipolarity, the history of bipolarity and nuclear 
weapons are intimately linked (Wagner 1993: 79). Adam Watson observed that,  
Since the ‘equilibrium of terror’ of the two super-powers, successive statesmen and the 
diplomatic dialogue itself have been imbued with the idea that nuclear war between them 
must be ruled out...This exclusion of force at the centre of the system has transformed ideas 
about the place and utility of force in the system itself and diplomacy (1982: 220). 
 
It is perhaps then unsurprising that around the same time that we see ideas around nuclear 
deterrence rather than warfighting becoming dominant in policy circles in the two 
established superpowers, that perceptions of polarity begin to change in some quarters. 
Discussion about the rise of China, and to a much lesser degree, India in the global system 
can be partly related to changing ideas about the use of force and by implication the relative 
importance of military capabilities. This is not to say that nuclear weapons made military 
capabilities obsolete as signifiers of great/superpower status – far from it. Yet it is likely to 
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have played some role, even if not explicitly articulated at the time, in shaping conceptions 
of the potential shift to a multipolar order and the loosening of the bipolar rivalry. This 
gradual change in the relationship between material capabilities and perceptions of power, 
appears to support Guzzini’s claim that “no single power base...is decisive” in determining 
influence in world politics (1993: 454). Interestingly, even when in the early 1960s the 
Soviet Union reached a rough parity with the United States in terms of nuclear weapons, 
Khrushchev wrote to US President, John F. Kennedy complaining of the discrepancy 
between US assessments of Soviet military strength and the way Moscow was treated 
diplomatically by Washington (Wohlforth 1993: 177-8; Larson and Shevchenko 2010a: 
289). Khrushchev asked Kennedy, “How then does the admission of our equal military 
capabilities tally with such unequal relations between our great states? They cannot be made 
to tally in any way” (quoted in Wohlforth 1993: 177-8). Khrushchev took care to refer to 
both the Soviet Union and the United States using the term “great states” demonstrates a 
need to project a particular status – a status which under conventional treatments of the 
relationship between polarity and material capabilities should be entirely self evident. This 
grouping of the two states together in terms of the international hierarchy is particularly 
revealing of socially constructed nature of polarity given the fierce ideological competition 
between the two states. Hurrell has pointed to the importance of status anxiety on the part of 
the Soviet Union, and therefore the fragility of perceptions of polarity, in the conduct of 
both potential poles of power throughout the period: 
Indeed, central to so many of the tensions of the Cold War lay Soviet demands for equality 
of status and for acknowledgement by the US of its equal rights as a super-power – demands 
that the United States was reluctant to grant even at the high point of détente (1999: 253).  
 
If anything, as the vanguard of revolutionary states, the Soviet Union should have been 
expected to be projecting an even higher social status in the global order than its Cold War 
competitor. As Kissinger pointed out in a note to Nixon, “it has always been one of the 
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paradoxes of Bolshevik behaviour that their leaders have yearned to be treated as equals by 
the people they consider doomed” (US Department of State 2006: 603). If a degree of 
ambiguity still characterises the relationship between global power and the possession of 
nuclear weapons (even at a time when there was fewer nuclear armed states in the world 
than exist today and the symbolism of nuclear weapons was at its most potent), then this 
ambiguity should logically be expected to affect military capabilities per se.            
As we have seen throughout this chapter, different perceptions of polarity (based on 
whatever criteria different actors use to come to some sort of measurement of power) can be 
held simultaneously. What Robert Cox called “collective images of social order” (1981) 
include differing views as to the nature of “prevailing power relations” and therefore can be 
“several and opposed” (1981: 136). This means that gradual changes in things like the 
nature of the use of force or patterns of consumption in world politics and their effect on 
material capabilities like military assets or economic potential are likely to shape 
perceptions of power in diffuse and varied ways. It also means that decision makers can 
entertain images of changes in the polarity of international society while continuing to act 
based on a previous, un-changed assessment. As we shall see in the next chapter in relation 
to the collapse of the bipolar order, ideas about the past, and particularly the ‘natural’ 
tendency towards multipolarity in history, can be highly influential in shaping perceptions 
of the future of global order. Added to this is the notion of ‘trading on future capabilities’ – 
both material and ideational – and what this does to contemporary perceptions of global 
polarity.        
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Chapter Six: From the ‘Unipolar Moment’ to the ‘Rise of the Rest’ (1990-
2012) 
 
The events of the year just ended, the Revolution of 1989, marks the beginning of a new era in world 
affairs. 
President George H. W. Bush, State of the Union Address (1990: 130). 
 
 
We knew better where we had been than where we were going. 
Condoleezza Rice (2008: 2). 
 
 
This chapter brings the historical discussion of the previous two chapters up to the present 
time in analysing trends in perceptions of polarity as demonstrated by the discourse and 
actions of states, scholars and the global media. The chapter covers the period from the 
immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union to 
the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century. 
In keeping with the previous chapters of Part II, it uses the theoretical arguments of Part I as 
a lens to trace the fragile nature of perceptions of polarity in international society throughout 
the period. The chapter discusses the expectation, and its influence on analyses of world 
order, of a return to multipolarity at the beginning of the 1990s before moving on to the rise 
of the, previously under-theorised, concept of unipolarity and its association with US 
primacy at the global level. The discussion will then turn to the emergence of a second 
narrative of imminent or event nascent multipolarity and its adoption by both adherents and 
critics of a more diffuse power structure. Finally, the chapter will also engage with 
perceptions not of multiple rising powers in a multipolar order but instead of the specific 
rise of China and the emergence of an implicit perception of bipolarity before taking note of 
a final trend towards depicting a leaderless and structureless international society.   
This discussion again reaffirms both the need for a way of understanding the concept of 
polarity outside of the narrow materialism and rationalism of mainstream IR and the utility 
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of applying an English school approach. Such an approach is particularly attuned to the 
historical and social contingencies which help determine perceptions of polarity. It is then 
these perceptions that are used as the main indicator as to what the polarity of this period 
actually ‘was’ in the sense that international society will ‘be’ (for example) multipolar, 
when its members act as if it is so based on their perceptions.  
The chapter highlights the importance of the notion of a balanced, multipolar system as 
being ‘normal’ in international history and therefore likely to prevail. It also discovers that 
the experience of the Cold War, as closely associated with structural bipolarity as it was, 
would work against the use of the term ‘bipolar’ to describe the nascent dyad perceived to 
be taking shape between the United States and China, despite this being the most 
appropriate term to use. These as well ideas about agency, both in terms of Washington’s 
ability to preserve a state of unipolarity and the prospects of a set of rising powers being 
able to revise the global order, are used to illustrate the need for an analytically eclectic 
approach to polarity analysis to capture its effects and operation in all its complexity.     
The Return to Multipolar Normality 
Some of the periods of perceptual transition discussed in the previous two chapters 
suggested that the ontological question of whether a structural shift in the distribution of 
power (however it is defined) had taken place was an open one. In contrast, the early 1990s 
displayed no such ambiguity. Following the final collapse of the Soviet Union, few 
commentators or decision makers were left in any doubt about whether the structure of 
international society had fundamentally shifted. Bipolarity was no longer, but what exactly 
would come to replace this structure was not necessarily immediately clear. As in previous 
periods, the role of history was important in shaping perceptions of polarity in the 
immediate post-Cold War period, particularly on the part of academic analysis. Just as in the 
nineteenth century, when Austria and Prussia’s historical role as great powers affected their 
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self-perceptions and the perception of others of their role in international society discussed 
in Chapter Four, and in the early Cold War years when the historical memory of a 
multipolar order and the leading roles played by states such as France and Britain discussed 
in Chapter Five, historical experience led most scholars to expect the imminent return of 
multipolarity.  
For realists, and in particular, neorealists, our knowledge of the structure of the international 
system stood out as the guiding light in what should shape expectations of things to come. 
John Mearsheimer was the first to gain widespread attention in proclaiming an inevitable 
return to historical certainties in an article published in International Security in 1990 that 
stated that “the bipolar structure that has characterized Europe since the end of World War 
II is replaced by a multipolar structure” (5-6) in which “Germany, France, Britain, and 
perhaps Italy would assume major power status; the Soviet Union would decline from 
superpower status but would remain a major European power, giving rise to a system of five 
major powers and a number of lesser powers” (7) . Mearsheimer’s main concern was that 
this shift in the shape of world order would create a far greater degree of insecurity than had 
existed under the relatively stable (if tense) relationship built between the two poles during 
the Cold War years. In this analysis, deterrence was more difficult under multipolar 
conditions and balancing – the automatic response of sovereign states in a self-help system 
defined by international anarchy and power inequalities – would face “difficult coordination 
problems” that could result in miscalculation, escalation and war (15).  
A year later Charles and Clifford Kupchan were discussing a major global debate on the 
prospects for peace in Europe. This debate, it was said, could be characterised by two 
schools of thought with “The pessimists, pointing to the waning of the Cold War and the 
end of bipolarity, fear a return to a more fractious multipolar Europe. The optimists, on the 
other hand, welcome the end of the East-West struggle and do not fear a return to 
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multipolarity” (1991: 114). What was clearly not at stake in the debate was the whether the 
bipolar order had in fact given way to multipolarity be it existent or imminent. This was 
echoed in the same year by Buzan who wrote that “There can be no doubt that the bipolar 
structure is evolving towards a multipolar one” (1991b: 52).    
Three years on from Mearsheimer’s initial intervention, Kenneth Waltz argued in 1993 that 
world had ceased to be bipolar and that the “emerging structure of international politics” 
was multipolar: “In the fairly near future, say ten to twenty years, three political units may 
rise to great-power rank: Germany or a West European state, Japan, and China” (1993: 50). 
Even Russia’s prospects, thanks almost entirely to its nuclear arsenal – a gift from the Cold 
War arms racing with the United States in the previous bipolar structure – were such that it 
may still count as one of the central poles of power in this more balanced and diffuse power 
system (50-51). For Waltz the effect on the structure of world politics and in particular the 
way the major players would organise themselves was simple: “Germany, Japan, and Russia 
will have to relearn their old great-power roles, and the United States will have to learn a 
role it has never played before: namely, to coexist and interact with other great powers” 
(72). 
Central to the expectation that the “essential skeleton” (Bull 1977: 206) of international 
society would take the form of multipolarity, was the dominance within the discipline of IR 
– both in terms of scholarship and the undergraduate courses taken by this stage by a 
generation of policymakers – of realism and its ideas about the automatic, or even natural, 
nature of balancing in world politics. The tendency towards equilibrium and balance of 
power politics inherent in the international system, defined as it is by realists by anarchy 
rather than hierarchy, would push international society away from the dominance of the sole 
remaining superpower and toward the ‘normality’ of a multipolar order. As Benjamin Miller 
has put it “According to this theory, long-term hegemony is not feasible because of the 
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effective functioning of the equilibrium mechanism which results in the recurrent formation 
of balances of power” (2000: 167). Despite the fact that the immediate circumstance in 
which the members of international society found themselves in, in which one pole of a 
bipolar order had ceased to exist, leaving a unipolar structure in its place, this line of 
thinking held that this would be a temporary phase characterised by a rapid rise in new great 
power contenders.   
By 1996 Zara Steiner, in her Martin Wight Memorial Lecture (published in International 
Affairs the following year), was totally unambiguous in discussing the “current multipolar 
system under which we now live” (1997: 534). This kind of certitude of the multipolar 
structure of international society was evident across journalism (Bowring 1998), academia 
(Kegley and Raymond 1994) and the language of state leaders (People's Republic of China 
and the Russian Federation 1997). History had righted itself and the old ways of balancing 
and alliances amidst a multipolar structure were back.  
The Creation of Unipolarity 
Yet despite the strength of the perception of the return to the natural order of things in the 
guise of a post-Cold War multipolar balance of power, an opposing idea of a unipolar order 
had become established in some quarters and grew in attraction towards the end of the 
1990s. Charles Krauthammer famously introduced the term unipolarity to a popular 
audience in an important piece in Foreign Affairs when he argued that “The immediate post-
Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is the 
unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies” (1990/91: 23). 
Krauthammer’s piece is symptomatic of the ways contemporary understandings of the shape 
of international society and ideas about its future direction interconnect and overlap. While 
he was introducing the language of unipolarity to a global political elite in a popular 
publication with worldwide circulation, he was also doing so in a way that emphasised 
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temporality and eventual transition when he spoke of the “unipolar moment.”39 While others 
such as Christopher Layne would argue that the perception of a unipolar world was in fact 
an illusion given the “structurally driven phenomenon” of the emergence of other great 
powers resulting from the interaction of two characteristics of the modern states system, 
differential growth rates and anarchy (1993: 9).  
Yet Krauthammer’s sense of the shape given to international society by the events which 
had left the United States as the sole superpower was persuasive to many and was reflected 
in some of the language of officials in Washington at the time. As the quote from the 
beginning of this chapter demonstrates, President Bush himself was convinced that the 
world stood at a “singular moment in history” of the sort that “divide all that goes before 
from all that comes after” (1990: 130). The crisis over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 
presented an opportunity for the United States to act as the ‘world’s policeman’ when it 
brought together a coalition of states backed by the UN Security Council to intervene. On 
the eve of the war, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft described 
the crisis as “the first test of our ability to maintain global or regional security in the post-
Cold War era” (quoted in Allphin Moore Jr. and Pubantz 1999: 300). In 1992 the New York 
Times reported that an early (leaked) draft of the Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal 
Years 1994-99 expressed a concern about the need to discourage other states “from 
challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic 
order” (Tyler 1992). The choice of language is important in detecting the perception of a 
unipolar world as potential rivals wouldn’t be challenging the global leadership of a 
collective multipolar order but that of the United States – what the New York Times would 
refer to as a “superpower whose position can be perpetuated by constructive behavior and 
sufficient military might” (Ibid). However, it is worth noting that those in the US 
                                                     
39
 Although it should be noted that despite Krauthammer’s language of a unipolar ‘moment’, he was 
at pains to point out that this structural condition would last for decades (1990/91: 24). 
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Department of Defence who had drafted the report felt the need to remind their political 
leaders that the Washington “must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential 
competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role” (Ibid). While the 
structure of international society was for now unipolar, it would require investment in the 
capabilities needed to keep it that way. Despite the fact that after public criticism of the 
document and its depiction of a US-led global order (Gelb 1992) the language was toned 
down, Layne has discussed the fact that the available evidence suggests that the language 
“accurately reflected official views about unipolarity” and was supported by other official 
horizon scanning and planning documents released at the time (1993: 6).     
Later in the decade statements such as that of US President Bill Clinton that Washington’s 
“leadership in the world is unrivalled” (Clinton 1998) were common. At the turn of the 
century William Wohlforth, a scholar who stands out in the IR literature for his attention to 
the role of perceptions of power, wrote that “the system is unambiguously unipolar... To 
describe this unprecedented quantitative and qualitative concentration of power as an 
evanescent ‘moment’ is profoundly mistaken” (1999: 7). By 2002, even Kenneth Waltz was 
downplaying the talk of a return to multipolarity and a return to a global balance of power 
when he stated that “Never since Rome has one country so nearly dominated the world” 
(2002: 350). 
The English school framework applied to polarity here focuses as much on how potential 
poles of power are treated by others as on how they act themselves. It is therefore important 
to note that a perception of unipolarity appears evident in the way those seeking influence 
on the world stage were sought this above all in Washington, particularly towards the end of 
the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. In 2001 John Ikenberry noted that the US capital 
appeared to him to be “inundated by foreign diplomats and revolving-door lobbyists” (2001: 
22). Yet in the same piece, Ikenberry hinted at the fragility of unipolarity when he called for 
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US officials to “consult with other governments. If not, Washington risks an ultimate shift 
toward some other form of global order” (2001: 25). The kind of order that Ikenberry was 
concerned that the United States might not be able to underpin and maintain on its own was 
a multilateral one. However, if unipolarity was determined by overwhelming US material 
power, then such concerns should be unfounded – a unipole can shape the order of which it 
sits at the top by virtue of its favourable share of the “indicators of national power” 
(Schmidt 2007: 47).  Ikenberry’s somewhat paradoxical concern was that actually acting as 
if the world was unipolar (ie. being unrestrained by the wants and needs of other states) was 
what could threaten the continued existence of unipolarity itself. If other states opted for 
“some other form of global order”, multilateral or otherwise, the world could surely not be 
thought of as properly unipolar any longer. 
The turn of the century and the coming to power of the George W. Bush Administration 
brought the discussion of unipolarity together with a fierce debate about the merits of 
unilateralism in foreign policy. In other words, structure and agency became equally 
important in the public discourse about the role of the United States in the world. The so-
called neo-conservative ideology that came to dominate Washington’s outlook during Bush 
Jnr’s first term was based on a “vision of world order…based on unrivalled American 
military might and a cultivated belief in American exceptionalism” (Ikenberry 2006: 230). 
This perception of world order called for the United States to “use its unipolar power” (ibid) 
rather than rely on multilateralism and cooperation. Charles Krauthammer, the originator of 
the ‘unipolar moment’ idea noted the connection between acting like a unipole and the 
widespread perception of the existence of unipolarity when he said “Rather than contain 
power within a vast web of constraining international agreements, the new unilateralism 
seeks to strengthen American power…” (2001: A29).               
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Central to the consolidation of the unipolar perception was the terrorist attacks in New York 
and Washington on 11 September 2001, and in particular the response by the Bush Jnr 
Administration. Writing only one year after the attacks Michael Cox stated that: 
Thus, whereas before September 11 the United States appeared to be floundering without purpose, 
within a blink of an eye it was playing a most active leadership role directing a loose but surprisingly 
obedient alliance of states of various repute in an ill-defined but very real ‘war’ against something 
called international terrorism (2002: 155). 
 
The effect, according to Cox, on debates about systemic pressures at the international level 
was that, 
From this perspective the problem is not that the US has too little power – an argument frequently 
used in the past to explain why the international system might be under stress – but that it now has 
too much. The Process may have begun before September 11, but it took September 11 to make 
things clear and reveal the truth (Ibid: 154). 
 
Two years after the September 11 attacks and in the year that the US-led coalition invaded 
Iraq, a leading British think tank declared that even the term superpower was no longer fit to 
describe the United States. Instead Washington had now become a ‘megapower.’ In 
explaining the choice of terminology, the Chatham House report explained that, 
During the Cold War, it had been customary to refer to the United States and the Soviet Union as 
‘superpowers’. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not at first lead to any semantic change, as both 
the United States and other countries took time to adapt to the new reality. However, the dominant 
military power of the United States, demonstrated in the 1990s in the first Gulf war, in Bosnia and in 
Kosovo, suggested that ‘superpower’ did not do justice to US hegemony. A new word was needed 
and we chose ‘megapower’ (in France, the word ‘hyperpuissance’ was already circulating, but 
‘hyperpower’ did not seem to be the most appropriate term in English) (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 2003: 1).   
 
This quote demonstrates the extent to which the unipolar perception of world politics had 
been entrenched by the response to the September 11 attacks and the unilateralism of the 
Bush Jnr years. The examples of US military might cited all took place in the 1990s, yet it 
was not until 2003 that their significance was such that it was deemed necessary to invent a 
new word to capture Washington’s global dominance. There is no mention of levels of 
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military spending, GDP, resources, population or even levels of innovation or the number of 
world class universities on US soil. Instead, three wars, all undertaken in coalition with 
others, against adversaries which could hardly be considered serious military powers are 
given as evidence that the United States had moved into a realm of relational power beyond 
that of even the Cold War. The question becomes, if the previous US Administrations of 
George Bush Snr and Bill Clinton had opted for a more unilateralist foreign policy, would 
such a perception have arisen earlier – for example at the time of these conflicts in the 
1990s.  
This point again raises the issue of agency in influencing perceptions of polarity and the 
need to theorise about polarity in a way that takes into account the mutually constitutive 
nature of agency and structure. Just as in the cases of Metternich’s diplomacy discussed in 
Chapter Four and the Kissinger-Nixon notion of a multipolar balance and Nehru’s idea of an 
Indian-led non-aligned bloc of power discussed in Chapter Five, the policies of the Bush Jnr 
Administration helped create a perception of unipolarity based on action. In purely material 
terms US-power had changed little from the earlier Clinton Administration. While defence 
spending eventually rose under Bush Jnr (Korb, Conley and Rothman 2011) the United 
States had been economically and militarily in a class of its own for some time (Wohlforth 
1999). Yet with the coming to power of Bush Jnr and his close circle of Neoconservative 
advisors, with their ideas of a New American Century, we see the effect of acting like a 
unipole on perceptions of polarity.       
The language of the Bush Jnr Administration gave a clear indication of where it perceived 
the United States’ position in international society. The 2002 National Security Strategy 
talked of Washington enjoying “a position of unparalleled military strength and great 
economic and political influence”, a strength which had been used to “maintained the peace 
in some of the world’s most strategically vital regions”. (Bush Jnr 2002).  The duty placed 
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on US foreign policy by this structural condition was described by President Bush Jnr in his 
2003 State of the Union speech when he said, “As our Nation moves troops and builds 
alliances to make our world safer, we must also remember our calling as a blessed country is 
to make the world better” (Bush Jnr 2003). Importantly, while not always sharing the view 
of the United States as a benign power, public statements of other states around this time 
also confirm a unipolar perception (Vedrine quoted in BusinessWeek 2001; Rice et al. 
2005). This is important given that, as discussed in Chapter Three, a central component of 
an approach to polarity using the framework of the English school as this study does, is the 
notion that the social status of a great/superpower is not only claimed by a pole of power but 
is also conferred on them by others (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 102-3; Buzan 2008 Clark 
2011b).  
The post-September 11 years saw the notion of international society being firmly unipolar 
become dominant in much of the popular and scholarly analysis, particularly in the West. 
The position in which the United States found itself made “a mockery of earlier claims that 
America’s relative power was on the wane” (O’Neil 2006: 140) and meant that “US leaders 
were called upon to strategize in an international environment defined by their own nation’s 
primacy” (Quinn 2010: 140). Largely, the argument that the global order at the turn of the 
century was defined by the dominance of one power rested on assessments of material 
capabilities and what had by then become known as the United States’ ‘soft power’ – the 
ability to “set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others” by being 
able to “entice and attract” (Nye 2002: 9). As one account put it,  
The striking indices of American global power are familiar to all students of contemporary 
international relations: America accounts for almost one quarter of total world economic output; it 
outlays more on military spending than the next eight countries combined; and it enjoys widespread 
international influence flowing from the ubiquity of American culture and its leading role in the 
global information technology revolution (O’Neil 2006: 140). 
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The level of acceptance of the unipolar position of the United States by analysts even led to 
a debate in the academic literature about whether the term ‘empire’ was a more appropriate 
characterisation of Washington’s global role (Cox 2003; 2004; 2005; Nexon and Wright 
2007; Sterling-Folker 2008). The language of empire was not confined to the academic 
discourse with much of the post-September 11 analysis offered in the press and in books 
written for a popular, rather than scholarly, audience adopting the terminology (Bacevich 
2002; Johnson 2004; Merry 2005). While much of even the scholarly literature used the 
term to describe nothing more than that which would normally be associated with being a 
superpower or even simply one of the great powers40, there were others who argued that the 
US role in the world was qualitatively different to the powers that had come before (at least 
during the time period covered by this study).  
Yet the unipolar perception amongst policymakers and analysts was never totally dominant, 
even during the ‘war on terror’ years of the early-mid 2000s. A growing focus on China, 
and in particular the Sino-US relationship as well as a more general focus on new ‘rising 
powers’ (both discussed below) persisted throughout. By the end of that decade, and the 
beginning of the next, competing visions of the polarity of international society were being 
expressed at exactly the same time by scholars and practitioners – even by those working 
from the geopolitical perspective of the same country. 41  This again, raises the difficult 
ontological question of how polarity analysis can capture the phenomenon of which form of 
polarity actually exists when perceptions differ to such an extent. Such a challenge 
represents a far greater theoretical puzzle for IR scholars at the current time than 
                                                     
40
 For example, Martin Griffiths described the “American empire” as being based on the 
“maintenance of a particular international strategic and economic order” and felt that the term was 
appropriate given that the United States had “a unique capacity to project power internationally” 
(2006: 105). Neither of these criteria denotes anything other than the definition of superpower status 
given in Chapter Two (which Chapter Four demonstrated had been associated with the United States 
for decades before the beginning of the twenty-first century).  
41
 For a Canadian scholar’s view of the challenges of a multipolar world see Murray 2012 which can 
be juxtaposed with a Canadian-government funded project published in a policy-focused journal in 
the same year discussing Canadian foreign policy in a unipolar world (Hawes and Kirkey 2012).   
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understanding the purely mechanistic elements of a unipolar world which Waltz and other 
neorealists originally neglected. Using a traditional theoretical framework for polarity 
analysis, there is no room for the emergence of a competing narrative about the power 
structure of the world having any serious consequences on state interaction.           
The Re-emergence of a Multipolar Narrative 
By around halfway through the first decade of the twenty-first century, US-objectives in 
both Afghanistan and Iraq appeared to be beyond Washington’s ability to realise. Despite 
the apparent shift in the criteria for pole status by this stage in which economic prowess was 
given similar weighting to military might, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were clear 
demonstrations not only of US military power but also of a superpower’s confidence in its 
special rights in international society. Both military operations had been couched in terms of 
being part of an on-going ‘war on terror’ that would span the globe if it needed to. But after 
early military successes (which relatively few commentators put in their proper context 
given the debilitated state of both the Taliban and Ba’ath Party regimes’ respective 
militaries making an initial US victory entirely predictable) it soon became apparent that 
both theatres of war were becoming militarily, financially and morally taxing on the United 
States. The effect of this on perceptions of polarity again demonstrates the need for a 
theoretical framework which is attuned to both ideational and material aspects of power (as 
well as the ways the two interact). While the global leadership aspirations and confident 
unilateralism of the Bush Administration neoconservatives shaped initial perceptions of US 
power, the inability to turn capabilities and intent into desired outcomes became 
increasingly apparent (Rogers 2008). English school, Constructivist and other approaches 
have highlighted the combination of both will and capacity for the maintenance of power 
balances (Navari 2009: 51-2) which hints at the need for pluralism in this regard when it 
comes to analysing the bases of perceptions of polarity. The approach outlined in this study 
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is able to make sense of the notion that a self-perception of the US’ role as a unipole led 
Washington to act as if it existed in a unipolar world even while the material realities of the 
decreasing utility of armed force raised questions about Washington’s power elsewhere 
(Bacevich 2005; Edmunds 2006).          
The timing of the shift in collective perceptions away from unipolarity and towards 
multipolarity is difficult to pin down exactly as totally contradictory views by different 
actors (even from a roughly similar vantage point such as from mainstream ‘policy circles’ 
in leading Western states) can be observed at exactly the same time. For example a year 
before the release of the report discussed above which proposed the title of ‘megapower’ for 
the United States, Charles Kupchan had published a book-length study on “The End of the 
American Era” (2002). Christopher Layne identifies the autumn of 2007 as the point at 
which the tide began to turn amongst the members of the American foreign policy 
establishment who had until that point taken for granted “that U.S. primacy would last far 
into the future” (2009: 151). By now the like of Immanuel Wallerstein, who had been 
writing about the ‘American eagle’ having “crash landed” for some years (2002; 2003) were 
no longer lone voices.  
Again the issue of agency is central to perceptions of polarity. The idea that multipolarity 
could be actively sought and created was discussed by many (Turner 2009; Roberts 2010) 
with one of China’s most influential analysts asserting that the Chinese people “believe 
China’s decline to be a historical mistake which they should correct” (Xuetong 2001: 33). 
This is captured in the statement by the Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2002 that 
“Russia and China have always stood for the establishment of a multi-polar world” (quoted 
in Turner 2009: 166). Peter van Ham has discussed China’s increasing “discursive power”, 
most evident in the success of the ‘peaceful rise’ (a phrase coined by Zheng Bijian which 
became popular in Chinese public statements and speeches from late 2003 onwards that 
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described a pathway for China’s rise in the global hierarchy without hegemonic ambition or 
revisionist strategies) image being all pervasive in debates about China’s growing 
economic, military and political clout (2010: 40). According to van Ham, for China, 
“uploading the norm of multipolarity is a vital geopolitical goal” (Ibid) and it is largely via 
the successful use of “social power” – the ability to establish the norms and rules around 
which other actor’s actions converge – that this was achieved (8). This is echoed by Hurrell 
who despite noting the realist critique of the “empty pretensions of those states whose 
ambitions run ahead of their material capabilities”, argues that the discourse and actions of 
rising powers demonstrates that “power in international relations requires a purpose and 
project, and the cultivation of such a purpose can both galvanize national support and 
cohesion at home and serve as a power resource in its own right” (2006: 2).    
According to this line of thinking joining China and Russia at the ‘top table’ of the global 
order would be other ‘rising powers’ such as Brazil, India and in time, potentially others 
who were more clearly regional powers for the moment (See Chapter Two) such as South 
Africa, Turkey and Indonesia.  
Both Brazil and India with their impressive growth rates, large populations and relatively 
stable regimes, came under increasing global scrutiny in one what began to seem almost like 
a hunt for the ‘next great powers.’ One commentator even went so far as to describe Indian 
and Brazilian permanent seats on the UN Security Council as being among the “most 
realistic plans on the table” (Kupchan 2012: 196).  
The rise of India as a pole of power appeared to be somewhat palatable to Western powers. 
As early as 2005, the United States was expressing its desire to “to help India become a 
major world power in the 21st century” (US Department of State 2005). In 2008, the British 
Foreign Secretary, singled out India when discussing the idea of a power shift from West to 
East saying that the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office would need to “transfer its 
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resources away from Europe and towards India, Asia and the Middle East” (The Times of 
India 2008). India’s growing status appeared to be confirmed by the other leading 
‘challenger’ state in 2010 when Chinese President Wen Jiabao described the relationship 
between the two countries as being one of “partners not competitors” (quoted in Mehdudia 
2010). This followed the upgrading of the status of the Chinese ambassador to New Delhi to 
Vice-Minister earlier that year despite the fact that “It is often said that India worries far 
more about China than China does about India” (Basrur 2011: 197).   
Brazilian President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made speeches where he spoke of “a world 
each time more and more diverse and multipolar” (2010) while expanding its diplomatic 
representations around the world (Kupchan 2012: 183).  Brazilian foreign policy elites 
cultivated an image of Brazil as an important ‘third party mediator’ and broker in difficult 
negotiations from trade to climate change to nuclear proliferation. This attempt at carving a 
great power role based on a negotiating strategy characterised by restraint, accommodation 
and bridge-building helped to cast Brazil as a rising ‘status quo’ power rather than a 
revisionist one. This according to Amrita Narlikar “assisted in securing a place for Brazil at 
several of the negotiating tables. But...failed to produce the sort of attention and engagement 
that China and India inspire...” (2010: 135). This may go some way to explaining the 
outlook from Brazil itself, described by one analyst as a situation where “The Brazilian 
government and in particular the diplomats of the foreign ministry Itamaraty are aware that 
Brazil still cannot compete with the established great powers” (Flemes 2009).   
Perhaps the most stark illustration of the power of the growing narrative of a shift towards 
multipolarity was the way in which Fareed Zakaria’s phrase the “rise of the rest” from his 
2008 book The Post-American World, was picked up and repeated in both policy circles 
(Trenin 2012) and academic discourse (Nederveen Pieterse 2009).  The phrase captured the 
growing perception that the trend towards multipolarity was fast becoming a defining 
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feature of world politics. In some quarters, the use of this narrative of the inevitable shift 
towards multipolarity even began to downplay or completely ignore the idea that there had 
ever been a unipolar period after the Cold War. This was the clear impression given by the 
President of the European Parliament when he said, “We no longer live in the bipolar world 
of the two super-powers. New powers have emerged both on the political and the economic 
stage. The enlargement of the G-8 to the G-20 setting was a long over-due recognition of 
this new reality” (Schulz 2012).   
In 2012 Michael Cox even went so far as describing,  
...the new truth of the early twenty-first century that the Western world we have known is fast losing 
its pre-eminence to be replaced by a new international system shaped either by the so-called BRICs 
comprising Brazil, Russia, India and China, the ‘rest’, or more popularly by that very broadly 
defined geographical entity known as Asia (Cox 2012: 369). 
 
This ‘new truth’ raises important questions for the way we use the concept of polarity in IR 
theory. According to Cox, firstly it was fundamentally inaccurate – “an irresistible ‘power 
shift’ in the making” was for him, at least questionable – which again challenges the notion 
that polarity is simply observed and ‘known’ by the members of international society. 
Further to this, even if one still maintains a fundamentally materialist version of power (and 
therefore that the poles of power are those states with a large share of the world’s 
capabilities), he argued that this narrative of a coming multipolarity was essentially based 
on economic capabilities only. Not only this, but it was in fact based on the future 
trajectories of the ‘rising powers’ of China, India, Brazil etc. rather than their actual 
realisable capabilities today. What is important about the growth of a ‘narrative’ about 
multipolarity based on expectations about the future is that once it has become as all 
pervasive as Cox argues, the narrative can be in itself singularly influential in shaping 
perceptions of the current power structure. Such a possibility is captured theoretically by 
Buzan’s complex polarity theory formulation discussed in Chapter Two in which the 
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existence of great powers alongside superpowers makes for a more complex world. Buzan 
points out that great powers (including China which he claims has successfully done so for 
nearly a century) can trade on its “potential as well as its ability” (2004a: 70). While the 
ability to credibly back up their military and economic potential at some point in time is 
important, it is “not strictly speaking necessary so long as other powers treat them as 
potential superpowers” (ibid). The blurring of lines between the exact point a regional 
power becomes a great power or when a great power becomes a superpower should be 
expected once the poles of power are understood as being the holders of a social status 
rather than those in possession of quantifiable capabilities.    
The notion of a narrative of an imminent or event contemporary change in polarity 
demonstrate the inadequacy of traditional ways of theorising about polarity which, if 
anything, prioritise military capabilities over economic ones. But more fundamentally it 
demonstrates the need for a different way of thinking about polarity, as theoretically, given 
the objective nature of the distribution of material capabilities, this phenomenon is so 
unlikely as to not be unimportant. Our current theories predict particular effects of different 
forms of polarity (in terms of stability, conflict, alliance patterns etc.) based on the 
assumption of complete agreement as to the polarity of the day. As Cox himself points out, 
“more subtle” theories of IR (Ibid: 381) are needed to be able understand this phenomenon 
as being more than just an anomaly.      
The same tendency to emphasise agency in the debate about the rise of multipolarity and the 
related relative decline of the United States is evident in a number of books and articles 
arguing for the possibility of reversing Washington’s fortunes (Lieber 2012; Kagan 2012a). 
These interventions are clearly aimed at countering the narrative of multipolarity by 
exposing the “myth of decline” (Kagan 2012b). Such ideas appeared to have gained some 
traction by 2011/2012 within the United States as both candidates in the presidential 
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election were at pains to portray themselves as rejecting “the philosophy of decline in all of 
its variants” (Romney 2011: 11; see also Layne 2012b). This line of thinking posits that 
ideas about US decline can be viewed “as a cyclical cultural trope, indicative more of the 
United States’ domestic and intellectual frailties than of genuine material or comparative 
trends” (Quinn 2011: 804-5). Such an approach therefore allows for the opportunity to 
reverse what is essentially an ideational rather than material phenomenon. The policy advice 
of those wanting to persuade policymakers in Washington that it is not too late to reverse 
the narrative towards US decline and the creation of a multipolar order points to the 
relevance for polarity analysis of the argument of Rey Koslowski and Friedrich  Kratochwil 
that “Any given international system does not exist because of immutable structures,  but 
rather the very structures  are dependent for their reproduction  on the practices of the 
actors” (1994: 216). The practices of these actors must be understood as being singularly 
driven by their perceptions of power, not simply the objective fact of power (however it is 
defined). Therefore an English school approach to polarity encourages us to ask questions 
about where things like a multipolar narrative come from. It is only by applying this 
approach that we can uncover elements such as a perception on the part of some decision 
makers that a particular form of polarity can be created, encouraged or resisted. While 
international society, including which states and which states are not conferred with 
great/superpower status, “is not reducible to the question of agency” (Dunne 2005b: 69) it is 
fundamentally derived from the ideas and actions of practitioners (and to some extent, those 
who influence them). As one account puts it, “nothing happens in international society 
without something being done by those who act in the name of governments...” (Ibid).     
The Case of the Missing Bipolarity 
Amidst the narrative of an almost certain return of a multipolar structure to international 
society, rarely expressed in terms of polarity, another strand of thinking emerged during the 
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mid-late 2000s. For some, while power at the global level may have been becoming more 
diffuse generally, as the unipolar era appeared to be ending, it was one relationship in 
particular that would come to characterise the first quarter of the twenty-first century – the 
US-China dyad.  
By 2009, Richard Rosecrance and Wang Jisi argued that, not only were the United States 
and China “destined to be the largest and strongest powers in the international system” 
(Allison 2009: xi) but their relationship “is one of the most important in world history” 
(2009: 207). Such statements were not rare with analysts (Shambaugh 2011), diplomats 
(Huntsman 2010) and politicians (Hu cited in Washington Post 2011) alike proclaiming that 
“no bilateral relationship between major powers today would be more crucial in shaping 
global order and agenda than the one between China and the United States” (Tung 2009: xii-
xiii) and that “There is a strong perception in both Beijing and Washington that they are 
each other’s most important interlocutor on a range of crucial issues, arising as much from 
their interdependence as from the competitive nature of their relationship” (Foot and Walter 
2011:1). In this view, while international society may be going to witness the ‘rise of the 
rest’ in time, at least in the short-medium term it was the rise of one that would  dictate the 
shape of global polarity. 
The perceived importance of the US-Sino relationship was reflected in public surveys with 
one showing that in 2012, 66% of the American public and 80% in the US Government 
think of China as a competitor (Pew 2012) with 52% of the public viewing China’s 
“emergence as a world power as a major threat to the U.S.” (Ibid). This perception was not 
limited to the United States. A ‘long-term vision’ study commissioned by the European 
Defence Agency in 2006 found that “There is no doubt that the evolution of US-China 
relations will be of major importance for the future of global order. No other power 
challenges America’s global prominence...” (Gnesotto and Grevi 2006: 149). And much of 
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the commentary from Beijing was by late in the first and early in the second decade of the 
twenty-first century talking about China having assets such as a modernised military which 
could “provide ‘public products’ to the rest of the world” which would require an 
understanding in Washington that “The world...is large enough for both Chinese and US 
forces” (Yi 2011). This is confirmed by the findings of one scholar who has noted that 
Chinese IR journals are “are primarily concerned with Sino‐US relations and US politics” 
(Noesselt 2012: 15).  
The sub-set of the polarity literature discussed in Chapter Two, power transition theory, 
made a comeback in the academic literature around this time almost entirely based around 
the United States and China. This was discussed in both traditional materialist terms (Chan 
2008; May and Hong 2009; Lebow and Valentino 2009) as well as in a more Constructivist 
account of a potential hegemonic transition (Beeson 2009; Clark 2011a). The standard 
approach to power transition theory and the majority of writing on the subject in the mid-
late 2000s, presupposes a dyadic relationship between a rising and a declining power. 
Particularly when it comes to the prospects for conflict arising from a power transition, “the 
crucial moment” is in which “one hegemonic nation is surpassed by another” (Bueno de 
Mesquita 1989: 152) which led one leading power transition theorist to argue that “The 
issue at hand, therefore, is under what conditions we would expect a deterioration in U.S.-
Chinese relations over the next two decades” (Copeland 2000: 243).   
It is very important to note that the language of bipolarity was very rarely invoked despite 
the fact that the image of the two states being portrayed was that “One is at the top of the 
international hierarchy, and the other is rising to it” (Rosecrance and Jisi 2009: 207). Booth 
and Wheeler even go so far as to use the language of a ‘cold war’ arguing that “the chief 
danger is a new cold war between the United States and China, which might attain 
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superpower status within a decade or so” (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 270). Again, this quote 
implies the creation of a bipolar order but avoids using the phrase.  
This tells us something else about the role of history in perceptions of polarity. It would 
appear that the close association with the historically contingent US-Soviet cold war of the 
late 1940s to the late 1980s with the idea of bipolarity has contributed to a reluctance to 
perceive the world in strictly bipolar terms despite predictions of a two superpower world. 
Just as some appeared eager to envision a return to multipolarity after the fall of the Soviet 
Union as this was the ‘normal’ state of history, it would seem that others were reluctant to 
think in terms of bipolarity in the early twenty-first century due to the image of the anomaly 
of the bipolar structure of the Cold War years. Such a trend points towards a need for an 
understanding of polarity which is theoretically eclectic enough to be able to allow for 
questions of “how and why, in certain contexts, some agents maintain or redefine, and 
others accept or resist, existing material and ideational structures” (Katzenstein and Sil 
2010: 47). The re-definition of polarity put forward in this study allows for just this kind of 
potential given that the distribution of economic and military power is taken to be part of 
what makes up global polarity but not what determines it. If instead it is perceptions of 
power as expressed as a particular status in the society of states, then a resistance to a 
particular perception of polarity due to its historical association becomes theoretically 
possible.         
For Henry Kissinger, the decisive trend is the rise of China as an “economic superpower and 
a major factor in shaping the global political order” since the mid-1970s more than a general 
‘rise of the rest’ (2011: xiv). It is this that led him to conclude by 2011 that “The 
relationship between China and the United States has become a central element in the quest 
for world peace and global well-being” (ibid). For this reason, without using the explicit 
language of bipolarity, Kissinger too argued that the priority for leaders in Washington and 
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Beijing (but with no mention of New Delhi, Brasília, Moscow or Brussels) must be avoiding 
confrontation and building trust. Kissinger’s prescription for the maintenance of global 
security is reminiscent of Hedley Bull’s idea of great power responsibility: 
Both sides should be open to conceiving of each other’s activities as a normal part of international 
life, and not in itself as a cause for alarm. The inevitable tendency to impinge on each other should 
not be equated with a conscious drive to contain or dominate, so long as both sides can maintain the 
distinction and calibrate their actions accordingly. (Kissinger 2011: 547). 
 
This quote demonstrates three important things for this study. First, that one of the most 
influential analysts of world politics and former decision maker (particularly one whose 
time in office was spent constructing the foreign policy of a ‘pole of power’) chooses to 
stress the importance of state’s conceptions of each other’s activities tells us something 
about polarity. Rather than simply needing to accurately assess and understand the structural 
limits imposed on them by the distribution of capabilities, Kissinger allows for a degree of 
agency in that international order will derive from the way Beijing and Washington 
conceive of each other’s roles in international society. Such a position jars with the 
structural determinism of the traditional polarity literature and only makes sense if a broader 
definition of polarity is used in which status is as important as the weapons of war and 
means of production. Secondly, and building on the theoretical assumption about the 
balance between material and ideational elements of power underlying the quote, it also in 
line with an English school approach to the notion of the great powers as a social institution 
with responsibilities as well as special rights. As Bull wrote, the great powers are those 
states which  are “recognised by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and 
peoples to have, certain special rights and duties” (1977: 202) which include avoiding or at 
least containing crises and respecting each other’s spheres of influence. And finally, the idea 
that Washington and Beijing would each conceive of the other’s actions as a normal part of 
international life confirms the image of bipolarity if, as Chapter Two argued, Buzan’s 
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notion of superpowers exercising “global military and political reach” and of having a status 
of constant global importance which is “accepted by others in rhetoric and behaviour” 
(2004a: 69).  
Both the idea of China and the United States managing their strategic relations at the level 
of great/superpower peers and interacting with each other on a systemic level was treated as 
inevitable and entirely natural by those proposing an institutional ‘Group of Two’ 
(Brzezinski 2009; Economy and Segal 2009; Garrett 2010). This would not take the place of 
the existing G8 or G20 multilateral groupings but would instead sit above these at the top of 
the global hierarchy. In this sense, it would provide a structured platform for the kind of 
summits held by the United States and the Soviet Union at various times throughout the 
bipolar period of the Cold War.    
Yet despite all the pronouncements on the central importance to world order of the US-Sino 
relationship the clear articulation of a perception of bipolarity is difficult to find (for a rare, 
but qualified case, see Ikenberry 2011). This is an important point for the theoretical 
argument advanced in this thesis – that redefinition of polarity is needed which has a 
sensitivity to historical and social contingency – as the traditional polarity literature has no 
way of predicting this occurrence nor understanding its importance. It also relates directly to 
the discussion in Chapter Three of the choice of the English school as the framework for 
this study (over both thin Constructivism and neoclassical realism). This kind of factor, as 
determined by historical contingency as it is, is brought out only when one searches for a 
way of theorising about polarity, and in particular, perceptions of polarity, as determined by 
historical experience.       
The Perception of a Structureless World 
Despite the certitude of some about either the coming of multipolarity, the self-evidently 
unipolar structure, or the centrality of the US-Sino relationship for global order, a fourth 
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narrative arose in the 1990s and endured well into the new century (Roberts 2008). This was 
the idea that no clear polarity had emerged in the wake of the bipolarity of the Cold War. 
The sense of confusion was captured by William Zartman when he wrote, as late as 2009, 
that, 
The successor system is not yet evident, and attempts to order interstate relations through such 
diverse and conflicting concepts as international organization, uni- or multipolarity, transnational 
regimes, competing culture blocs, or a North-South divide remain inconclusive (2009: 2). 
 
While Zartman is making a larger point about order that goes beyond polarity (relating to 
geopolitics, multilateralism and the concept of polarization discussed in Chapter Two), 
nevertheless he is clear that in even in the inter-state hierarchy, both unipolar and multipolar 
perceptions had prevailed. This runs in direct contradiction to Waltz’s point about the 
number of poles being an “empirical question” for which one only needs to use “common 
sense” to answer (1979: 131).  
Eventually this narrative would spawn a narrative of the decline of polarity (discussed in 
Chapter Two) captured by Richard Haas’ phrase of the “age of nonpolarity” (2008). This 
sentiment was built upon by Randall Schweller (2010) who talked of moving from polarity 
to entropy, to some extent by Buzan’s notion of the United States being a “leader without 
followers” (2008) and Charles Kupchan (2012) who contended that the post-unipolar world 
“will have no center of gravity. It will be no one’s world” (5).  
However despite the seemingly novel nature of this perception of a world without the 
central direction provided by the managerial function of the great powers, the vast majority 
of this analysis actually stayed very closely to the general narrative of the ‘rise of the rest’ 
and reinforced a growing perception of imminent multipolarity (Ibid). The theoretical 
problems associated with the ‘nonpolarity’thesis discussed in Chapter Two meant that, in 
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practice, this school of thought became simply another way of describing the onset of a 
multipolar world.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has built on the analysis of the previous two historical chapters by adding the 
differing perceptions of world order that characterised the post-Cold War era. Like both 
chapters five and six, history and agency emerged as key elements in shaping perceptions of 
global polarity.  
The theoretical framework outlined in Part I was employed to focus specifically on the ways 
in which polarity was perceived by actors and how those perceptions were shaped by social 
and historical contingency. The role of history shaped the assumption that the world would 
soon return to the ‘normality’ of multipolarity in the early 1990s as well as a reluctance to 
associate a growing dyadic relationship between Washington and Beijing with the 
emergence of bipolarity in the mid-late 2000s due to its close association with the Cold War 
era.  
Ideas about the role of agency in shaping a new world order were central to perceptions of 
China, Russia  and others ‘creating’ a new multipolar world rather than simply benefiting 
from this natural structural evolution. Equally, towards the beginning of the 2010s a 
narrative of US agency being able to reverse the trend towards decline and the end of 
unipolarity became an important strand in the global discourse about power and order.  
Finally, this chapter has again demonstrated the need for dealing with complexity and 
contradiction in studying perceptions of order in international society. The period 
demonstrates, perhaps most vividly of the three periods under review in this study, that the 
way we theorise polarity and its effect on the foreign policies of states must be able to take 
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into account actors holding multiple and contradictory views of the shape of world order 
simultaneously.  
As early as 2007, the then US Defence Secretary, Robert Gates was telling reporters that 
“we are in a multipolar world now” (quoted in Hoagland 2007) and in 2010, the British 
Foreign Secretary, William Hague spoke of “increasing multipolarity” meaning that “we 
have more governments to influence and that we must become more active” (2010). 
Two years after and only a year before the Gates and Hague quotes respectively on the 
current multipolar order, one of the leading IR journals, World Politics, published a special 
issue on the importance of theorising unipolarity (Ikenberry et al. 2009). This followed a 
widely cited book by Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth that argued that “adverse 
trends for the United States will not cause a polarity shift in the near future” (2008: 34) and 
“the United States does, in fact, have an opportunity to revise the system – and, 
moreover…this opportunity will long endure” (217). In the same year Fareed Zakaria 
proclaimed that “while unipolarity continues to be a defining reality of the international 
system for now, every year it becomes weaker and other nations…grow in strength” (2008: 
218). 
And by 2011, despite the general tendency to talk, in terms of polarity, about either the 
endurance of unipolarity or the coming of multipolarity, Clark captured the way in which 
much of the popular analysis of world politics was actually focusing – without necessarily 
articulating it explicitly – on a bipolar world made up of the US and China (Rosecrance and 
Guoliang 2009) when he wrote that “In terms of power transition, the key question is 
whether China is inevitably destined to challenge America’s position” (2011a: 22).  
In other words, within a very small space of time, all three forms of polarity, uni, bi and 
multi, were being put forward as the most accurate descriptions of the structure of the global 
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hierarchy. Yet the entire literature on polarity and its effect on world politics had no way of 
accounting for such diversity of perception let alone the ways in which this might affect the 
foreign policies of states. If power was understood as the distribution of capabilities across 
the system, and polarity was an expression of which states were the best endowed in this 
regard, then disagreement should be settled by quantitative analysis. At worst, such 
disagreement should be expected to be short-lived as the behaviour of states, “shaped and 
shoved” (Waltz 1979) as it is by the structure of the international system would soon 
demonstrate which states truly had the resources at their disposal to order and manage 
international society. The introduction to the above mentioned special issue of World 
Politics summed up this issue perfectly when it argued that “To determine polarity, one has 
to examine the distribution of capabilities and identify the states whose shares of overall 
resources obviously place them into their own class...There will doubtless be times in which 
polarity cannot be determined, but now does not appear to be one of them” (Ikenberry et al 
2009: 5-6). Yet the discussion above demonstrates anything but certainty and clarity when it 
comes to the question of which states could be said to give international society its ‘essential 
skeleton’ by virtue of their strength or their status.  
The post-Cold War period under review in this chapter has demonstrated the need to move 
away from analysing polarity as understood as the sum of the material capabilities of the 
most powerful states. Instead, a new definition of polarity – as the number of states that can 
be said to hold the particular social status of great/superpower – is required to make sense of 
the differing perceptions of world order discussed above. This social status is dependent 
upon a reciprocal construction: a state’s view of itself and the view of it held by others 
(Buzan 2004a: 61). Therefore polarity only exists in as much as it is perceived by the 
members of a social system and those members could, theoretically, perceive polarity 
differently at any one time and those perceptions can change over time. 
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The English school provides an avenue for investigating the interplay of material and 
ideational forces at the structural level (of both system and society) whilst keeping a focus 
on the role of the great powers in playing a uniquely influencing role in this (Buzan: 
2004a:10). As will be discussed further in the next and final chapter, using this approach to 
re-define polarity will not only open up the theoretical space for a more nuanced analysis of 
the evolution of the social institution of the great powers but will also re-orient polarity 
analysis away from abstract theorising and towards a closer association with the way the 
term is actually used by practitioners in world politics. 
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Part III: Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
200 
 
Chapter Seven: Rethinking Polarity for the Twenty-first Century 
 
So long as humankind remains divided up into political entities claiming the ultimate right of self-
government (states)...the distribution of power among them is going to matter. 
Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers (2004a: 42) 
 
 
Ever since Carr delivered his devastating rhetorical blow against the "utopians" and claimed power 
for "realism" the discipline of international relations has tended to treat power as the exclusive 
province of realism.  
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics” (2005: 40). 
 
 
When we set power over opinion side by side with military and economic power, we have none the 
less to remember that we are dealing no longer with purely material factors, but with the thoughts 
and feelings of human beings. 
E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (1939a: 144) 
 
 
This study has argued for the continuing utility of the concept of polarity but in a way that 
requires a redefinition, not of the way the concept is used in practice, but how it is defined 
in the existing theoretical literature. In particular, this has focused on the way power is 
treated in the specific polarity analysis literature (situated within the larger body of 
neorealist work). However the argument for a redefinition outlined and tested here, has 
important consequences for the broader IR field as a whole given the all-pervasive nature of 
‘great power politics’ to almost every area within the discipline.  
This chapter returns to the theoretical question posed at the outset about whether a new 
definition of polarity could be used to redirect this area of IR theory towards a closer 
association to the way the concept is actually used in world politics. It draws together the 
ontological and epistemological conclusions from parts I and II and singles out a number of 
factors which emerge as central to understanding the factors that influence perceptions of 
power and therefore the operation of polarity in international society. This includes the role 
of historical knowledge and experience, ideas of agency and evolving conceptions of the 
utility of different forms of material power.      
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In Part I we explored the ways in which the concept of polarity is treated in IR theory and 
argued the need for a redefinition as well as outlining what this might look like using the 
theoretical framework of the English school. Chapter One made the case for returning to the 
issue of polarity at the beginning of the twenty-first century, despite the size of the existing 
literature on the subject. This was based not only on an assumption about the utility of state-
centric theories but also on the importance of practice for informing theory. It argued that 
while the concept of polarity continues to be invoked by practitioners and the analysts who 
influence them, polarity analysis will remain an important part of contemporary IR theory. It 
then situated this within not only neorealist theories of IR – the theoretical home ground of 
polarity analysis – but also the recent move to apply the insights from the critical and 
ideational ‘turns’ to the traditional ‘high politics’ subject matter of mainstream IR. In 
particular, the discussion demonstrated the need to find a way of theorising about polarity in 
a way which captures the phenomenon of breakdowns of perceptions of order. Finally 
Chapter One presented the redefinition of polarity pursued in the thesis not as the 
distribution of capabilities in the international system but instead as: The number of states 
perceived as holding the social status of great/superpower at any one time.    
Chapter Two explored the existing literature on the concept of polarity and the major 
debates about its effects on world politics. This served to highlight the inadequacies of the 
current literature in terms of capturing the complexity of the ways that states have interacted 
in history in contexts other than the mechanistic and rationalist world depicted by 
neorealists. The chapter also expanded on the previous discussion of the theoretical 
importance of perceptions of power as a key conduit for the effects of polarity in practice.     
Chapter Three took this further by outlining a theoretical framework for situating this 
redefinition within the broad project of analytical eclecticism in general and the English 
school of IR in particular. While the discussion found much to engage with from both the 
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thin Constructivist and neoclassical realist literatures, it found that it is ultimately the 
English school which offers an understanding of the great/superpowers as a social 
institution that is therefore perceived in a social and historical context by the members of 
international society. This is not the way in which the concept is normally depicted by 
neorealism which posits that polarity is simply the sum of the distribution of material 
capabilities in the international system. Therefore, in this position, polarity is not perceived 
it simply exists in an objective sense and is merely assessed and understood by the units 
within the system. Chapter Three argued that the English school offers a less parsimonious 
but far richer account of the hierarchy of power that has existed between states in history. It 
was argued that this body of literature offers an analytically eclectic approach to polarity a 
set of theoretical concepts (international society, primary institutions etc.) and a language 
for thinking about the units of analysis in polarity theory in a way that goes beyond the 
reductionism of realist notions of power. The discussion of what an English school version 
of polarity would look like involved clarifying the ontological position in relation to the 
traditional distinction found in English school writing between an international system and 
an international society as well as the methods by which perceptions of polarity can be 
analysed.   
Part II moved the discussion from the theoretical to the historical in order to illustrate the 
need for a new definition of polarity as well as the utility of the particular definition 
advanced here. Each of the chapters covered a period of history between 1815-2012 which 
is generally thought of as being uniformly either multi, bi or unipolar. Instead, by applying 
the lens of an English school understanding of polarity, the analysis showed how 
perceptions of both decision makers and analysts have often diverged from the narrative 
given in post-hoc analysis. Periods which are said to be clearly multi, bi or unipolar 
emerged instead as being far more fragile in terms of the collective perceptions of the 
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members of international society, than the standard accounts depict. This is important, as 
Part I argued for the need to take the perceptions of the members of international society at 
the time as the ontological and epistemological starting point of any understanding of 
polarity and its effects.  
The remainder of this chapter will reflect further on the major findings from the historical 
analysis in the previous three chapters and their lessons for polarity analysis into the future. 
This includes the ontological and epistemological implications of redefining polarity in this 
way as well as a number of specific conclusions about the role of historical legacies in 
shaping perceptions of power and the agent-structure problem in IR.     
Ontological Conclusions 
The analysis presented in this study leads us towards the conclusion that polarity, as defined 
as the number of great/superpowers that exist at any one time, only exists in as much as it 
exists in the minds of actors. The analysis in chapters four to six show that perceptions of 
power have been instrumental to the way polarity has structured interstate relations and 
therefore a purely materialist account of the global power structure is unable to capture the 
ontological foundations of polarity.    
This is not to say that ‘actual’ polarity that exists ‘out there in the real world’ (as 
philosophical realists would have it), measured in purely material terms, does not 
dramatically affect inter-state relations. For example, if the majority of actors in a system 
treat one particular state as a unipole, looking to it to hold special responsibilities, when its 
material capabilities do not easily facilitate such a role, then the impact of this disjuncture 
between expectation based on social status and the reality based on material capabilities is 
likely to be extremely important. What is important to note here is that without adopting the 
theoretical approach to polarity analysis outlined in this thesis, this distinction would not 
even register as a possibility. If polarity is to be simply the top layer of the sum of material 
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capabilities possessed by states as it is in traditional polarity analysis, then not only would 
there be no way of dealing theoretically with such a mismatch between perception and 
reality, there would in fact be no room for perception as a factor at all. To put it simply, 
polarity would not be perceived, polarity would just be.       
Instead the approach taken here focuses specifically on the poles of power which make up 
any polarity system as being the holders of a particular historically defined social status. 
Therefore this opens up much more theoretical ground for transitions in polarity to be more 
complex and perhaps more important than even the existing power transition literature 
would posit.  
The main ontological conclusion from this study, that polarity as defined as the number of 
great/superpowers that exist at any one time, exists in as much as it exists in the minds of 
decision makers presents somewhat of a challenge to the classical English school literature. 
As Steve Smith has noted, “there is a real tension in Bull’s...work between order as 
observable and order as construction” (1999: 103). As Part I discussed, the traditional 
distinction between an international system and an international society, while being a 
useful conceptual device, allows neorealism to monopolise polarity analysis within its 
purely systemic and physical ontology. This is also reflected in a number of English school-
inspired attempts within the thin Constructivist literature to plot an alternative to realist 
understandings of structural power. Guzzini (1993) for example, has argued that power 
analysis can be divided into the ‘dyads’ of either agent capacity or structural ‘governance.’ 
This, according to Berenskoetter, still abandons the relational aspect of power in a “poles 
first and relations after” approach (2007: 15). In contrast, the conclusion reached in this 
study is that structural power and therefore the different forms of polarity that exist at any 
one time, must be thought of as a product of (and a key element in producing) international 
society. In this sense, polarity, rather than being an objective phenomenon with 
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characteristics than transcend history, “only exists in interaction” (Ibid; Blau 1964), and 
therefore must be studied in historical and social context.  
Epistemological Conclusions  
One of the central conclusions of this study is that the complexity of the social realm must 
be part of any understanding of the concept of polarity. Therefore simple and parsimonious 
approaches to power that reduce international structure to control over resources and the 
possession of capabilities simply cannot provide a sufficient basis. Ted Hopf reminds us 
that, like power, “identities are always relational” (2002: 7) which means that the only 
method for analysing great power politics in all its complexity is to interrogate diplomatic 
history. Only then can our theoretical approach to polarity be deduced directly from the 
socially and historically contingent examples of great power status being claimed and 
conferred.     
This approach should not necessarily replace quantitative studies of the distribution of 
material capabilities over space and time but would complement such scholarship by adding 
the missing dimension of social interaction between the members of international society. 
The need for this has perhaps been taken more seriously by practitioners than it has been by 
scholars. Yet some scholars have factored this into their analysis of foreign policy analysis 
without going further to take this insight ‘all the way up’ to structural analysis. This does 
not mean that one must go as far as Felix Gilbert who observed, 
Diplomats are not schooled to base their opinions and recommendations on an intensive 
study and expert knowledge of economic developments and military budgets; they gauge the 
trend of future policy from an analysis of public opinion as it is expressed in newspapers, in 
political meetings, and in conversations with the various political personalities with whom 
they must keep in contact (quoted in Jervis 1970: 42).        
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Quantitative analysis of the relative distribution of material capabilities is still an important 
element in polarity analysis, but only in as much as it can be shown to directly influence 
perceptions of polarity. Polarity itself cannot simply be reduced to these material factors.   
The preceding analysis has shown that to understand the way that polarity actually shapes 
the behavioural patterns (Ikenberry et al 2009) of states, an approach must be taken in 
which contemporary perceptions are privileged over post-hoc analysis. An approach which 
looks back at shifts in polarity in history and tries to deduce the effect on state interactions 
will miss the full effects of polarity as discussed in the previous three chapters. What might 
be thought of as an epistemological ‘hindsight bias’ (which derives directly from a 
materialist conception of power) is evident throughout the existing literature. For example, a 
recent article discussing the benchmark dates used by the discipline to order the way world 
politics is conceived, studied and taught has noted that “Research on balancing is supported 
by benchmark dates such as 1945 and 1989, with the system undergoing a shift from 
multipolarity to bipolarity after 1945, and from bipolarity to unipolarity after 1989” (Buzan 
and Lawson 2012: 7). The use of benchmark dates based around shifts in polarity not only 
helps shape the way we think about international history but it also reinforces a particular 
view of polarity – that it fundamentally affects world politics when major power transitions 
occur which we can observe after the fact whether or not they were perceived at the time.    
The epistemological and methodological conclusions that arise from this study go beyond 
the body of literature in which it is situated (outlined in Chapters One and Two). A clear 
implication from the effectiveness of an eclectic theoretical approach to polarity 
demonstrated in the previous pages is that other schools of thought outside of the traditional 
realist domain of polarity analysis can and should engage with the concept of polarity. The 
opening up of the theoretical space around the question of the number of great/superpowers 
in existence that this study has argued for may even invite more radical epistemological 
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approaches in this area such as the growing literature on the logic of practicality in IR 
(Neumann 2002; Adler 2005b; Pouliot 2010; Adler and Pouliot 2011). The work that 
Vincent Pouliot describes as focusing more on practical knowledge (the inarticulate, 
experientially learned kind) rather than representational knowledge (the conscious, reflexive 
and observational kind) discussed in this study, could potentially push the analysis of an 
essentially socially constructed concept of polarity even further (Pouliot 2010: 14-31). 
Although this would involve the significant downside of diverging even further from 
rationalist approaches to power most closely associated with polarity analysis and power 
transition theory and therefore likely detract from rather than add to the larger project of 
analytic eclecticism in which this study is purposely couched.        
It also suggests that, beyond the traditional area of engagement between the psychology and 
FPA literatures, a further engagement between structural approaches to IR and social 
psychology is needed. This will open up the space for trying to understand the complexity 
of questions around, for example why “beliefs tend to persevere even when the initial 
evidence on which they were based has been discredited (Kunda 1999: 99). The way in 
which IR has essentially left theorising about polarity and its effects to one section of the 
scholarly community (with the ontological and epistemological biases that any one camp of 
theorists tend to hold) has effectively shut-off this engagement. At a time of perceptual 
transition and cognitive dissonance in relation to the polarity of international society, 
questions of judgement under conditions of uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), 
biases in social perception (Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz 1977) and perceptual readiness 
(Bruner 1957) can all help understand the dynamics of how power transitions work. A 
deeper engagement between IR theorists and social psychologists promises to push the kind 
of analysis presented in the previous chapters even further. Given the period of cognitive 
208 
 
dissonance in relation to the polarity of intentional society in which Chapter Six 
demonstrated we are still in the midst of, such an engagement could not be more timely.        
History  
The role of history, experience and memory in shaping perceptions of polarity is consistent 
with cognitive explanations of causality found in social psychology that argue that “both 
formative experiences and recent, vivid experiences shape individual’s causal beliefs and 
their view of other actors” (Bennett 2003: 191; and Nisbett and Ross 1980). They not only 
shape the ideas about the world but these ideas about the world in turn influence their 
actions. Of course, these ideas need not be totally explicit and conscious, as one account 
puts it, “Decision-making in systems as complex as the international system inevitably 
requires the operation of the unconscious as well as the conscious mind” (Boulding 1967: 
14). The repeated examples from the previous three chapters that point to the importance of 
ideas about which states have and have not been thought of as great powers historically in 
shaping perceptions of power reinforces the notion that simply analysing the distribution of 
capabilities is insufficient for understanding polarity. An ahistorical approach to polarity 
analysis is not only theoretically questionable but the empirical evidence suggests that it is 
clearly only capturing part of the story.   
This provides a direct challenge to the existing literature on polarity which due to its largely 
rationalist and behaviouralist underpinnings, has sought to “identify laws that are immune to 
historical variation” (Buzan and Little 2000: 19). In the way in which polarity is redefined 
here, not only does history become important to the basis of the theory (ie. our predictions 
about the effect of different forms of polarity or power transitions become less reliant on 
logics of economic competition), but should also be expected to play an important role in 
shaping perceptions of power. Perceptions of anything are always, at least to some extent, 
products of experience. Therefore there is no theoretical reason why we should expect this 
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to be any different when it comes to perceptions of polarity and this has been borne-out in 
the preceding chapters. Ideas about which states have an historical claim to the special rights 
and responsibilities of the great powers (Bukovansy et al. 24-34) has been of fundamental 
importance to how polarity is perceived and this should be expected to continue to be the 
case into the future. Also the historical association of certain periods with particular forms 
of polarity (the Nineteenth Century Concert of Europe with multipolarity, the US-Soviet 
Cold War with bipolarity etc.) should also be expected to shape perceptions of current or 
future order. In the final analysis, history becomes not simply hostage to fluctuations of 
polarity over the years but an important factor in shaping those fluctuations in the form of 
perceptions of polarity. Such a conclusion does not simply arise from applying the insights 
of polarity analysis to a wider time period than is the case in the standard literature. Instead 
it requires a redefinition of polarity itself with a greater focus on what exactly its main unit 
of analysis – the poles of power – have actually been in history, the possessors of military 
and economic might or something more than this? Without re-thinking the definition of 
polarity itself, not only is such a question difficult to answer but more importantly, it is 
unlikely to be asked.        
Structure and Agency 
If structure is conceived as both social and material forces, the cognitive structures used by 
actors trying to navigate the complexity of world politics should be expected to be evident 
in the words and actions of important actors in history. Chapters Four to Six have 
demonstrated that, perceptions of order have often been expressed in terms of polarity (even 
if not always explicitly using the language of multi, bi and unipolarity) in which a clear 
assumption is made that the number of major powers in existence will affect world politics. 
As Hopf has argued, “A social cognitive structure establishes the boundaries of discourse 
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within a society, including how individuals commonly think about themselves and others” 
(2002:6).  
Yet not only do perceptions of the inter-state order shape the way actors perceive the limits 
of their potential action, but ideas about agency also shape perceptions of the power 
structure itself. The idea that Churchill’s return to leadership in post war Britain or Nehru’s 
conception of India as a major power based on its leadership of the NAM or the arguments 
put forward about reversing US decline through domestic innovation and renewed 
confidence could affect the respective state’s position in the global order all point to the 
strength of notions of agency as being able to shape structure. This reminds us that while 
focusing on structural power remains theoretically valid, we must be constantly vigilant 
against this descending into determinism.     
Of course, the neorealist reply to this finding about the importance of agency in shaping 
perceptions of polarity would be that Waltz himself admitted that “With skill and 
determination structural constraints can sometimes be countered. Virtuosos transcend the 
limits of their instruments and break the constraints of systems that bind lesser performers” 
(1985: 344). However, such an argument still only captures part of that which is advanced in 
this thesis. By ignoring the social components of a global power structure, this line of 
thinking still conceives of the structure as being purely material and its impact on state 
interactions as being purely mechanistic. Therefore there is still a ‘real’ polarity (defined as 
the distribution on material capabilities) in existence ‘out there’ which is being resisted by a 
state. In this sense, while agency can be defined by both material and ideational attributes, 
structures are still fundamentally material. What is more, these material structures can be 
expected to override any short-term gains made by agents in the final analysis (Waltz 1985: 
331; see Chapter One, note 3 in this study). It is still from the “dynamics of the system” that 
we can “infer general properties of behavior” (Waltz 1985: 344). The standard treatment of 
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polarity within its traditional home of neorealism would still hold that while “specific 
outcomes” may be difficult to predict (such as agents resisting the constraints of material 
structure by perceiving a polarity that is different to that which a quantitative analysis would 
point to), “if our theory is good, we will see the kind of behavior and record the range of 
outcomes the theory leads us to expect” (ibid). In other words, on the whole, the polarity of 
the system will still induce the kind of balancing, bandwagoning, chain-ganging and buck-
passing behaviour that neorealism would predict despite minor deviations from time to time. 
This defence of the neorealist position, of which even English school and other 
constructivist theorists risk deferring to if the system/society divide is rigidly adhered to in 
practice (see Chapter Three), still presumes that polarity is something that ‘is’ rather than ‘is 
perceived’ and therefore prioritises structure over agency to the point of determinism. As 
Part II of this study has demonstrated, this simply leaves too many questions unanswered 
when applied to the diplomatic history of the last two hundred years as to be unpersuasive. 
An analytically eclectic approach to polarity must explicitly engage with both structure-
oriented and agency-oriented approaches, or as Martin Hollis and Steve Smith would put it, 
those attempting to ‘explain’ from the outside and those opting to ‘understand’ from the 
inside (1990; 1994). A complete and operational version of polarity must be able to “lead us 
to expect” the kind of contrasting and contradictory understandings of the shape of the 
global order found in the analysis of chapters Four to Six (and anticipate their effects on the 
“range of outcomes” expected by the theory).  
The only way to do this is to adopt an analytically eclectic approach to theory, including to 
the methods normally associated with different levels of analysis in IR. If international 
society is the product of the conscious actions of decision makers, this means that the third 
and second levels/images are by definition mutually constitutive. It is the perceptions of 
actors that create structures such as polarity and it is those structures that in turn enable 
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certain policy choices while constraining the ability to pursue others. Only by interrogating 
both can we hope to fully understand the workings of either. To put it more directly, without 
knowing how agents perceive a structure, it is difficult to know whether our theories of how 
that structure is likely to ‘shape and shove’ actually play out in practice. But without 
keeping a focus on the structure as a whole, our analysis is unable to generalise about these 
perceptions and their effect outside of any one case study. Again, somewhat surprisingly, 
we can turn back to Waltz for guidance. In the final lines of Man, the State and War, Waltz 
reminds us that, 
The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second 
images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second 
images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to 
assess their importance or predict their results (1959: 238).   
 
While this approach lacks the parsimony and the simple hypotheses generated by pure 
structuralism, the main argument of this study is that for the concept of polarity to have any 
claim to capturing an element of international praxis, a more flexible approach to the 
structure-agency question is unavoidable. If the choice is between parsimony and practical 
relevance, the latter must surely take precedence for scholars of order in world politics.  
Power 
From the outset of the historical period analysed in this study, it is impossible to empirically 
reduce power to the possession of attributes. Chapter Four discussed the establishment of 
the Concert of Europe and its role in shaping perceptions of polarity by establishing a clear 
division between great and non-great powers. While the Concert was conceived as a 
practical response to war and inter-state conflict giving the major powers of Europe (ie. the 
major protagonists in Europe’s wars) a regular mechanism for seeking diplomatic solutions 
to crises, its operation also helped create the social institution of the great powers. This went 
beyond constraining the application of material brute force. As William Daugherty has 
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written, “the great powers consciously assumed roles: along with the right to impose their 
collective will on themselves and other European states, they took on the responsibility for 
preserving international order” (1993: 78 emphasis in original). Rights and responsibilities 
simply do not exist, at least not in a theoretically coherent sense, in an analysis of structural 
power that remains in the systemic realm.   
But more than just suggesting that power cannot be reduced to material capabilities, the 
historical analysis has confirmed what many scholars are now suggesting, that different 
capabilities take on different meanings as time moves on. An historically focused analysis 
suggests that it is not possible to equate power and status with the same resources at the 
disposal of states throughout history. As one account puts it persuasively in relation to the 
current situation, “To an unprecedented degree, the major powers now need one another to 
grow their economies, and they are loath to jeopardize this interdependence by allowing 
traditional military and strategic competitions to escalate into wars” (Gelb 2010: 37). This 
means that polarity analysis, if it is to be able to capture the way that the great/superpowers 
are actually perceived, must be attuned to changes in the nature of power itself. More than 
this, our analytical approaches must expect power to be something that is subject to change 
over time and in different social circumstances. It is difficult to see how by not adopting the 
approach outlined here, and instead maintaining a traditional neorealist understanding of 
polarity, that this can be done. While this thesis has focused more on tracing divergences in 
perceptions of polarity than following this ‘all the way down’ to analysing in great detail the 
exact sources of perceptual change on the part of different actors, such work clearly stands 
out as the next stage in this research programme. However the important point to note for 
this study is, that without making the theoretical moves in which perceptions of polarity 
become the central variable in explaining the effect of polarity and changes in polarity in 
world politics, such work lacks a theoretical basis for which to provide anything other than 
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highly specific discussions of different sectors or issue areas. While it may be true that 
“Different domains of world politics have different structures” (Bukovansky et al 2012: 74), 
the appeal of polarity analysis is that it captures an important feature of the whole rather 
than explaining how power operates separately in all parts of international life. Therefore 
polarity analysis needs both more flexibility and more holism in its theoretical 
underpinnings to be able to factor in the changing nature of power over time. An 
analytically eclectic approach which reconfigures polarity by maintaining the neorealist 
assumption that system (or in this case society) wide pressures remain of fundamental 
importance provides a more fruitful avenue than taking polarity analysis ‘all the way’ to the 
critical end of reflexivism. An approach to polarity as an element of international society 
can be contrasted with postmodern theories which, “inevitably devolve into a study of 
conflicts from within their local, contingent and historicised locations, because 
postmodernists operate on the assumption that there is no universal rationality that can 
uniformly comprehend and evaluate the entirety of global politics” (Sterling-Folker and 
Shinko 2007: 261). While the analysis here has attempted to correct the historical and social 
blind spots of neorealist polarity analysis, it is precisely the conclusions about the 
importance of historical ideas about what the great powers are (as a social institution) that 
require a universalist conception of order. Within the framework of international society as 
both a theoretical construct and expression of actual historical practice, one can find a 
middle ground in which to analyse polarity as a recurrent phenomenon shaped by the 
contingency of actor’s perceptions. Not only does this approach help ‘rescue’ polarity 
analysis from neorealism, but it also brings structural power ‘back in’ to the English school 
in a way which is compatible with its key ontological assumptions. Future research in this 
area can build on this by thinking through the implications on other major debates within the 
English school, for example about the impact of a move towards a world society (or in the 
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framework used here, the increasing dominance of world society along the international 
system-international society-world society spectrum), of a closer engagement with the 
polarity analysis literature.                    
Polarity Analysis, World Politics and Academic IR 
Part I of this thesis argued that while the concept of polarity is used by practitioners in world 
politics, IR theory will need some way of understanding its effect on the interactions of 
states. If Douglas Lemke is right in arguing that, “If one were to understand the present and 
predict the future based on extrapolations of a pre- existing theory, one should select a 
theory that accounts well for the events of the past” (1997: 24), then polarity analysis must 
be able to account for the historical cases of cognitive dissonance in relation to perceptions 
of polarity identified throughout Part II. The arguments made by Cox (2012), discussed in 
Chapter Six about the need to question the current ‘multipolar narrative’ are centrally 
important to the conclusions that we should draw from the analysis in this thesis about the 
future of polarity analysis and its impact on policymaking. Cox argues forcefully that, 
...too much of what has become the new mantra predicting an almost inevitable revolution in world 
politics, with one part of world declining and another rising, is based on the altogether questionable 
notion that we can easily know what the world and the world economy is going to look like in 5, 10, 
15 or nearly 50 years time. We need to be a bit more circumspect. After all, only a few years before 
the end of the Cold War, it was predicted that the USSR would remain the same – and it did not 
(2012: 381). 
 
Cox’s point may be sound; it is true that there is very little evidence that economic 
projections alone are a reliable guide to the future shape of international society in terms of 
its power hierarchy. However, it does obscure a fundamentally important point. Unless the 
majority of the members of international society accept his and others’ arguments about 
taking stock and not letting the narrative overtake the reality, it will soon become reality. To 
put it simply, if decision makers believe they are now in a multipolar world, and in turn act 
as if they are in a world with multiple centres of power, for all intents and purposes the 
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world will be multipolar. If the theoretical framework with its ontological argument about 
the existence of polarity in a social context is accepted then such a trend should not be 
unexpected. Once the theoretical move is made to redefine polarity as the number of states 
that hold a particular social status, then the idea that polarity will not be uniformly assessed 
and understood becomes possible. The historical analysis in Part II of this thesis suggests 
that in fact this cognitive dissonance in relation to the polarity of international society is not 
only possible but likely in the future.     
While one should not read this as a conclusion from the previous chapters as saying that no 
attention should be given to material indices which can be quantified and assessed with 
some degree of objectivity, the fundamental picture that emerges from a redefined concept 
of polarity is that perceptions matter most. Therefore, while a narrative of a particular 
change in polarity may be inaccurate in relation to the distribution of material capabilities, 
this does not mean that it is inaccurate in describing how most members of international 
society understand their world. In this sense, continuing to engage in polarity analysis will 
remain important for the foreseeable future but we must find ways of doing so that engage 
with the experience and therefore the perceptions of actors rather than simply relying on 
abstract structural theories.    
This thesis has raised serious questions about the standard polarity analysis literature and its 
ability to fully account for great power politics ‘out there in the real world.’ The idea that 
structural power can be analysed in a purely systemic/mechanistic sense using objective and 
quantitative methodologies has been shown to be theoretically problematic and empirically 
disputable. But it has also put forward an alternative theoretical framework for 
reconfiguring polarity analysis under the broad rubric of analytical eclecticism and the 
specific understanding of the great powers as a social institution found in the English 
school. Setting out what a reconfigured version of polarity could look like and also the way 
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in which this brings out a different diplomatic history of the last two hundred years, 
demonstrates that allowing one theoretical tradition to monopolise polarity analysis has been 
a mistake. IR theorists (not simply those working within the English school tradition used 
here) can and should return to some of the central questions of the structural effects of 
different forms of polarity but in ways which are not constrained by materialism and 
parsimony. The next step will be to take this broad theoretical move and drill down further 
into the implications for policymaking in a world in which ones own perception of the inter-
state order may not be shared by other important actors within international society. Issues 
around how to construct multilateral institutions, conflict resolution mechanisms and even 
individual foreign policy strategies and objectives in ways which can maximise the order 
provided by the managerial role of the great/superpowers, even in times of perceptual 
discord in relation to polarity, will all require the attention of scholars.       
The central contribution of this thesis is the attempt to find a way of theorising about 
polarity which is directly related to the way the concept is used in practice. It has redefined 
polarity away from a simple understanding of the distribution of material capabilities to a 
more nuanced conception of the number of states holding a particular status in international 
society. By combining the neorealist notion of counting the poles of power of the inter-state 
system with the English school understanding of the social institution of the 
great/superpowers in international society we can hope to make sense of the future of the 
global hierarchy of states in all its complexity.     
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